CVE-2026-77250

When OAuth tokens are saved, MCP Atlassian always writes a plaintext fallback copy under ~/.mcp-atlassian/oauth-<client_id>.json. The fallback file is created with the process default umask rather than restrictive permissions. In this environment the file was created as mode 0664, exposing access and refresh tokens to same-group local users and any process that can read the home directory.

Details

OAuthConfig._save_tokens() stores OAuth token data in keyring, but it also unconditionally maintains a plaintext file fallback for backwards compatibility in src/mcp_atlassian/utils/oauth.py:350-386. If keyring saving fails it also falls back to the same file path in src/mcp_atlassian/utils/oauth.py:387-391.

The fallback writer creates ~/.mcp-atlassian and then writes oauth-<client_id>.json with a normal open(token_path, "w") call in src/mcp_atlassian/utils/oauth.py:392-420. No mode=0o600, os.open(..., 0o600), chmod, or owner-only directory permission is applied. The file contains both access_token and refresh_token (src/mcp_atlassian/utils/oauth.py:360-367) and is later loaded from the same plaintext path in src/mcp_atlassian/utils/oauth.py:450-470.

The security policy warns that OAuth client credentials and secrets should not be exposed (SECURITY.md:39-44), but the current implementation creates a persistent plaintext token copy even when keyring succeeds.

PoC

The following safe local proof uses a temporary HOME and mocked keyring writes. It creates and deletes only temporary files.

uv run python - <<'PY'
import json, os, shutil, stat, tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
from mcp_atlassian.utils.oauth import OAuthConfig

home = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='mcp-atlassian-oauth-poc-')
old_home = os.environ.get('HOME')
os.environ['HOME'] = home
try:
    cfg = OAuthConfig(client_id='poc-client', client_secret='client-secret', redirect_uri='http://localhost/callback', scope='offline_access', cloud_id='cloud-id')
    cfg.access_token = 'poc-access-token'
    cfg.refresh_token = 'poc-refresh-token'
    cfg.expires_at = 2000000000
    with patch('keyring.set_password', return_value=None):
        cfg._save_tokens()
    token_file = Path(home) / '.mcp-atlassian' / 'oauth-poc-client.json'
    mode = stat.S_IMODE(token_file.stat().st_mode)
    data = json.loads(token_file.read_text())
    print(json.dumps({
        'token_file_exists': token_file.exists(),
        'token_file_mode_octal': oct(mode),
        'contains_access_token': data.get('access_token') == 'poc-access-token',
        'contains_refresh_token': data.get('refresh_token') == 'poc-refresh-token',
        'token_file_path': str(token_file),
    }, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
finally:
    if old_home is not None:
        os.environ['HOME'] = old_home
    else:
        os.environ.pop('HOME', None)
    shutil.rmtree(home)
PY

Observed output from this environment:

{
  "contains_access_token": true,
  "contains_refresh_token": true,
  "token_file_exists": true,
  "token_file_mode_octal": "0o664",
  "token_file_path": "/tmp/mcp-atlassian-oauth-poc-9m9wvktp/.mcp-atlassian/oauth-poc-client.json"
}

The proof confirms that a plaintext file containing both access and refresh tokens is created and is not owner-only.