Summary
Mistune directives/include: mutual .. include:: recursion crashes the renderer with RecursionError, denial of service via two attacker-controlled markdown files
Type: Uncontrolled recursion via mutual include. The Include directive checks for direct self-reference (a.md cannot include a.md), but does not detect indirect cycles. Two markdown files that include each other (a.md → includes b.md → includes a.md) cause unbounded recursion until Python's stack limit fires RecursionError. The exception propagates out of the renderer and crashes the calling code.
File: src/mistune/directives/include.py, lines 33-37 (the self-include check is the only cycle-detection logic).
Root cause: the include logic only compares os.path.abspath(dest) == os.path.abspath(source_file). There is no per-render set of "files already included" that would catch transitive cycles. When a.md includes b.md, the recursive block.parse(new_state) call uses dest (b.md) as the new __file__, which then includes a.md (passing the self-check, because the immediate parent file is b.md, not a.md), which then includes b.md, and so on. Each recursion level adds Python frames; the default stack limit of 1000 frames trips after ~7-10 cycle iterations and Python raises RecursionError. Since the directive does not catch the exception, it propagates out of Markdown.parse() and surfaces in the calling code, crashing the request.
Affected Code
File: src/mistune/directives/include.py, lines 28-54.
relpath = self.parse_title(m)
dest = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(source_file), relpath)
dest = os.path.normpath(dest)
if os.path.abspath(dest) == os.path.abspath(source_file): # <-- only catches direct self-include
return {"type": "block_error", "raw": "Could not include self: " + relpath}
if not os.path.isfile(dest):
return {"type": "block_error", "raw": "Could not find file: " + relpath}
with open(dest, "rb") as f:
content = f.read().decode(encoding)
ext = os.path.splitext(relpath)[1]
if ext in {".md", ".markdown", ".mkd"}:
new_state = block.state_cls()
new_state.env["__file__"] = dest
new_state.process(content)
block.parse(new_state) # <-- recursive parse, no cycle tracking
return new_state.tokens
Why it's wrong: the cycle-detection check is one level deep. Multi-file cycles slip through trivially. Python's default recursion limit is 1000 frames, so a cycle of length 2 trips after a few hundred mutual includes; the exception is uncaught by the directive, propagating out of Markdown.__call__() and crashing whatever called it.
Exploit Chain
- Application uses mistune with the
Includedirective enabled. Application accepts user-supplied markdown files (CMS, wiki, multi-user documentation platform, note-taking app, CI/CD doc renderer). - Attacker uploads two markdown files:
a.md:.. include:: b.mdb.md:.. include:: a.md
- Renderer is invoked on
a.md(or any markdown that references this pair).Includedirective includesb.md, which includesa.md, which includesb.md, ... Each recursion adds Python frames. - After ~340 cycle iterations (depending on default
sys.setrecursionlimit(1000)and the per-include frame depth), Python raisesRecursionError: maximum recursion depth exceeded. - The exception is not caught by the directive. It propagates through
block.parse, throughMarkdown.__call__, and into the application's request handler. If the application doesn't catch it explicitly, the request errors out (HTTP 500 in web contexts, crash in CLI tools).
Security Impact
Attacker capability: crash the rendering engine on demand by submitting any markdown that triggers the cycle. Repeated requests deny service. If the renderer is used in a hot path (per-page-view docs rendering, search-index regeneration, scheduled doc-export jobs), the cycle persists across the whole pipeline.
Preconditions: application uses mistune with the Include directive enabled and renders user-supplied markdown that can reference other user-uploaded files. Attacker needs write access to two .md files in the include search path (or a single file including a known-recurring pair).
Differential: PoC-verified against [email protected]:
import os, mistune
from mistune.directives import RSTDirective, Include
os.makedirs('/tmp/mistune-recur', exist_ok=True)
with open('/tmp/mistune-recur/a.md', 'w') as f:
f.write('A\n\n.. include:: b.md')
with open('/tmp/mistune-recur/b.md', 'w') as f:
f.write('B\n\n.. include:: a.md')
md = mistune.create_markdown(plugins=[RSTDirective([Include()])])
state = md.block.state_cls()
state.env['__file__'] = '/tmp/mistune-recur/a.md'
md.parse('.. include:: b.md', state=state)
# RecursionError: maximum recursion depth exceeded
The patched build (with the suggested fix below) returns a block_error token like the existing self-include check, instead of recursing forever.
Impact
CVE-2026-59927 has a CVSS score of 5.3 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (3.3.0); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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Track included paths in state.env and reject any include that would re-enter a path already on the include stack:
--- a/src/mistune/directives/include.py
+++ b/src/mistune/directives/include.py
@@ -28,8 +28,18 @@ class Include(DirectivePlugin):
relpath = self.parse_title(m)
- dest = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(source_file), relpath)
- dest = os.path.normpath(dest)
+ base = os.path.realpath(os.path.dirname(source_file))
+ dest = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base, relpath))
+
+ # Track include stack across recursive parses to detect cycles.
+ include_stack = state.env.setdefault("__include_stack__", [])
+ if dest in include_stack or dest == os.path.realpath(source_file):
+ return {
+ "type": "block_error",
+ "raw": "Could not include (cycle): " + relpath,
+ }
- if os.path.abspath(dest) == os.path.abspath(source_file):
- return {
- "type": "block_error",
- "raw": "Could not include self: " + relpath,
- }
@@ ... in the markdown-include branch ...
+ include_stack.append(dest)
+ try:
+ new_state = block.state_cls()
+ new_state.env["__file__"] = dest
+ new_state.env["__include_stack__"] = include_stack
+ new_state.process(content)
+ block.parse(new_state)
+ return new_state.tokens
+ finally:
+ include_stack.pop()
This catches cycles of any length (a → b → a, a → b → c → a, etc.). Pair this with the path-containment fix from the LFI advisory and the HTML-extension fix from the include-XSS advisory; together those three patches make the Include directive safe to enable on user-supplied markdown.
Add a regression test asserting that a 2-cycle and a 3-cycle both produce block_error rather than RecursionError.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-59927? CVE-2026-59927 is a medium-severity security vulnerability in mistune (pip), affecting versions < 3.3.0. It is fixed in 3.3.0.
- How severe is CVE-2026-59927? CVE-2026-59927 has a CVSS score of 5.3 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of mistune are affected by CVE-2026-59927? mistune (pip) versions < 3.3.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-59927? Yes. CVE-2026-59927 is fixed in 3.3.0. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-59927 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-59927 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-59927 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-59927? Upgrade
mistuneto 3.3.0 or later.