GHSA-HV6H-HC26-Q48P

A record user could read field values hidden from them by field-level SELECT permissions by reaching the records through a graph-edge (->) or back-reference (<~) traversal instead of a direct SELECT.

When a table was readable at the table level but carried a field hidden by a field-level permission (DEFINE FIELD secret ON knows PERMISSIONS FOR select NONE), a direct SELECT * FROM knows hid secret, but reaching the same records through a traversal that yields full objects, person:bob->(SELECT * FROM knows), person:bob<~(SELECT * FROM comment), or a projected target vertex ->knows->(SELECT * FROM person), returned it intact.

The root cause: the shared resolve_record_batch helper used by GraphEdgeScan (FullEdge) and ReferenceScan (FullRecord) enforced only the table-level SELECT permission and pushed raw record data, never running the field-level filtering (build_field_state / filter_fields_by_permission) that ordinary table scans and fetch_record apply.

Workarounds

• Force the unaffected legacy executor with --planner-strategy compute-only (env SURREAL_PLANNER_STRATEGY).
• Do not rely on field-level SELECT permissions to hide values on tables reachable as a graph edge, reference target, or traversal vertex; restrict at the table level instead.
• Use namespace / database isolation as the primary boundary where feasible.

References

• SurrealQL Documentation, DEFINE FIELD
• SurrealQL Documentation, DEFINE TABLE … PERMISSIONS
• SurrealQL Documentation, Graph relationships
• fix(exec): apply field-level SELECT permissions + computed fields when graph/reference traversals materialize full records

A record user can read the values of fields hidden by field-level SELECT permissions, on tables they already hold table-level SELECT on, by materialising the records through a graph-edge, back-reference, or target-vertex traversal, recovering the values directly, for every record the traversal returns.

The disclosure is confined to the field-permission layer: it grants no unauthorised cross-table, cross-record, or cross-namespace/database access. The table's own SELECT permission, including any row-level WHERE predicate, is still enforced, so the caller only reaches records they were already entitled to read; only the per-field SELECT filtering within those records is skipped. Root and record-owner sessions are unaffected, and data cannot be modified (confidentiality only).

Table-level enforcement on these traversals landed in 3.1.0 (the fix for GHSA-vjjx-rfw4-rmfc); releases before 3.1.0 additionally exposed whole records on tables the caller could not read, and are covered by that advisory.

The application does not correctly enforce access controls, allowing a principal to access resources or operations beyond their granted permissions. Typical impact: unauthorized data access or execution of privileged operations.

GHSA-HV6H-HC26-Q48P has a CVSS score of 4.3 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (3.1.5); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.

Kodem intelligence

resolve_record_batch (the shared helper that materialises full records for graph and reference traversals) now applies field-level SELECT permissions and read-time COMPUTED fields to each record, matching the regular table-scan and fetch_record paths.

Versions 3.1.5 and later are not affected.

1. What is GHSA-HV6H-HC26-Q48P? GHSA-HV6H-HC26-Q48P is a medium-severity incorrect authorization vulnerability in surrealdb (rust), affecting versions >= 3.1.0, < 3.1.5. It is fixed in 3.1.5. The application does not correctly enforce access controls, allowing a principal to access resources or operations beyond their granted permissions.
2. How severe is GHSA-HV6H-HC26-Q48P? GHSA-HV6H-HC26-Q48P has a CVSS score of 4.3 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
3. Which versions of surrealdb are affected by GHSA-HV6H-HC26-Q48P? surrealdb (rust) versions >= 3.1.0, < 3.1.5 is affected.
4. Is there a fix for GHSA-HV6H-HC26-Q48P? Yes. GHSA-HV6H-HC26-Q48P is fixed in 3.1.5. Upgrade to this version or later.
5. Is GHSA-HV6H-HC26-Q48P exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-HV6H-HC26-Q48P is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
6. What actually determines whether GHSA-HV6H-HC26-Q48P is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
7. How do I fix GHSA-HV6H-HC26-Q48P? Upgrade surrealdb to 3.1.5 or later.