CVE-2026-62204

installBazaarPlugin (and the equivalent endpoints for widgets/icons/templates/themes) accept
packageName, repoURL, and repoHash as independent request fields with no validation that
they refer to the same package. packageName alone determines the install destination;
repoURL/repoHash alone determine what content gets downloaded and written there. A request
can name an already-installed, already-enabled plugin as packageName while pointing repoURL/
repoHash at different, attacker-influenced content, silently overwriting the existing plugin's
files.

Affected code

kernel/api/bazaar.go:

util.BindJsonArg("packageName", &packageName, true, true)
util.BindJsonArg("repoURL", &repoURL, true, true)
util.BindJsonArg("repoHash", &repoHash, true, true)
err := model.InstallBazaarPackage("plugins", repoURL, repoHash, packageName, 0)

kernel/model/bazaar.go:

func getPackageInstallPath(pkgType, packageName string) (string, string, error) {
    case "plugins":
        return filepath.Join(util.DataDir, "plugins", packageName), "plugin.json", nil

kernel/bazaar/install.go:

func installPackage(data []byte, installPath string) (err error) {
    ...
    if err = filelock.Copy(srcPath, installPath); err != nil { return }
    return
}

installPath is derived solely from packageName; the downloaded data is derived solely from
repoURL/repoHash; nothing cross-validates them, and installPackage performs no check for
whether installPath already contains an existing package before copying into it. The same
pattern applies to the widget/icon/template/theme install endpoints, which share
getPackageInstallPath.

This does not involve path traversal, installPath always resolves inside
DataDir/plugins/ (or the corresponding directory for other package types), so this is not an
instance of "arbitrary file write outside the workspace path" (excluded by this project's
SECURITY.md). The issue is that the write lands in the wrong, existing location within the
intended directory, not outside it, an authorization/identity-verification gap, not a path
traversal.

Reachability / why this is not trivially remote

The bazaar endpoints are gated by model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly.
When no lock-screen password is configured (the common desktop default), CheckAuth still
enforces a same-origin check:

if !localhost || ... || ("" != origin && !util.IsLocalOrigin(origin)) || ... {
    // reject with 401
}

I verified IsLocalOrigin/IsLocalHostname correctly parse the Origin header via url.Parse
and check exact hostname / loopback IP:

func IsLocalOrigin(origin string) bool {
    if u, err := url.Parse(origin); err == nil {
        return IsLocalHostname(u.Hostname())
    }
    return false
}
func IsLocalHostname(hostname string) bool {
    if "localhost" == hostname || strings.HasSuffix(hostname, ".localhost") {
        return true
    }
    if ip := net.ParseIP(hostname); nil != ip {
        return ip.IsLoopback()
    }
    return false
}

This was tested against common bypass patterns (subdomain-suffix tricks like
localhost.attacker.com, and Origin: null as sent by sandboxed iframes) and found no bypass ,
this is a correctly-implemented check. This means a purely remote attacker (e.g. a malicious
website) cannot invoke this endpoint via CSRF; a request must originate from SiYuan's own
renderer origin.

Realistic impact

Given SiYuan runs as an Electron app with nodeIntegration: true (per prior advisories in this
repository), a same-origin script-execution primitive (e.g. an XSS bug in the renderer, of which
several have been fixed in this repository recently) is typically already sufficient for direct
code execution. This bug's marginal value is persistence: a transient XSS-driven compromise
can use this endpoint to overwrite an existing, trusted, already-enabled plugin's index.js,
converting a one-time compromise into code that runs on every future launch of the application,
surviving after the original XSS vector is closed.

The overwrite does not effect immediately, via this specific
endpoint. PushReloadPlugin (the websocket event that triggers frontend hot-reload without
restart) is only called from the batch-update path (InstallBazaarPackages, used by
batchUpdatePackage), which explicitly checks if petal != nil && petal.Enabled before forcing
a reload via SetPetalEnabled. The single-package install endpoint (installBazaarPlugin) does
not call PushReloadPlugin at all, it only pushes a generic success toast. So an overwrite via
this endpoint activates on the next app restart or manual plugin toggle, rather than instantly
still a realistic and frequent event for a desktop application, but not an instant hot-reload.

Verification notes

Confirmed via static source review of kernel/api/bazaar.go, kernel/model/bazaar.go,
kernel/bazaar/install.go, kernel/model/session.go (CheckAuth), kernel/util/net.go
(IsLocalOrigin/IsLocalHostname), and kernel/model/push_reload.go /
app/src/plugin/loader.ts (reload trigger wiring). I do not have a running SiYuan instance
in this environment to execute an end-to-end proof of concept; findings are based on tracing
the actual, unmodified control flow across these files rather than assumption.