GHSA-8QQM-FP2Q-V734

A wrong policy can be an open door.
You have to check input.attributes.request.http.truncated_body in your policy.

Description

Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-50197: an oversized declared-Content-Length body still hands OPA an empty parsed_body, so deny-on-presence Rego policies fail OPEN while the full payload reaches upstream.

The CVE-2026-50197 fix (commit 3152f3b0, PR #4041, v0.26.10) substituted expectedSize = maxBodyBytes
only when req.ContentLength < 0 (chunked / HTTP/2 without content-length). But when a request declares a
Content-Length larger than maxBodyBytes, expectedSize > maxBodyBytes, the body-extraction if is
skipped entirely, and ExtractHttpBodyOptionally returns rawBodyBytes = nil, so OPA evaluates an empty
parsed_body, while the full forbidden payload still flows to the upstream. A deny-on-presence policy
(default allow = true; allow = false if input.parsed_body.<forbidden>), the exact Rego shape the
advisory describes, fails OPEN. The fix's own comment reasons only about ContentLength == -1; the
oversized branch was never considered, and the added PoC test only covers small bodies.

Affected code

• filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go ExtractHttpBodyOptionally: the
  expectedSize <= maxBodyBytes gate lets an oversized declared body fall through to
  return req.Body, nil, func() {}, nil (OPA sees an empty document).
• Corroborated by Skipper's own unit test "Read body exhausting max bytes" ({ "welcome": "world" },
  maxBodySize: 5 → bodyInPolicy: "").

Steps to reproduce

See attached docker-compose.yml (official golang image) + setup.sh + exploit.sh, which run a real
Skipper proxy (proxytest) with a real OPA control plane (opasdktest),
WithMaxRequestBodyBytes(32), policy allow = false if input.parsed_body.action == "delete", route
* -> opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody("test") -> upstream:

• {"action":"delete"} (19B ≤ 32) → 403 (denied).
• {"action":"delete","pad":"X..64"} (> 32) → 200, upstream received the full body (BYPASS).
• small chunked {"action":"delete"} → 403 (positive control: the original CVE is fixed).

(Library-tier: validated via Skipper's real proxy test harness, not a deploy of the official image; benign
oracle = status diff + upstream-received body; no RCE.)

Mitigation

Document how policy owners should block requests with oversized body.

Example deny by default and use "allow if" no oversized body:

default allow := false

allow if {
    input.attributes.request.http.truncated_body == false
    # ... body-based conditions
}

Example allow by default and use "deny if" an oversized body:

default deny := false

deny if {
    input.attributes.request.http.truncated_body == true
    # ... body-based conditions
}

Documentation is published by https://github.com/zalando/skipper/releases/tag/v0.27.26

Credit

Reported as part of an incomplete-patch measurement study (responsible disclosure).