Summary
Nginx UI: Authentication bypass: password login does not enforce a passkey-only second factor (2FA bypass)
nginx-ui supports two second-factor methods, TOTP (OTP) and WebAuthn passkeys ,
and reports an account as 2FA-enabled when either is configured. However, the
password login endpoint (POST /api/login) only enforces a second factor when a
TOTP secret is present. An account that has registered a passkey but no
TOTP is logged in after password verification alone, the passkey is never
requested. This silently downgrades a passkey-protected account to single-factor
(password-only) authentication.
Details
The account's 2FA policy treats passkeys as a valid factor (model/user.go):
func (u *User) EnabledOTP() bool { return len(u.OTPSecret) != 0 }
func (u *User) EnabledPasskey() bool { /* true if a passkey row exists */ }
func (u *User) Enabled2FA() bool { return u.EnabledOTP() || u.EnabledPasskey() }
func (u *User) AfterFind(_ *gorm.DB) error {
u.EnabledTwoFA = u.Enabled2FA() // exposed to the UI as `enabled_2fa`
return nil
}
But the login handler only checks EnabledOTP() (api/user/auth.go, Login):
u, err := user.Login(json.Name, json.Password)
...
if u.EnabledOTP() { // <-- only TOTP is enforced
if json.OTP == "" && json.RecoveryCode == "" {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, LoginResponse{Message: "The user has enabled 2FA", Code: Enabled2FA}) // 199
user.BanIP(clientIP)
return
}
if _, err = user.VerifyOTP(u, json.OTP, json.RecoveryCode); err != nil { /* ... */ }
secureSessionID = user.SetSecureSessionID(u.ID)
}
// Passkey-only accounts fall through to here and receive a full session token:
accessToken, err := user.GenerateJWT(u)
No branch requires a WebAuthn assertion during password login whenEnabledPasskey() is true. The root cause is the mismatch between the
policy definition (Enabled2FA() = OTP or passkey) and the
enforcement check (EnabledOTP() only).
The same EnabledOTP()-only gating in RequireSecureSession()
(internal/middleware/secure_session.go) means passkey-only users are also
exempted from step-up on sensitive actions.
Proof of Concept
Tested against nginx-ui built from source (go build -tags unembed) on127.0.0.1:9000, with WebAuthn configured and a victim account that has a
registered passkey and no TOTP. The vulnerable code is identical on the
production main branch (api/user/auth.go Login gates on u.EnabledOTP()
only; verified at commit 6c86e5a, 2026-05-17).
Account state advertised by GET /api/2fa_status:
{"enabled":true,"otp_status":false,"passkey_status":true, ...}
Attacker logs in with password only (POST /api/login, encrypted params as
the client normally sends):
HTTP 200
{"message":"ok","code":200,"token":"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...."}
code: 200 + a valid JWT = an authenticated session, with the passkey never
used. For comparison, the identical account with a TOTP secret instead correctly
returns the second-factor challenge:
HTTP 200
{"message":"The user has enabled 2FA","code":199}
| Account state | POST /api/login (password only) |
|---|---|
| Passkey registered, no TOTP | code 200 + JWT, 2FA NOT enforced |
| TOTP registered | code 199, 2FA challenge enforced |
This isolates the defect: the login path enforces OTP but ignores passkeys.
Affected components
api/user/auth.go,Loginmodel/user.go,EnabledOTP,EnabledPasskey,Enabled2FA,AfterFindapi/user/2fa.go,get2FAStatusinternal/middleware/secure_session.go,RequireSecureSession
Impact
- Any account protected only by a passkey is reduced to password-only
authentication. An attacker who obtains the password (phishing, reuse, leak)
gains full access despite the registered security key. - In nginx-ui all authenticated users are effectively administrators and the
terminal feature grants a host shell, so account takeover leads to full
control of the managed nginx instance / host. - Users are given a false sense of security: the UI shows the account as
2FA-enabled while the second factor is not enforced at login.
The application does not adequately verify the identity of a user, device, or process before granting access. Typical impact: unauthorized access to functions or data reserved for authenticated parties.
CVE-2026-107808 has a CVSS score of 8.1 (High). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
Already deployed Kodem?
See it in your environmentNew to Kodem? Get a demo →Remediation advice
- Gate the second-factor decision on
u.Enabled2FA()(notu.EnabledOTP()) inLogin, in both SSO callbacks, and inRequireSecureSession(). - For a passkey-only user logging in with a password, return a
"passkey assertion required" challenge and complete login only after a
successful WebAuthn assertion (thebegin_passkey_login/finish_passkey_login
flow already exists and should be required as the second step). - Centralize session-token issuance so no login entry point can skip the 2FA
decision.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-107808? CVE-2026-107808 is a high-severity improper authentication vulnerability in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI (go), affecting versions >= 1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1, < 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814. It is fixed in 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814. The application does not adequately verify the identity of a user, device, or process before granting access.
- How severe is CVE-2026-107808? CVE-2026-107808 has a CVSS score of 8.1 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI are affected by CVE-2026-107808? github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI (go) versions >= 1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1, < 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-107808? Yes. CVE-2026-107808 is fixed in 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-107808 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-107808 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-107808 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-107808? Upgrade
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UIto 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814 or later.