CVE-2026-44741

GM-369

SQL injection in Pimcore's translation grid date filter, the user-supplied property field from the filter JSON is interpolated directly into a UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(...))) SQL expression without parameterization or allowlist validation.

Affected Component

• Package: pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle
• File: src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
• Lines: 565 (input), 569 (inadequate sanitization), 593 (injection point)
• Endpoint: POST /admin/translation/translations

Description

The translation grid endpoint processes JSON filter parameters. When a filter has type: "date", the property field is extracted and used to construct a SQL expression:

$fieldname = $filter[$propertyField];              // Line 565, user input
$fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);    // Line 569, trivially bypassable
$fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;        // Line 577
$fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))";  // Line 593, injection

The str_replace('--', '') sanitization is trivially bypassable (use /**/ comments or ----). In non-language mode, $fieldname is concatenated directly into the SQL condition without quoting or parameterization.

Proof of Concept

POST /admin/translation/translations
filter=[{"property":"1))) UNION SELECT password FROM users WHERE ((1","type":"date","operator":"eq","value":"2026-01-01"}]

References

• CWE-89: SQL Injection
• Related: CVE-2026-27461 (RLIKE injection in Dependency/Dao.php, different code path)

Suggested Fix

In TranslationController.php: (1) Add allowlist check for non-language fieldnames before processing. (2) Replace raw string interpolation UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname}))) with $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname) to prevent SQL injection in date filter expressions.

--- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
+++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
@@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
                 $fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);
 
                 if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)
                     || $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
                     continue;
                 }
 
+                // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection
+                $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
+                if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+
                 if (!$languageMode) {
                     $fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;
                 }
@@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
                         } elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') {
                             $operator = '=';
-                            $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))";
+                            // Use validated fieldname only, never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions
+                            $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname));
                         }

Proposed Fix

--- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
+++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
@@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
                 $fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);
 
                 if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)
                     || $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
                     continue;
                 }
 
+                // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection
+                $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
+                if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+
                 if (!$languageMode) {
                     $fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;
                 }
@@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
                         } elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') {
                             $operator = '=';
-                            $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))";
+                            // Use validated fieldname only, never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions
+                            $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname));
                         }

Happy to submit this as a PR against a private fork if that is the preferred workflow.

Authenticated user with translations view permission can extract arbitrary database data via UNION-based or error-based SQL injection. Combined with GM-249 (unsafe unserialize), this enables an SQLi → deserialization → RCE chain.

Untrusted input alters a database query, allowing the attacker to read or modify data the query was not intended to access. Typical impact: data disclosure or modification.

CVE-2026-44741 has a CVSS score of 8.8 (High). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (2.3.6); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.

Kodem intelligence

Validate $fieldname against an allowlist of valid column names before SQL interpolation:

$allowedDateColumns = ['creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
if (!in_array($fieldname, $allowedDateColumns, true)) {
    continue;
}

1. What is CVE-2026-44741? CVE-2026-44741 is a high-severity SQL injection vulnerability in pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle (composer), affecting versions <= 2.3.5. It is fixed in 2.3.6. Untrusted input alters a database query, allowing the attacker to read or modify data the query was not intended to access.
2. How severe is CVE-2026-44741? CVE-2026-44741 has a CVSS score of 8.8 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
3. Which versions of pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle are affected by CVE-2026-44741? pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle (composer) versions <= 2.3.5 is affected.
4. Is there a fix for CVE-2026-44741? Yes. CVE-2026-44741 is fixed in 2.3.6. Upgrade to this version or later.
5. Is CVE-2026-44741 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-44741 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
6. What actually determines whether CVE-2026-44741 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
7. How do I fix CVE-2026-44741? Upgrade pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle to 2.3.6 or later.