GHSA-3CM4-CCVW-6XR6

SiYuan: /history/path and /repo/diff/path potentially exposing historical snapshots of data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json and data/templates/*

ginServer.GET("/history/*path", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, func(context *gin.Context) {
    p := filepath.Join(util.HistoryDir, context.Param("path"))
    // 加密笔记本的历史是密文（.sy/assets/AV），需先解密再输出
    if serveEncryptedHistory(context, p) {
        return
    }
    secureAssetContentHeaders(context, p, p)
    http.ServeFile(context.Writer, context.Request, p)
})

ginServer.GET("/repo/diff/*path", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, func(context *gin.Context) {
    requestPath := filepath.Clean(context.Param("path"))
    if strings.Contains(requestPath, "..") {
        context.Status(http.StatusUnauthorized)
        return
    }
    ...
    p := filepath.Join(repoDiffBaseDir, requestPath)
    if !gulu.File.IsSubPath(repoDiffBaseDir, p) {
        context.Status(http.StatusUnauthorized)
        return
    }
    http.ServeFile(context.Writer, context.Request, p)
})

// 禁止访问 data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json（含发布模式明文访问密码）
publishAccessPath := NormalizeAndResolve(filepath.Join(DataDir, ".siyuan", "publishAccess.json"))
if fileNorm == publishAccessPath {
    return true
}

// 禁止访问 data/templates 目录（含目录本身及其全部子路径）
templatesBase := NormalizeAndResolve(filepath.Join(DataDir, "templates"))
if fileNorm == templatesBase || gulu.File.IsSubPath(templatesBase, fileNorm) {
    return true
}

An admin-authenticated request to either route can potentially retrieve
a historical copy of data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json (disclosing a
plaintext publish-mode password even after it has been changed or the
live file has been protected) or a data/templates/* file, directly
undermining the protection GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34 was written four days
prior to this review specifically to provide, via two routes that
predate that fix and were not updated alongside it.

## Affected products

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | **Go** |
| Package name | `github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel` |
| Affected versions | Present as of commit `251596f` (2026-08-12, the version this review confirmed), i.e. postdates and was not covered by the `GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34` fix (commit `3542530`, 2026-08-08) |
| Patched versions | *(none yet, leave blank until a fix is released)* |

## Severity

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vector string | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:M/I:N/A:N` |
| Score | **~5.9 (Medium)**, `PR:H` since admin authentication is required at the HTTP layer, confidentiality impact scoped to whatever sensitive historical content happens to exist in the tracked snapshots for a given deployment (a real but deployment-dependent condition, honestly reflected as Medium rather than assumed to always be present), no integrity/availability impact since both are read-only. |

## Weaknesses (CWE)

- **CWE-862**: Missing Authorization (primary)
- **CWE-200**: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

## Notes for filing
- Direct, narrow follow-up to `GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34`; recommend
  referencing that advisory directly when filing, since this is
  precisely the "sibling caller missed" pattern that fix's own
  centralization (moving the check into a shared `util` function) was
  presumably intended to prevent, just for two callers that existed
  before the shared function did and weren't migrated to it.
- Suggested fix: add `if util.IsForbiddenAbsPath(p) { ... reject ... }`
  to both handlers, matching the pattern already applied in
  `kernel/api/file.go` and `kernel/mcp/tools/file.go`.

The application does not perform an authorization check before performing a sensitive operation. Typical impact: unauthorized access to restricted functionality or data.

GHSA-3CM4-CCVW-6XR6 has a CVSS score of 4.9 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, high privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (0.0.0-20260816034002-035bf9a8c311); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.

Kodem intelligence

Already deployed Kodem?

1. What is GHSA-3CM4-CCVW-6XR6? GHSA-3CM4-CCVW-6XR6 is a medium-severity missing authorization vulnerability in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel (go), affecting versions < 0.0.0-20260816034002-035bf9a8c311. It is fixed in 0.0.0-20260816034002-035bf9a8c311. The application does not perform an authorization check before performing a sensitive operation.
2. How severe is GHSA-3CM4-CCVW-6XR6? GHSA-3CM4-CCVW-6XR6 has a CVSS score of 4.9 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
3. Which versions of github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel are affected by GHSA-3CM4-CCVW-6XR6? github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel (go) versions < 0.0.0-20260816034002-035bf9a8c311 is affected.
4. Is there a fix for GHSA-3CM4-CCVW-6XR6? Yes. GHSA-3CM4-CCVW-6XR6 is fixed in 0.0.0-20260816034002-035bf9a8c311. Upgrade to this version or later.
5. Is GHSA-3CM4-CCVW-6XR6 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-3CM4-CCVW-6XR6 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
6. What actually determines whether GHSA-3CM4-CCVW-6XR6 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
7. How do I fix GHSA-3CM4-CCVW-6XR6? Upgrade github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel to 0.0.0-20260816034002-035bf9a8c311 or later.

Other vulnerabilities in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel