Summary
Vikunja: Assignee email addresses disclosed to read-only project members via the task assignees endpoint
TaskAssginee.ReadAll returns assignee user objects without blanking the Email field, disclosing assignee email addresses to any read-only project member. Every sibling path that returns user objects obfuscates the email; this one does not.
Details
pkg/models/task_assignees.go (~lines 306-344) does Select("users.*") and returns the result directly. User.Email is json:"email,omitempty", so a non-empty value always serializes. The endpoint gates on task.CanRead, so a read-only member passes. Sibling paths blank the field: pkg/models/tasks.go:530, pkg/models/project_users.go:216, pkg/models/teams.go:177, pkg/models/label_task.go:312, pkg/models/task_attachment.go:511. The omission here reads as an oversight, not a decision.
The same file's getRawTaskAssigneesForTasks (~line 56) also selects users.* but is safe because its only caller (addAssigneesToTasks) blanks the email afterwards.
PoC (verified at runtime against v2.5.0, v1 and v2)
GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}/assignees (reader with permission:0)
-> [{"id":37,"username":"...","email":"[email protected]", ...}]
Same leak on GET /api/v2/tasks/{id}/assignees (routes through the identical model method). Contrast: GET /api/v1/projects/{id}/projectusers and the project task-embed both return the same users with no email.
Impact
Disclosure of assignees' email addresses to users who should only see usernames. Read-only.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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Blank Email on each returned user in TaskAssginee.ReadAll before returning, matching the sibling paths. Covers v1 and v2 at once.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is GHSA-8WVG-R2J4-3737? GHSA-8WVG-R2J4-3737 is a medium-severity security vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api (go), affecting versions <= 2.5.0. It is fixed in 2.6.0.
- Which versions of code.vikunja.io/api are affected by GHSA-8WVG-R2J4-3737? code.vikunja.io/api (go) versions <= 2.5.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for GHSA-8WVG-R2J4-3737? Yes. GHSA-8WVG-R2J4-3737 is fixed in 2.6.0. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is GHSA-8WVG-R2J4-3737 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-8WVG-R2J4-3737 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether GHSA-8WVG-R2J4-3737 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix GHSA-8WVG-R2J4-3737? Upgrade
code.vikunja.io/apito 2.6.0 or later.