CVE-2026-71324

There is a critical vulnerability in Traefik's default HTTP reverse proxy that leads to unauthenticated cross-user response poisoning. When a client opens an HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 CONNECT request, Traefik forwards it, body included, to an HTTP/1.1 upstream over a shared net/http.Transport. If the upstream answers the CONNECT with a keep-alive non-2xx response without draining the body, the now-desynchronized backend socket is returned to Traefik's shared connection pool and reused for other clients, letting an attacker make a different client read a response the attacker smuggled, which may be another user's authenticated or private content. The entrypoint's sanitizePath option (default true) is not a reliable defense: backends that answer CONNECT / with a keep-alive non-2xx remain exploitable. The experimental FastProxy implementation was not affected. The issue is fixed by deferring the forwarded CONNECT payload until the backend accepts the tunnel, by not returning CONNECT connections to the shared idle pool, and by discarding the CONNECT body in the ForwardAuth path.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

Traefik's default reverse proxy forwards a plain HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 CONNECT request and its body to
an HTTP/1.1 upstream through a shared net/http.Transport. When the upstream answers the CONNECT
with a keep-alive non-2xx response and does not drain the body, Traefik returns the now
desynchronized backend socket to its shared pool and reuses it for other clients. An
unauthenticated attacker uses this to make a different client read the attacker's smuggled response.

Traefik's default proxy is net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy over a shared http.Transport, so it
inherits the same root cause as the Caddy reverse_proxy CONNECT pool poisoning.

Traefik ships one partial mitigation Caddy does not. The entrypoint option sanitizePath (default
true) rewrites the forwarded CONNECT's empty path to /, so Traefik emits CONNECT / instead of
authority-form CONNECT host:port. This is not a reliable defense. It avoids the smuggle only
against backends that reject CONNECT / by closing the connection (Apache, nginx). Backends that
answer CONNECT / with a keep-alive non-2xx and leave the body undrained still cross. That set
includes any Go net/http server and gunicorn/Flask.

Confirmed on the official image traefik:v3.6.23 (a currently supported release), default
configuration, against stock go-httpbin (Go) and kennethreitz/httpbin (Python gunicorn/Flask),
attacker and victim in separate containers, over both HTTP/2 and HTTP/3.

Affected

• traefik:v3.6.23 (official image) and current v3, default configuration, standard proxy to an
  HTTP/1.1 upstream. Backend keep-alive pooling is on by default (MaxIdleConnsPerHost 200).
• Attacker frontend is HTTP/2 or HTTP/3. An HTTP/1.1 frontend is not affected.
• The upstream keeps the connection alive after a non-2xx to the forwarded CONNECT and does not
  drain the body.
• The experimental FastProxy implementation is not affected (see Not affected).

Details

Three behaviors compose.

1. Traefik forwards a plain CONNECT as an ordinary proxied request. The default proxy is
   httputil.ReverseProxy with a shared http.Transport (pkg/proxy/httputil/proxy.go). The
   director assigns the outbound URL.Host directly and does not reject CONNECT, leaving the
   request body a live stream. The client places a raw HTTP/1.1 request in that body (H2/H3 DATA
   frames), which is written onto the backend socket after the CONNECT header block.

2. net/http writes the CONNECT body unframed and pools the socket. For a CONNECT the transport
   writes the body with no Content-Length and no Transfer-Encoding. The upstream answers a
   keep-alive non-2xx and parses the trailing bytes as a pipelined request. Go reads the non-2xx
   response and returns the socket to the shared idle pool once the request body reaches EOF (the
   wroteRequest gate), while the smuggled request's response is still pending.

3. Desynchronized reuse. The smuggled request targets a slow endpoint so its response arrives after
   the socket is pooled. A different client that reuses the socket reads the pending smuggled
   response as its own.

sanitizePath (default true, pkg/server/server_entrypoint_tcp.go) calls req.URL.JoinPath(),
which turns the CONNECT's empty path into /. Traefik emits CONNECT /. Whether that stops the
smuggle depends only on the backend: Apache and nginx answer 400 Bad Request with
Connection: close (socket torn down, no cross); Go net/http and gunicorn/Flask answer a
keep-alive non-2xx and pipeline the trailing bytes (cross). With sanitizePath off, Traefik emits
authority-form CONNECT host:port, which Apache answers with a keep-alive 405.

HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 only. Pooling requires the forwarded request body to reach EOF. An H2/H3 client
half-closes the CONNECT stream (END_STREAM), so the body reaches EOF while the connection stays open
and the socket is pooled. An H1 CONNECT body is the tunnel and cannot reach EOF without closing the
connection, so the socket is closed, not pooled. HTTP/3 routes to the same handler chain as HTTPS.

Backend behavior

"Armed" means the backend answers with a keep-alive non-2xx and parses the trailing undrained bytes
as a pipelined request. Default Traefik emits CONNECT /; with sanitizePath: false it emits
authority-form CONNECT host:port.

Proof of concept

poc/run.sh runs the official traefik:v3.6.23 image fronting real off-the-shelf backends over
HTTP/1.1, with attacker and victim in separate containers. Requires docker and python3. It builds
the attack client, pulls the stock images, and runs the scenarios below.

The attacker opens an H2 or H3 CONNECT to Traefik and sends a raw HTTP/1.1
GET /delay/2?tag=ATTACKERSMUGGLED as the CONNECT body, then half-closes the stream. Traefik
forwards the CONNECT to the Go/Python backend, the backend answers a keep-alive non-2xx, keeps the
socket, and parses the trailing GET as a pipelined request, so a response to it is queued on that
socket. net/http returns the socket to Traefik's shared pool. The victim then sends
GET /get?tag=VICTIMOWN on its own connection, Traefik reuses the pooled backend socket, and the
victim reads the queued /delay response instead of its own. CROSS means the victim received a
response that was not its own.

Expected output from poc

== core: DEFAULT config, cross-user poisoning vs real off-the-shelf backends ==
  [core-go-h2] h2->h2 CROSS
  [core-go-h3] h3->h3 CROSS
  [core-go-x] h2->h3 CROSS
  [core-py-h2] h2->h2 CROSS
  [core-py-h3] h3->h3 CROSS
== mechanism: sanitizePath off -> stock Apache 405 (the direct Caddy analogue) ==
  [mech-ap-h2] h2->h2 CROSS
  [mech-ap-h3] h3->h3 CROSS
== controls: must NOT cross ==
  [ctl-apache] h2->h2 NO_CROSS
  [ctl-pooloff] h2->h2 NO_CROSS
  [ctl-kaoff] h2->h2 NO_CROSS
== safe variant: experimental FastProxy chunk-frames the CONNECT body ==
  [safe-fast] h2->h2 NO_CROSS
== cascade: bounded pool, one desync poisons a queue of victims ==
  smuggled=1 other_user=7 own=0 of 8 (cross-user poisoned=8)
RESULT: PASS

• Core rows. DEFAULT Traefik config against a Go backend (go-httpbin) and a Python gunicorn/Flask
  backend (kennethreitz/httpbin), for H2->H2, H3->H3, and H2->H3. The victim reads the attacker's
  smuggled response.
• Mechanism rows. sanitizePath off and stock Apache. Traefik emits authority-form
  CONNECT apache-backend:80, Apache answers a keep-alive 405, and it crosses. This is the direct
  Caddy analogue and proves the full mechanism including Apache.
• Control rows. ctl-apache runs the default config against Apache, which closes CONNECT /;
  ctl-pooloff disables Traefik backend reuse (maxIdleConnsPerHost: -1); ctl-kaoff runs Apache
  with KeepAlive Off. All three print NO_CROSS, so the crossing depends on backend socket reuse,
  not pipelining or a shared client.
• Safe variant. Experimental FastProxy against the Go backend prints NO_CROSS because it
  chunk-frames the CONNECT body.
• Cascade. MaxIdleConnsPerHost 1 and a slow victim endpoint. One CONNECT desync shifts the queue:
  of 8 sequential victims, 1 reads the attacker's smuggled response, 7 read another user's response,
  0 read their own.

The captured crossing (poc/evidence/RELEASE_v3.6.23_victim.json): the victim sent
GET /get?tag=VICTIM_OWN and received a 200 whose body is the response to
GET /delay/2?tag=ATTACKER_SMUGGLED with the echoed header X-Smuggled: released-v3.6.23, none of
which the victim sent.

Not affected

• HTTP/1.1 frontend. An H1 CONNECT body cannot reach EOF without closing the connection, so the
  backend socket is not pooled.
• Experimental FastProxy (experimental.fastProxy). It chunk-frames the forwarded CONNECT body
  (Transfer-Encoding: chunked, captured in poc/evidence/wire_fastproxy_chunked.txt), so the
  trailing bytes are read as the CONNECT body, not a pipelined request. safe-fast is NO_CROSS.

ForwardAuth

The ForwardAuth middleware with forwardBody: true and preserveRequestMethod: true re-issues the
request to the auth server as a CONNECT with the buffered body re-attached and ContentLength never
set (pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go). The auth client writes that body unframed to the auth
server (captured on the wire), so a keep-alive non-2xx from the auth server poisons the shared
auth-client pool the same way.

Root cause

net/http pools a connection after a keep-alive non-2xx response to a CONNECT whose body it wrote
unframed. Traefik's default proxy forwards client CONNECT through a shared net/http.Transport and
applies no CONNECT rejection. sanitizePath changes the emitted request target but does not remove
the defect. Traefik's own FastProxy implementation frames the CONNECT body and does not cross, which
shows this is a property of the httputil/net/http path, not fixed by path normalization.

POC

poc.zip