Summary
Open WebUI: Cross-user code-interpreter and tool execution via unvalidated Socket.IO event-caller session_id
An authenticated low-privilege user can execute arbitrary code-interpreter Python and tools inside another user's authenticated session. The Socket.IO event-caller (get_event_call) delivers execute:python / execute:tool events to a client-supplied session_id after only checking that the session is connected, never that it belongs to the requester. Combined with ydoc:document:join, which exposes the live socket ids of everyone in a shared note's collaboration room to any read-access participant, an attacker can target a victim's session and run attacker-chosen code/tools in the victim's browser context. When the victim is an administrator, that hijacked context reaches the admin-only Functions API, whose source is executed server-side, yielding remote code execution as the server process (root in the default container).
Affected component
backend/open_webui/socket/main.py,get_event_call()/__event_caller__backend/open_webui/main.py, chat-completion metadata (session_idtaken from the request body)
Root cause
The event-caller routes to a caller-controlled session id with no ownership check:
# backend/open_webui/socket/main.py, get_event_call()
async def __event_caller__(event_data):
session_id = request_info['session_id']
if session_id not in SESSION_POOL: # only checks the session is connected
return {'error': 'Client session disconnected.'}
return await sio.call('events', {...}, to=session_id, ...) # delivered to that sid
session_id originates from the request body and is never validated against the authenticated user:
# backend/open_webui/main.py
metadata = {
'user_id': user.id, # server-derived (trustworthy)
'session_id': form_data.pop('session_id', None), # client-controlled
...
}
SESSION_POOL[session_id] is the user record of whoever owns that socket. Because the caller checks only membership (in SESSION_POOL), a request carrying another user's session_id causes execute:python / execute:tool to be delivered to that other user's browser.
Reachability
execute:python/execute:toolare emitted from the code-interpreter and tool-call paths (utils/middleware.py,tools/builtin.py), all routed throughget_event_call.- The victim's live
session_idis disclosed to any read-access participant of a shared note viaydoc:document:join. POST /api/v1/chat/completionsrequires onlyget_verified_user(the default user role). The attacker uses their own account and a model / Direct Connection they control to choose the payload.
Proof of Concept
The reporter's exploit.py reproduced on ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:0.9.6 and a build of the v0.9.6 tag, confirming blind server-side RCE out-of-band (callback returns uid=0(root)), using only a low-privilege user account that shared a note with an admin victim. Preconditions: code interpreter enabled; attacker shares a note with the victim; victim opens it while online; admin victim required for server RCE.
Affected / Patched
- Affected:
< 0.10.0(last affected release 0.9.6) - Patched: v0.10.0.
get_event_callnow verifies the target session belongs to the requesting user before delivering (session is None or session.get('id') != request_info.get('user_id')), using the server-deriveduser_idfrom the request metadata. The recommendedydoc:document:joinsid-disclosure restriction is defence-in-depth and independent of this fix; the ownership check closes the cross-user delivery regardless of whether the victim's sid is known.
Impact
- Any victim: arbitrary code-interpreter Python and tool execution in the victim's authenticated session, the attacker acts with the victim's identity and origin (full session/account compromise).
- Admin victim: the hijacked admin context reaches
POST /api/v1/functions/create, whose source isexec()'d server-side → remote code execution as the server process (root in the default container).
The Functions API is intended administrator code-execution; the vulnerability here is the cross-user delivery that lets an attacker drive another user's session, including an admin's, into it. The primitive is a full session compromise even against non-admin victims.
Untrusted input is evaluated as executable code within the application's runtime environment. Typical impact: arbitrary code execution within the application's privilege context.
CVE-2026-59216 has a CVSS score of 7.7 (High). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and user interaction required. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (0.10.0); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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get_event_call must verify the target session belongs to the requesting user before delivering, not merely that it is connected:
session = SESSION_POOL.get(session_id)
if session is None or session.get('id') != request_info.get('user_id'):
return {'error': 'Client session disconnected.'}
user_id in the request metadata is server-derived from the authenticated user, so it is trustworthy. Restricting ydoc:document:join so it does not disclose other participants' socket ids is recommended as defence-in-depth.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-59216? CVE-2026-59216 is a high-severity code injection vulnerability in open-webui (pip), affecting versions < 0.10.0. It is fixed in 0.10.0. Untrusted input is evaluated as executable code within the application's runtime environment.
- How severe is CVE-2026-59216? CVE-2026-59216 has a CVSS score of 7.7 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of open-webui are affected by CVE-2026-59216? open-webui (pip) versions < 0.10.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-59216? Yes. CVE-2026-59216 is fixed in 0.10.0. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-59216 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-59216 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-59216 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-59216? Upgrade
open-webuito 0.10.0 or later.