Summary
Crossplane's TOCTOU between cosign verification and image fetch in xpkg.CachedClient allows tag-based package install to bypass signature check
Crossplane allows package signature verification to be configured via the ImageConfig mechanism. When enabled, the package manager uses cosign to verify that packages are correctly signed before pulling and installing them.
When a package is installed using a tag reference (e.g., a semantic version), a malicious OCI registry could serve a correctly signed image for verification, then subsequently serve an unsigned image for installation. This is possible because Crossplane resolves the tag reference separately for each step.
This vulnerability is relevant only for users who do all three of the following:
- Configure signature verification for packages,
- Install packages using tag references rather than digests, and
- Install packages from registries they do not control.
Mitigation
Installing packages by image digest rather than using tags avoids this issue.
Credits
This issue was reported, independently, by @bugbunny-research and @tonghuaroot.
Impact
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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The package manager has been updated to resolve tag references once and use the resulting digest for both signature verification and image fetching. This ensures that Crossplane pulls the same content that had its signature verified. The fix has been applied to Crossplane's main branch and backported to the v2.3 and v2.2 release branches; it will be released in v2.3.3 and v2.2.3.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is GHSA-MF7Q-R4RV-JV94? GHSA-MF7Q-R4RV-JV94 is a high-severity security vulnerability in github.com/crossplane/crossplane-runtime/v2 (go), affecting versions = 2.4.0-rc.0. It is fixed in 2.4.0-rc.1, 2.3.3.
- Which versions of github.com/crossplane/crossplane-runtime/v2 are affected by GHSA-MF7Q-R4RV-JV94? github.com/crossplane/crossplane-runtime/v2 (go) versions = 2.4.0-rc.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for GHSA-MF7Q-R4RV-JV94? Yes. GHSA-MF7Q-R4RV-JV94 is fixed in 2.4.0-rc.1, 2.3.3. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is GHSA-MF7Q-R4RV-JV94 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-MF7Q-R4RV-JV94 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether GHSA-MF7Q-R4RV-JV94 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix GHSA-MF7Q-R4RV-JV94?
- Upgrade
github.com/crossplane/crossplane-runtime/v2to 2.4.0-rc.1 or later - Upgrade
github.com/crossplane/crossplane-runtime/v2to 2.3.3 or later
- Upgrade