CVE-2026-114129

FlexAssembler, the custom-container assembler shipped in the stream-json package (src/core/utils/flex-assembler.js, re-exported at stream-json/utils/flex-assembler.js and stream-json/web/utils/flex-assembler.js), compiles a string or RegExp path filter into a matcher that runs keyStack.join(separator) on every container start. Because the key stack grows one entry per open object or array with no depth bound, a JSON document nested to depth D drives D container-start tokens that each perform an O(D) join, for O(D^2) total CPU on the single-threaded event loop. An unauthenticated party who can supply JSON bytes to a pipeline that uses a FlexAssembler with a string or RegExp rule filter can stall the process with a small input: roughly 96 KB (depth 16000) blocks the event loop for over a second, and the cost grows quadratically.

Root Cause

FlexAssembler reconstructs JavaScript values from the parser token stream and supports custom containers selected by path-matching rules. When a rule filter is a string or RegExp, compileFilter returns a matcher that computes the joined path from the full key stack before making any match decision. That join is O(current depth), and it is invoked unconditionally for every rule on every container start. The key stack that feeds the join has no depth cap. The package does have a depth guard (maxDepth), but it exists only in the unrelated filter base state machine and never executes on the FlexAssembler code path, so nested input is unbounded here.

src/core/utils/flex-assembler.js
  compileFilter (lines 5-21): string branch computes `path.join(separator)` (line 10)
    before the `=== filter || startsWith(...)` comparison; RegExp branch computes
    `filter.test(path.join(separator))` (line 17). The join runs first, unconditionally.
  FlexAssembler._matchRule (lines 160-166): calls `rule.filter(this.keyStack)` for every
    rule; invoked from startObject (line 184) and startArray (line 197) on every
    container start.
  FlexAssembler._pushState (lines 168-176): pushes one entry onto `keyStack` per open
    container with no depth bound.

Proof of Concept

Node.js and the published [email protected] package. Drive a FlexAssembler configured with a string rule filter, comparing against a function filter as a negative control.

1. Install [email protected].
2. Construct a deeply nested object token stream (or equivalently parse a document like '{"k":' repeated D times, a 1, then '}' repeated D times, through parser/parserStream).
3. Feed it to a FlexAssembler whose objectRules contains a rule with a string filter.
4. Observe wall-clock time scaling as roughly 4x per doubling of D (quadratic), while a function-filter configuration stays flat.

import FlexAssembler from 'stream-json/utils/flex-assembler.js';

function run(filter, D) {
  const asm = new FlexAssembler(filter ? {objectRules: [{filter, create: () => ({})}]} : undefined);
  const t = performance.now();
  asm.startObject();
  for (let i = 0; i < D; i++) { asm.keyValue('k'); asm.startObject(); }
  return performance.now() - t;
}

for (const D of [4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]) console.log('string', D, run('k', D).toFixed(1), 'ms');
for (const D of [4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]) console.log('function(control)', D, run(p => p.length > 0, D).toFixed(1), 'ms');

string filter (path.join per token):     function filter (negative control, no join):
  D=4000     91.9 ms                        D=4000     1.6 ms
  D=8000    341.9 ms                        D=8000     0.9 ms
  D=16000  1359.2 ms  (~4x per doubling)    D=16000    1.7 ms   (flat)
  D=32000  5430.0 ms  (= O(D^2))            D=32000    2.6 ms

End to end through a real parserStream, roughly 96 KB (depth 16000) of attacker-supplied JSON stalls the event loop for over 1.3 seconds.

Attack Chain

1. Exposure: The attacker supplies JSON bytes to a service pipeline that assembles values with a FlexAssembler configured with a string or RegExp rule filter; FlexAssembler is a documented submodule of the published package on both the Node and Web Streams surfaces.
2. Control: The attacker controls the JSON bytes and therefore the nesting depth D, which directly controls the key stack length.
3. Path: Each { or [ emits startObject/startArray, which push onto keyStack and call _matchRule, which calls the compiled filter with the current key stack.
4. Guard: There is no depth or size cap on this path; the only maxDepth guard in the package lives in the filter base state machine and never runs in FlexAssembler.
5. Primitive: For each of the D container starts, the compiled string/RegExp filter runs an O(D) join before any match decision, for O(D^2) total CPU.
6. Result: The single-threaded event loop stalls, denying service to all concurrent work on the process; a small input scales quadratically to sustained unavailability.

Bypass Evidence

This is a novel finding on a code path that no prior fix protects, so there is no guard to bypass on the FlexAssembler path. The relevant prior fix is the maxDepth cap published as part of the remediation for CVE-2026-71429 (GHSA-528h-pc64-c93x), which addressed the analogous O(depth^2) behavior in the pick/ignore/filter/replace filters. That fix was placed only in src/core/filters/filter-base.js; src/core/utils/flex-assembler.js neither imports nor invokes it, so the guard never executes here. A search for maxDepth across src/ returns only the filter base file and its type declaration, and flex-assembler.js imports only {none} from stream-chain/core. Attempts to refute the finding all failed: the join was confirmed to run unconditionally before the match comparison in both the string and RegExp branches; a function-filter negative control stayed flat while the string filter scaled at 4x per doubling, isolating the join as the quadratic cause; and the behavior was reproduced both by driving FlexAssembler directly and end to end through a real parser pipeline. This is not the same issue as the JSONC comment re-scan advisory (GHSA-hqr4-qq8f-hg3x) or the Assembler prototype pollution advisory (GHSA-mjw6-4jj6-33hc), which involve different components, mechanisms, and impact classes.

Affected Versions

• Ecosystem: npm
• Package: stream-json
• Confirmed affected range: >= 2.0.0, <= 3.6.0
• Latest release checked: 3.6.0 (npm registry latest)
• Fix status: not fixed

FlexAssembler was introduced in 2.0.0; the 1.x line has no such component. The vulnerable compileFilter join branches, the uncapped key stack, and the absence of any depth guard are present and effectively identical across the 2.0.0 through 3.6.0 releases, including the current registry latest (3.6.0). No fixed release exists: the depth cap shipped for the related filter issue does not touch FlexAssembler, so every release in the range is affected and a future release remains affected until a FlexAssembler-side bound ships.

Maintainer note on scope

The attack vector is local — stream-json's documented input is data the user owns (dumps, exports, logs, configuration you wrote); it is not designed for JSON from the open internet, and the docs say so. The crafted document reaches the vulnerable component as a buffer, so AV:L gives 6.2, the same vector and score as GHSA-528h-pc64-c93x and GHSA-hqr4-qq8f-hg3x. FlexAssembler now takes a maxDepth option, default 1024, which throws a RangeError before any rule is matched; Infinity opts out, and once rules are configured the cap covers containers of both kinds, because a rule's path state is kept at every level whatever kind it matches. A follow-up went past what the advisory needed and removed the per-check join entirely — a string filter keeps prefix-match state per level, a RegExp an accumulated path, a function filter the parts array it already received — so deeply nested input is linear now rather than merely capped.