Summary
SiYuan: MCP file tool's blocklist is incomplete relative to the HTTP file API it claims to align with, exposing publish-mode passwords and other sensitive workspace files
kernel/mcp/tools/file.go's resolvePath() includes an explicit comment stating its
sensitive-path blocklist is meant to align with the HTTP file API's established blacklist
(refuseToAccess() in kernel/api/file.go), following the remediation for GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8
("Unauthenticated Administrator takeover exfiltrated via the MCP"), which specifically
recommended restricting this tool's scope. In practice, the MCP tool implements only 1 of the
4 static blocklist entries the HTTP API enforces.
Comparison
kernel/api/file.go refuseToAccess() blocks:
conf/conf.json(API token, cookie signing key, accessAuthCode)data/snippets/conf.json- the entire
data/templatesdirectory data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json- (dynamic, per-request) any path the current publish-mode session isn't authorized for
kernel/mcp/tools/file.go resolvePath() blocks only:
confPath := filepath.Join(util.ConfDir, "conf.json")
if abs == confPath {
return "", fmt.Errorf("access to conf.json is forbidden")
}
Items 2, 3, and 4 are absent. The tool's own list/read/grep/find actions remain fully
functional against them.
Why this is a distinct finding, not a duplicate
GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8 was about reachability an unauthenticated Reader-tier JWT being forwarded
to admin-scoped paths including /mcp. That has been fixed. This report is about the tool's own
scope once reached by a legitimate, properly-authenticated caller, the remediation notes for
that same advisory explicitly called for restricting resolvePath toWorkspaceDir/temp/siyuan/*.log, which was not implemented; instead the tool retains
workspace-wide scope with only a single-file blocklist addition.
Impact
An MCP client with access to the file tool (post-fix for GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8, i.e. a properly
authenticated Administrator-level caller) can read data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json directly:
type PublishAccessItem struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Visible bool `json:"visible"`
Password string `json:"password"` // plaintext; empty string = no password
Disable bool `json:"disable"`
}
This exposes the plaintext access password for every publish-mode-shared notebook/document,
letting the reader bypass password protection on any publish-mode share. This is a serious
sibling issue given the volume of publish-mode access-control bugs already reported against this
codebase, the passwords protecting exactly that feature are directly readable through a tool
whose own description says "never use for workspace data."
data/templates and data/snippets/conf.json are lower-severity but still inconsistent with
the HTTP API's own precedent for what counts as sensitive.
The application does not correctly enforce access controls, allowing a principal to access resources or operations beyond their granted permissions. Typical impact: unauthorized data access or execution of privileged operations.
CVE-2026-60083 has a CVSS score of 4.9 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, high privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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See it in your environmentNew to Kodem? Get a demo →Remediation advice
Either replicate the full refuseToAccess() blocklist in resolvePath() (minimum fix, keeps
parity with the HTTP API going forward by extracting refuseToAccess's path list into a shared
helper both call), or implement the originally-recommended allowlist restricting the tool toWorkspaceDir/temp/siyuan/*.log for read and disabling write/delete/rename/copy entirely unless
the caller is Administrator, matching the tool's own advertised "debugging/log reading only"
scope.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-60083? CVE-2026-60083 is a medium-severity incorrect authorization vulnerability in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel (go), affecting versions < 0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f. It is fixed in 0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f. The application does not correctly enforce access controls, allowing a principal to access resources or operations beyond their granted permissions.
- How severe is CVE-2026-60083? CVE-2026-60083 has a CVSS score of 4.9 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel are affected by CVE-2026-60083? github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel (go) versions < 0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-60083? Yes. CVE-2026-60083 is fixed in 0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-60083 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-60083 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-60083 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-60083? Upgrade
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernelto 0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f or later.