Summary
xmldom PI grammar regex ReDoS: quadratic backtracking on unterminated processing instructions
@xmldom/xmldom's processing-instruction (PI) grammar regex exhibits quadratic-time backtracking
(ReDoS) when parsing an unterminated processing instruction. A single small XML document
containing <? + a target + a long run of whitespace and no closing ?> forces the regular
expression engine into O(n²) work, stalling the Node.js event loop. The input is parsed withDOMParser.parseFromString under default options, so it is reachable from unauthenticated,
network-delivered XML (SOAP/SAML, webhooks, uploads, XML APIs).
Details
The PI production in lib/grammar.js compiles (flags mu) to:
^<\?(NameChars)(?:[\x20\x09\x0D\x0A]+([Char]*?))?\?>
^^^ S+ greedy ^^^ Char*? lazy
lib/grammar.jsline 261: https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/grammar.js#L261
In the optional tail (?:S+(Char*?))?, both the greedy separator S+ and the lazy data Char*?
match XML whitespace. When the required trailing ?> is absent, the engine must ultimately fail ,
but first it tries every partition of the whitespace run between S+ and Char*?, which is O(n²)
in the length of the trailing whitespace.
The regex is executed against the entire remaining source string in two places in lib/sax.js,
so the whole whitespace tail is scanned:
parsePI, https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/sax.js#L680-L691parseProcessingInstruction, https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/sax.js#L862-L879
Affected Versions
Only the 0.9.x line is affected. lib/grammar.js (and this PI regex) was introduced in
commit 726b471 ("fix!: preserve DOCTYPE internal subset (#498)"), first released in
0.9.0-beta.9, and is unchanged through 0.9.10.
The 0.8.x line (≤ 0.8.13) and the unscoped xmldom package (≤ 0.6.0) parse PIs via a different
code path bounded by indexOf('?>'), they do not contain this regex and are not affected
by this issue. (They were not separately tested for a different PI ReDoS; the scope here is the
specific grammar.js regex.)
| Line | PI code path | Affected? |
|---|---|---|
0.9.x (0.9.0-beta.9 … 0.9.10) |
grammar.js PI regex over full remaining source |
Yes |
0.8.x (≤ 0.8.13) |
parseInstruction, bounded by indexOf('?>') |
No |
unscoped xmldom (≤ 0.6.0) |
older indexOf('?>')-bounded parsing |
No |
Proof of Concept
const { DOMParser } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');
const n = 32 * 1024;
const payload = '<a><?p' + ' '.repeat(n); // unterminated PI, no `?>`
console.time('parse');
new DOMParser().parseFromString(payload, 'text/xml');
console.timeEnd('parse');
Measured (Node 18), trailing whitespace after <?p, no ?>, time quadruples per doubling of
input length (canonical O(n²)):
| Trailing whitespace | g.PI.exec |
parseFromString |
|---|---|---|
| 2 KB | 4.4 ms | 5.1 ms |
| 4 KB | 16.9 ms | 17.0 ms |
| 8 KB | 111.4 ms | 66.3 ms |
| 16 KB | 263.8 ms | 336.5 ms |
| 32 KB | 1073.1 ms | , |
Fix Applied
Fixed in @xmldom/xmldom 0.9.11 (0.9.x-only; the 0.8.x LTS line and the
unscoped xmldom package use a different, bounded PI code path and are not affected).
PR #1039 inserts a fixed-width negative lookahead(?!\s) immediately after the greedy S+, so the separator can no longer hand whitespace back to
the lazy data group:
- var PI = reg(/^<\?/, '(', Name, ')', regg(S, '(', Char, '*?)'), '?', /\?>/);
+ var PI = reg(/^<\?/, '(', Name, ')', regg(S, '(?!', _SChar, ')(', Char, '*?)'), '?', /\?>/);
The change is correct, minimal, and behavior-preserving: it produces identical [target, data]
captures on all valid PIs tested (incl. whitespace-heavy, tab/newline, empty-data, and xml-decl
cases) and removes the backtracking blow-up (linear, ~0.4 ms at 128 KB after the fix). The lookahead
is fixed-width and cannot itself backtrack, a strict improvement with no new parsing risk.
Severity note
The complexity is quadratic, not exponential, so a multi-second stall requires
tens-to-hundreds of KB of input. VA:H reflects that xmldom applies no input-size limit and the
path runs on default-options parsing, so a single unbounded parse can fully stall the event loop.
Impact
Availability only: a single parse of a small crafted document blocks the Node.js event loop for the
duration of the quadratic scan (≈1 s at 32 KB; multi-second with larger inputs). No memory blow-up,
no data exposure, no integrity impact. Because XML is routinely accepted from untrusted sources and
parsed with default options, one request can stall a server.
Crafted input forces the application to consume excessive CPU, memory, or other resources, degrading or denying service. Typical impact: denial of service.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
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Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-83606? CVE-2026-83606 is a high-severity uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in @xmldom/xmldom (npm), affecting versions >= 0.9.0-beta.9, <= 0.9.10. It is fixed in 0.9.11. Crafted input forces the application to consume excessive CPU, memory, or other resources, degrading or denying service.
- Which versions of @xmldom/xmldom are affected by CVE-2026-83606? @xmldom/xmldom (npm) versions >= 0.9.0-beta.9, <= 0.9.10 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-83606? Yes. CVE-2026-83606 is fixed in 0.9.11. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-83606 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-83606 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-83606 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-83606? Upgrade
@xmldom/xmldomto 0.9.11 or later.