Summary
LiquidJS: pop filter bypasses memoryLimit accounting that its array-filter siblings enforce
pop filter bypasses memoryLimit accounting that its array-filter siblings enforce
CWE: CWE-770 (Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling), sibling class of GHSA-8xx9-69p8-7jp3 and GHSA-2546-xv4c-mc8g, applied to memoryLimit instead of renderLimit
The pop array filter at src/filters/array.ts:91-95 allocates a full clone of its input array via [...toArray(v)] but does not call this.context.memoryLimit.use(...) the way every other array-clone filter in the same file does (shift, unshift, compact, concat, reverse, sample, slice, map, sortBy, where, group_by, uniq). This silently disables the memoryLimit budget for {{ huge_array | pop }}, letting a template render allocate an O(N) clone of an attacker-influenced array regardless of how strictly memoryLimit is set.
Affected
- liquidjs ≥ all versions that ship the current
popfilter implementation (verified10.27.0, HEADa8fd734b5) - Deployments where any template uses
{{ arr | pop }}on an array whose length is influenced by untrusted input (typical multi-tenant context arrays: orders, log lines, catalog entries, user lists, etc.)
Vulnerability details
Code
src/filters/array.ts:91-95:
export function pop<T> (v: T[]): T[] {
const clone = [...toArray(v)] // O(N) allocation, not charged to memoryLimit
clone.pop()
return clone
}
Note: the function signature does not even declare this: FilterImpl, so it has no typed access to this.context.memoryLimit at the type level, a visual tell that the author skipped the limit-accounting boilerplate the surrounding filters use.
Compare with shift (src/filters/array.ts:97-103), which is functionally identical except for the array-end operated on:
export function shift<T> (this: FilterImpl, v: T[]): T[] {
const array = toArray(v)
this.context.memoryLimit.use(array.length) // ← guard present
const clone = [...array]
clone.shift()
return clone
}
And unshift, compact, concat, reverse, sample, slice, map, sortBy, where, group_by, uniq, all of which also charge memoryLimit.use(array.length) (or lhs.length + rhs.length etc.) before allocating their working buffer.
The asymmetry confirms pop is an accidental omission, not by design.
Why the bypass matters
memoryLimit is the documented control for bounding the memory a single render() call may allocate (docs/source/tutorials/dos.md). Every array-output filter in src/filters/array.ts other than pop deducts its working set from the limit, so a render that does {{ huge | shift }} with memoryLimit: 100 and huge.length === 5_000_000 correctly throws memory alloc limit exceeded. The identical {{ huge | pop }} does not throw, the allocation proceeds, and the only ceiling is the Node process's heap.
Proof of concept
const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs');
const l = new Liquid({ memoryLimit: 100 }); // 100-unit budget
const huge = Array(5_000_000).fill('x'); // 5M-element context array
(async () => {
try { await l.parseAndRender('{{ a | shift | size }}', { a: huge }); }
catch (e) { console.log('shift: ' + e.message); } // expected: memory alloc limit exceeded
try { await l.parseAndRender('{{ a | unshift: 0 | size }}', { a: huge }); }
catch (e) { console.log('unshift: ' + e.message); } // expected: memory alloc limit exceeded
const out = await l.parseAndRender('{{ a | pop | size }}', { a: huge });
console.log('pop: OK, size=' + out); // size=4999999, allocation succeeded
})();
Observed (against dist/liquid.node.js at a8fd734b5):
shift: memory alloc limit exceeded, line:1, col:1
unshift: memory alloc limit exceeded, line:1, col:1
pop: OK, size=4999999
Workaround for users
Until a fix lands, deployments relying on memoryLimit should either:
Avoid
| popin templates whose inputs include untrusted-length arrays. Use| slice: 0, arr.size | minus: 1or equivalent guarded alternatives.Register a wrapping
popfilter that does the accounting:liquid.registerFilter('pop', function (v) { const arr = Array.from(v ?? []); this.context.memoryLimit.use(arr.length); arr.pop(); return arr; });
Impact
memoryLimitdoes not boundpopallocations. Any template that can reach{{ <untrusted-sized array> | pop }}allocates an O(N) clone outside the budget.- Realistic attack surface: when a server passes an attacker-influenced large array to the template context (search results, paginated lists, batch-export pages) and the template uses
| popanywhere on it, a single render can allocate hundreds of MB of array slots that the operator believedmemoryLimithad ruled out. - Concurrent amplification: N parallel requests each allocate their own unguarded clone, the practical ceiling is the Node process heap, after which the host runs
oom-kill. This is the same outcome the renderLimit-empty-body advisories (GHSA-8xx9-69p8-7jp3 / GHSA-2546-xv4c-mc8g) prevented for CPU; this report prevents it for memory.
Severity is configuration-dependent (requires memoryLimit to be set, plus a template that uses pop, plus attacker-influenced array length). For deployments that rely on memoryLimit as a DoS guard, this is a real bypass of that guard.
The application allocates resources such as memory, threads, or file descriptors based on untrusted input without enforcing a cap. Typical impact: resource exhaustion leading to denial of service.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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One-line addition mirroring shift:
export function pop<T> (this: FilterImpl, v: T[]): T[] {
const array = toArray(v)
this.context.memoryLimit.use(array.length) // ← add this line, and add `this: FilterImpl`
const clone = [...array]
clone.pop()
return clone
}
No API or behavior change for callers within budget; rejects out-of-budget calls with the standard memory alloc limit exceeded exception the sibling filters already throw.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-55575? CVE-2026-55575 is a high-severity allocation of resources without limits or throttling vulnerability in liquidjs (npm), affecting versions <= 10.27.0. It is fixed in 10.27.1. The application allocates resources such as memory, threads, or file descriptors based on untrusted input without enforcing a cap.
- Which versions of liquidjs are affected by CVE-2026-55575? liquidjs (npm) versions <= 10.27.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-55575? Yes. CVE-2026-55575 is fixed in 10.27.1. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-55575 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-55575 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-55575 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-55575? Upgrade
liquidjsto 10.27.1 or later.