Summary
nebula-mesh: POST /api/v1/hosts/{id}/mobile-bundle response lacks Cache-Control: no-store
internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:62-66 sets only Content-Type: application/yaml. The Web-UI sibling at internal/web/handlers.go:1316-1321 sets Cache-Control: no-store, Pragma: no-cache, Expires: 0, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, and has a test asserting it. The API path was missed.
Affected
All released versions up to v0.3.0.
Threat model
The endpoint returns a freshly minted X25519 private key inline. Without no-store, any intermediary proxy or CDN that caches 200 OK YAML responses retains the private key for its cache TTL. Same applies to browser disk cache for direct API hits. Combined with the cross-tenant authz advisory (critical), even a corrected authz layer would still leak via cache after fix.
Suggested patch
Verified locally: go vet, go test -race -count=1 ./..., golangci-lint v2.12 all clean.
diff --git a/internal/api/mobile_bundle.go b/internal/api/mobile_bundle.go
index fc09da0..73152eb 100644
--- a/internal/api/mobile_bundle.go
+++ b/internal/api/mobile_bundle.go
@@ -58,8 +58,15 @@ func (s *Server) handleMobileBundle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
- // Return YAML bundle with proper content-type
+ // Return YAML bundle with proper content-type. The bundle inlines a
+ // freshly-minted X25519 private key, so suppress every layer of cache
+ // between server and operator (intermediate proxies/CDNs, browser disk
+ // cache). Mirrors the Web-UI sibling at internal/web/handlers.go.
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/yaml; charset=utf-8")
+ w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+ w.Header().Set("Pragma", "no-cache")
+ w.Header().Set("Expires", "0")
+ w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
if _, err := w.Write(bundle); err != nil {
s.logger.Error("write mobile bundle response", "error", err)
diff --git a/internal/api/mobile_bundle_test.go b/internal/api/mobile_bundle_test.go
index dcb8cd9..da08b01 100644
--- a/internal/api/mobile_bundle_test.go
+++ b/internal/api/mobile_bundle_test.go
@@ -52,6 +52,19 @@ func TestHandleMobileBundle_Success(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want 'application/yaml; charset=utf-8'", ct)
}
+ // Bundle inlines a private key, every cache between server and operator
+ // must drop the response. Mirrors the Web-UI sibling's headers.
+ for header, want := range map[string]string{
+ "Cache-Control": "no-store",
+ "Pragma": "no-cache",
+ "Expires": "0",
+ "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+ } {
+ if got := w.Header().Get(header); got != want {
+ t.Errorf("%s = %q, want %q", header, got, want)
+ }
+ }
+
// Verify body is valid YAML with expected keys
var yamlData map[string]interface{}
if err := yaml.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &yamlData); err != nil {
Impact
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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Copy the four headers from the Web sibling:
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/yaml; charset=utf-8")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
w.Header().Set("Pragma", "no-cache")
w.Header().Set("Expires", "0")
w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
Mirrors internal/web/handlers.go:1316-1321. Add a parallel test to the existing web-side coverage.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is GHSA-6VGG-XHVH-38FF? GHSA-6VGG-XHVH-38FF is a low-severity security vulnerability in github.com/juev/nebula-mesh (go), affecting versions <= 0.3.1. It is fixed in 0.3.2.
- Which versions of github.com/juev/nebula-mesh are affected by GHSA-6VGG-XHVH-38FF? github.com/juev/nebula-mesh (go) versions <= 0.3.1 is affected.
- Is there a fix for GHSA-6VGG-XHVH-38FF? Yes. GHSA-6VGG-XHVH-38FF is fixed in 0.3.2. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is GHSA-6VGG-XHVH-38FF exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-6VGG-XHVH-38FF is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether GHSA-6VGG-XHVH-38FF is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix GHSA-6VGG-XHVH-38FF? Upgrade
github.com/juev/nebula-meshto 0.3.2 or later.