Summary
AsyncHttpClient: Replay to a different host sends the original host request and credentials to the new host
Affected versions
- 3.x: up to and including 3.0.12
- 2.x: up to and including 2.16.0
Both lines are affected identically. This is long-standing behaviour, not a recent regression.
Workarounds
Do not use a ResponseFilter that replays to a different host, and disable request retries, if the client is configured with credentials or used through a proxy. Replaying to the same host is not affected.
Details
NettyRequestSender.newNettyRequestAndResponseFuture calls setCurrentRequest without setTargetRequest, and replayRequest does not move the target either. The stale target is then read by the pool key derivation in NettyResponseFuture, by ConnectSuccessInterceptor when it writes the tunnelled request, by the realm selection in NettyRequestSender, and by NettyConnectListener when it decides whether to install an SSL handler.
Existing replay tests do not cover this, because all of them replay to the same host.
Impact
When a request is replayed onto a different host, the client updates only the current request and leaves the target request pointing at the original host. Four consumers read that stale value, and each one sends the first host's request, credentials, or both to the second host.
A replay happens through documented, ordinary features: a ResponseFilter that returns a different request, which is the supported failover pattern, and the IOException retry path. The attacker does not need to induce the replay; an application that uses failover produces it by design.
- The socket to host B is filed in the connection pool under host A's key. A later request the application addresses to A is served over the connection to B, and A's
Authorizationheader goes to B. - Over a CONNECT tunnel, the client tunnels to B and negotiates TLS with B correctly, then writes A's request into that tunnel. B receives A's path, A's
Host, and A'sAuthorization. TLS does not protect against this, because the handshake really is with B, so no certificate mismatch occurs. - The replay reuses the original realm, so A's credentials are regenerated onto a replay request that carries no realm of its own. The cross-origin redirect path strips realms for exactly this reason; the replay path never did.
- The stale value also decides whether TLS is used at all. When the original request was
http://and the replay ishttps://, no SSL handler is installed and the replayed request, credentials included, is written in cleartext.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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Fixed in 3.0.13 on the 3.x line and in 2.16.1 on the 2.x line. The target request now moves when a request is replayed, and the proxy moves with it: the proxy is part of the connection pool key, so correcting only the host would convert a harmless pool miss into a hit and route a proxied connection to a direct request.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-107282? CVE-2026-107282 is a critical-severity security vulnerability in org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client (maven), affecting versions >= 3.0.0, <= 3.0.12. It is fixed in 3.0.13, 2.16.1.
- Which versions of org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client are affected by CVE-2026-107282? org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client (maven) versions >= 3.0.0, <= 3.0.12 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-107282? Yes. CVE-2026-107282 is fixed in 3.0.13, 2.16.1. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-107282 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-107282 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-107282 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-107282?
- Upgrade
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-clientto 3.0.13 or later - Upgrade
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-clientto 2.16.1 or later
- Upgrade