Summary
@hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened
Affected: @hulumi/baseline < 1.4.0, Fixed in: 1.4.0, Severity: High, CWE-1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation / Behavioral Inconsistency)
The S3 bucket that AccountFoundation creates to receive CloudTrail and AWS Config audit logs is meant to be tamper-resistant, if someone with delete access can erase from it, the forensic trail is gone. There were three independent ways the protection could be silently weakened:
- No Write-Once-Read-Many on the startup-hardened audit bucket. The startup-hardened tier hard-coded
objectLock: falseon the audit bucket. (The reason was real, bucket-wide Object Lock blocks an AWS Config write-then-delete probe, but the fix was a sledgehammer that disabled WORM for all objects, not just the probe key.) forceDestroywas forwarded to the audit bucket. Nothing prevented a downstream stack from settinglogBucketForceDestroy: true, which madepulumi destroypurge every audit-log object on teardown.- Sandbox tier dropped everything. Sandbox-tier
AccountFoundationcreated its audit bucket withtier: "sandbox", which skipped Object Lock, server access logging, AND the CloudTrail-LakeEventDataStore(the independent immutable mirror), leaving sandbox accounts with no audit immutability at all.
Workarounds
Replicating audit logs out-of-account to an Object-Locked archive bucket partially mitigates while you upgrade.
Resources
- PR #178 (Cluster C); see CHANGELOG
### Migrationfor theforceDestroybehaviour change.
Impact
Consumers using AccountFoundation could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal, while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded).
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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See it in your environmentNew to Kodem? Get a demo →Remediation advice
Upgrade to @hulumi/[email protected]. A single invariant in SecureBucket now fires whenever the bucket actually backs CloudTrail/Config delivery (i.e. awsServiceLogDelivery.cloudTrail === true || .config === true):
- refuses
forceDestroy: trueon the startup-hardened tier; - emits the CloudTrail-Lake
EventDataStoreregardless of parent tier (so sandbox accounts regain immutable audit capture); - adds a deny-
s3:DeleteObject*bucket-policy statement scoped to the CloudTrail and Config history/snapshot prefixes (a retention floor on the audit objects). The deny excludes the AWS ConfigConfigWritabilityCheckFileprobe key so Config's write-then-delete still works, which is why bucket-wide Object Lock is intentionally NOT re-enabled.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-48035? CVE-2026-48035 is a high-severity security vulnerability in @hulumi/baseline (npm), affecting versions < 1.4.0. It is fixed in 1.4.0.
- Which versions of @hulumi/baseline are affected by CVE-2026-48035? @hulumi/baseline (npm) versions < 1.4.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-48035? Yes. CVE-2026-48035 is fixed in 1.4.0. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-48035 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-48035 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-48035 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-48035? Upgrade
@hulumi/baselineto 1.4.0 or later.