Summary
kin-openapi: Unauthenticated panic (DoS) in openapi3filter legacy router via non-canonical/unsupported HTTP method on a static path
The openapi3filter.ValidationHandler (the exported, documented request-validation middleware) hard-wires the legacy router (routers/legacy). That router matches the incoming request method verbatim against a trie built exclusively from upper-cased canonical HTTP methods. A request carrying a method token that is not one of the 9 standard methods, a legitimate-but-unsupported token such as PROPFIND, or a non-canonical case variant such as lowercase get, misses the trie, leaves route == nil, and for an existing static path falls through to PathItem.GetOperation(method), whose default: case calls panic(...). The panic fires inside route resolution, before any authentication runs. This is an unauthenticated, remotely triggerable denial of service (recovered per-connection panic + unbounded error-log growth).
Root Cause
openapi3filter/validation_handler.go:39,ValidationHandler.Load()always constructslegacyrouter.NewRouter(doc); there is no alternative router option on this path.routers/legacy/router.go:109, the request method is used verbatim (method, url := req.Method, ...); there is no canonicalization or rejection of unknown method tokens.routers/legacy/router.go:69-70, the trie is populated withstrings.ToUpper(method)keys taken frompathItem.Operations()(canonicalhttp.Method*constants only).routers/legacy/router.go:141,root.Match(method + " " + remainingPath)misses for a non-canonical/unsupported method →route == nil.routers/legacy/router.go:146-150, in theroute == nilblock,doc.Paths.Value(path)returns non-nil for an existing static path, and control reachespathItem.GetOperation(method).openapi3/path_item.go:174,GetOperation'sswitch methodhas no matching case →default: panic(fmt.Errorf("unsupported HTTP method %q", method)).
Proof of Concept
Serve any spec with a static path (e.g. /ping) behind openapi3filter.ValidationHandler, then:
printf 'PROPFIND /ping HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n' | nc target 8080 # connection aborted (panic)
printf 'get /ping HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n' | nc target 8080 # connection aborted (panic)
printf 'GET /ping HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n' | nc target 8080 # 200 OK (process survived)
Reproduced end-to-end against a real net/http.Server + ValidationHandler: PROPFIND /ping and lowercase get /ping both abort the connection with a panic at path_item.go:174 (stack: GetOperation <- legacy.FindRoute router.go:150 <- ValidationHandler.validateRequest validation_handler.go:84); the process stays alive and subsequent GET /ping returns 200.
Attack Chain
- Entry: unauthenticated
PROPFIND /ping HTTP/1.1(any known static path). Guard: net/http method validation. Bypass proof: net/http accepts any valid HTTP token as a method,PROPFINDand lowercasegetboth reach the handler. - Route match:
legacy/router.go:141root.Match("PROPFIND /ping"). Guard: trie match. Bypass proof: trie holds only upper-cased canonical methods → miss →route == nil. route == nilblock:router.go:146doc.Paths.Value("/ping")→ non-nil for an existing static path (exact map lookup). Guard:pathItem == nilcheck (l.147). Bypass proof: static path exists → not nil → proceeds.- Sink:
router.go:150pathItem.GetOperation("PROPFIND")→path_item.go:174default: panic(...). - Impact: handler goroutine panics; net/http recovers per connection; request never reaches auth.
Bypass Evidence
- net/http does NOT reject non-standard method tokens, confirmed empirically:
PROPFINDand lowercasegetboth reached the handler and panicked. - No canonicalization/rejection exists between
FindRouteentry andGetOperation;req.Methodis used verbatim (router.go:109). git show v0.144.0:openapi3/path_item.goshowspanic(...)at line 174;git show v0.144.0:routers/legacy/router.goshows verbatim method use and the unguardedGetOperationcall.git log v0.144.0..HEADon these files is empty (no post-tag fix).
Scoping Note
The panic requires the request path to be an exact static (non-templated) key in the served spec. A concrete path against a /{id} template returns a clean 500 (not a panic), because Paths.Value is an exact map lookup. Static paths (/health, /login, /version, /metrics, /ping, /) are ubiquitous in real specs and discoverable from public specs/standard endpoints, so a vulnerable target almost always exists. This makes the finding arguably broader than existing panic advisories, as it needs no special spec construct, any static path suffices.
Affected Versions
<= 0.144.0 (present on the latest release tag v0.144.0; long-standing; no patched version).
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker sends a single request with a non-standard HTTP method token to any existing static path. The handler goroutine panics; Go's net/http recovers the panic per connection (process survives), aborts the connection (client sees a reset / 500), and logs a full stack trace. Repeated requests cause connection churn and unbounded http: panic serving log growth, and the request never reaches authentication. Availability impact (A:L) under the default synchronous ValidationHandler middleware; on non-net/http hosts or when reached on an application goroutine the ceiling is a full crash.
The application does not adequately validate input before processing it, allowing unexpected values to reach sensitive code paths. Typical impact: varies by context: data corruption, logic bypass, or denial of service.
CVE-2026-100347 has a CVSS score of 5.3 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (0.145.0); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
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Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
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In the legacy router, canonicalize/validate the request method before route resolution and return ErrMethodNotAllowed/ErrPathNotFound for unknown methods, or make PathItem.GetOperation return an error (nil) for unrecognized methods instead of calling panic.
Reported by zx (Jace), GitHub: @manus-use
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-100347? CVE-2026-100347 is a medium-severity improper input validation vulnerability in github.com/getkin/kin-openapi (go), affecting versions <= 0.144.0. It is fixed in 0.145.0. The application does not adequately validate input before processing it, allowing unexpected values to reach sensitive code paths.
- How severe is CVE-2026-100347? CVE-2026-100347 has a CVSS score of 5.3 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of github.com/getkin/kin-openapi are affected by CVE-2026-100347? github.com/getkin/kin-openapi (go) versions <= 0.144.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-100347? Yes. CVE-2026-100347 is fixed in 0.145.0. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-100347 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-100347 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-100347 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-100347? Upgrade
github.com/getkin/kin-openapito 0.145.0 or later.