CVE-2026-55524

The web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initial URL: it resolves the hostname once
with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results. It then passes the URL to
a fetcher that uses httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) - or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is
absent, which also follows redirects - and re-resolves the hostname at connect time, with no further
validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is bypassable two independent ways: HTTP redirects and
DNS rebinding.

Affected code: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py

• Single-shot validation (lines 229-238):
  if os.environ.get("ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL") != "true":
  ip_str = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) # resolved ONCE, at validation time
  ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
  if ip.is_loopback or ip.is_private or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast or ip.is_unspecified:
  continue # rejected
  
  url_list.append(u)
• Vulnerable fetch (_crawl_with_httpx, lines 142 / 149): follows redirects, re-resolves DNS, no re-check:
  with httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True, timeout=30.0) as client: response = client.get(url)fallback: urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=30) (also follows redirects by default)
• web_crawl / crawl_web are registered tools (tools/init.py:156-157); httpx is the default fallback
  provider (dispatch at web_crawl_tools.py:269).

The two bypasses:

1. Redirect: validation approves an attacker domain resolving to a public IP; attacker server replies
   302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/... (or any internal host); the fetcher follows it unchecked.
2. DNS rebinding (TOCTOU): validator's gethostbyname and fetcher's connect-time resolution are
   independent; a low-TTL attacker domain answers public to the validator and private/loopback to fetch.

Impact:
An agent with web_crawl - driven by direct input or indirect prompt injection - can be made to read
internal-only HTTP services and cloud instance-metadata endpoints (e.g. IAM credentials), with the
response body returned in the tool output. Scope is Changed because the request pivots into the
internal network.

Proof of concept:
A PoC drives the real web_crawl() (httpx absent -> genuine urllib fallback). It runs a loopback
"internal metadata" service and a loopback attacker redirector, substituting DNS only to stand in
for "attacker owns a public domain" / offline routing - the redirect-following and connect-time
re-resolution are the repo's own behavior. Observed:
CONTROL: web_crawl("http://127.0.0.1:.../meta-data/") -> blocked (validator works)
PoC 1A (redirect): attacker.example approved (public); 302 -> loopback metadata
-> result.content leaks {"AccessKeyId":"ASIA_FAKE_STOLEN_CREDENTIAL_..."}
PoC 1B (rebinding): gethostbyname(rebind.example)->public (allowed); connect->127.0.0.1
-> same secret leaked
The control proves the validator blocks a direct loopback request, so the bypasses are genuine.

Remediation:
Resolve the hostname once, validate that IP, and connect to that exact validated IP (pin it) rather
than re-resolving. Disable redirect following (follow_redirects=False; for urllib use a redirect
handler that re-validates), or re-validate every redirect hop's resolved IP. Apply the deny check to
both the validator and the actual socket target. file_tools.py:364 already uses follow_redirects=False
and is the correct pattern to propagate.

Distinct from prior advisories:
The accepted SSRF advisories concern host-string parsing in different code, alternate loopback
encodings in spider_tools (GHSA-5c6w-wwfq-7qqm) and the CLI @url feature (GHSA-5cxw-77wg-jrf3). This
is in the web_crawl tool, which neither advisory names, and the mechanisms (redirect-following and DNS
rebinding) differ categorically from host-string encoding; the spider_tools _host_is_blocked hardening
does not apply to this tool.