Summary
ArcadeDB has cross-database IDOR: /ts/, /batch/, Prometheus and Grafana handlers bypass authorization
About 14 HTTP handlers resolve the {database} path param and call getDatabase(...) WITHOUT user.canAccessToDatabase(...) and without setting the engine principal, because they extend AbstractServerHttpHandler directly instead of DatabaseAbstractHandler (which holds the only per-database gate at DatabaseAbstractHandler.java:69,88-90). Affected: PostBatchHandler:129, PostTimeSeriesWriteHandler:115, PostPrometheusWriteHandler:83, PostTimeSeriesQueryHandler:69, GetTimeSeriesLatestHandler:58, PostGrafanaQueryHandler:69, GetGrafanaHealthHandler:49, GetGrafanaMetadataHandler:52, GetPromQLQueryHandler:63, GetPromQLQueryRangeHandler:71, GetPromQLLabelsHandler:56, GetPromQLLabelValuesHandler:62, GetPromQLSeriesHandler:72, PostPrometheusReadHandler:85. The engine fallback is also void: LocalDatabase.checkPermissionsOnDatabase:711 early-returns when getCurrentUser()==null.
Exploit: a user authorized only for DB 'a' calls POST /api/v1/batch/b, POST /api/v1/ts/b/write, GET /api/v1/ts/b/prom/api/v1/query, POST /api/v1/ts/b/query -> full read AND write of DB 'b' (200 OK). The equivalent /api/v1/command/b correctly returns 403.
Fix: re-parent these handlers to DatabaseAbstractHandler, or add a shared resolveAuthorizedDatabase() choke point that enforces canAccessToDatabase and sets the engine principal before getDatabase(...). Fail closed when the security context is absent.
Impact
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
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Frequently Asked Questions
- What is GHSA-X8MG-6R4P-87PF? GHSA-X8MG-6R4P-87PF is a high-severity security vulnerability in com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server (maven), affecting versions < 26.7.2. It is fixed in 26.7.2.
- Which versions of com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server are affected by GHSA-X8MG-6R4P-87PF? com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server (maven) versions < 26.7.2 is affected.
- Is there a fix for GHSA-X8MG-6R4P-87PF? Yes. GHSA-X8MG-6R4P-87PF is fixed in 26.7.2. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is GHSA-X8MG-6R4P-87PF exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-X8MG-6R4P-87PF is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether GHSA-X8MG-6R4P-87PF is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix GHSA-X8MG-6R4P-87PF? Upgrade
com.arcadedb:arcadedb-serverto 26.7.2 or later.