Summary
Central Dogma: SSH host-key verification permanently disabled in Git mirror (SshGitMirror)
Vulnerability
Central Dogma's Git mirror SSH client installs an Apache MINA SSHD ServerKeyVerifier lambda that returns true unconditionally for every outbound SSH connection used by git+ssh:// mirrors. The accompanying lines disable the known_hosts and ~/.ssh/config fallbacks, and a repo-wide search confirms that no host-key pinning mechanism (no acceptedHostKeys, knownHosts, KnownHostsServerKeyVerifier, StaticServerKeyVerifier, or RequiredServerKeyVerifier) exists anywhere in server-mirror-git/. Operators have no opt-in way to enable verification. Every outbound mirror connection blindly trusts whatever host key the remote presents.
Evidence
File: server-mirror-git/src/main/java/com/linecorp/centraldogma/server/internal/mirror/SshGitMirror.java
Lines 143-160 (especially 149) on branch main @ commit d64a5151:
private SshClient createSshClient() {
final ClientBuilder builder = ClientBuilder.builder();
// Do not use local file system.
builder.hostConfigEntryResolver(HostConfigEntryResolver.EMPTY); // line 146
builder.fileSystemFactory(NoneFileSystemFactory.INSTANCE); // line 147
// Do not verify the server key.
builder.serverKeyVerifier((clientSession, remoteAddress, serverKey) -> true); // line 149
...
}
Verification:
- Read confirmed on 2026-05-21 against
main@d64a5151. - A multi-agent code audit verified that no operator-facing pinning field exists on
SshKeyCredential,PasswordCredential, orMirrorContext. - Exploit PoC reproduced locally with a
paramiko-based fake SSH server bound to 127.0.0.1. The fake server presents an ephemeral RSA host key never seen before; the Central Dogma mirror client accepts the connection and proceeds to authentication, logging the offered username and public-key fingerprint. A correctly hardened SSH client would refuse the connection before reaching the authentication phase. - Full PoC artifacts (read-only, loopback-only) at
~/centraldogma-poc/C1_ssh_hostkey_bypass/on the reporter's workstation.
How to fix
- Add an
acceptedHostKeys: List<String>field toSshKeyCredentialandPasswordCredential(or toMirrorContext). Values are SHA-256 fingerprints of trusted remote SSH server host keys, e.g.SHA256:nThbg6kXUpJWGl7E1IGOCspRomTxdCARLviKw6E5SY8. - Replace the accept-all lambda at
SshGitMirror.java:149with a verifier that computes the SHA-256 fingerprint of the presented host key and compares it against the credential's allowlist using a constant-time comparison. - Refuse to connect when
acceptedHostKeysis empty, fail-closed. Do not implement implicit TOFU. - Optionally provide an admin-only
dogma mirror probe-host-key <remote>tool that performs a single audited connection, prints the server's fingerprint, and prompts the operator to add it to the credential. This makes TOFU an explicit, audited operation. - Update
SshGitMirrorTest.javaandit/mirror/*tests to pin a test fingerprint or use the explicit trust-once tool, so the regression cannot silently return.
Impact
Threat model: An on-path attacker on the corporate network, ARP spoofing on the LAN, internal DNS poisoning, malicious internal DNS overriding github.com or the configured internal git hostname, BGP hijack, sidecar/CNI compromise in Kubernetes, or any process able to answer TCP on the resolved IP. No Central Dogma account required; only network position.
- Direction
LOCAL_TO_REMOTE: the attacker impersonating the remote git server receives the entire mirrored repository contents over the SSH session. Central Dogma is a configuration store, so this typically exfiltrates DB credentials, third-party API keys, certificates, feature flags, and any other secret configuration committed to mirrored repositories. - Direction
REMOTE_TO_LOCAL: the attacker can serve arbitrary commits which Central Dogma materializes into the local repo and then broadcasts to every subscribing microservice via the watch API. This is a supply-chain root-of-trust compromise across all downstream services consuming Central Dogma configuration. - Credential theft chain with finding H2 (mirror credentials are not bound to a hostname): an SSH key or access token configured for
github.comcan be captured by the attacker's fake server and replayed against the real upstream, extending impact beyond Central Dogma itself.
Scope is Changed (CVSS) because exploitation alters trust assumptions of every downstream client of Central Dogma, not just Central Dogma itself.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
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Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-11745? CVE-2026-11745 is a high-severity security vulnerability in com.linecorp.centraldogma:centraldogma-server-mirror-git (maven), affecting versions < 0.84.0. It is fixed in 0.84.0.
- Which versions of com.linecorp.centraldogma:centraldogma-server-mirror-git are affected by CVE-2026-11745? com.linecorp.centraldogma:centraldogma-server-mirror-git (maven) versions < 0.84.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-11745? Yes. CVE-2026-11745 is fixed in 0.84.0. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-11745 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-11745 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-11745 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-11745? Upgrade
com.linecorp.centraldogma:centraldogma-server-mirror-gitto 0.84.0 or later.