Summary
GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository
Affected: GitPython 3.1.61 (latest release) and main, git/objects/submodule/base.py. git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty, so both are identical here.
The gap
The fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc added Submodule._validated_name() and wired it into update() and five siblings, closing the .gitmodules name → .git/modules/<name> traversal. The other attacker-controlled .gitmodules field, path, is read raw:
# git/objects/submodule/base.py:172-177
def _set_cache_(self, attr):
if attr in ("path", "_url", "_branch_path"):
reader = self.config_reader()
self.path = reader.get("path") # raw .gitmodules value
and GitPython's own containment guard is applied in only two of the places that consume it:
400: def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo, path) # the guard (abspath + commonpath containment)
542: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path) # add() , guarded
1041: module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path) # move(), guarded
update() validates only the name and then uses the path-derived absolute location directly:
788: self._validated_name(self.name) # NAME only
801: checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath # derived from self.path, unguarded
821: os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)
So path = ../../../tmp/escaped in an attacker-authored .gitmodules selects the directory that gets created and, on the clone path, populated from the submodule URL. The same absolute location is what force_remove hands to shutil.rmtree.
The asymmetry is the argument: this is not a missing concept, the project wrote _to_relative_path() precisely for this, and add()/move() use it. update() does not.
Honest limits (please read before rating)
- The most common flow is not affected.
Repo.clone_from(...)→repo.submodules→sm.update(init=True)re-derivespathfrom a canonical tree lookup, and real git refuses to check out a tree containing a..component, so an evil.gitmodulesnever lands in the working tree in the first place. A reachable trigger therefore requires the victim's code to name a non-HEAD commit (a historical-commit API such assubmodule_update(previous_commit=...)). - The researcher did not build that end-to-end trigger. The researcher only verified first-hand the code above: the guard's two call sites, the name-only validation in
update(), and the unguardedabspath→os.makedirs()flow at 3.1.61 ==main.
Prior art checked
GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc (this is a residual of its fix, in the sibling field, not a re-report) plus the repository's 30 published advisories, none mentions the path field or _to_relative_path. Searched issues and PRs for _to_relative_path, gitmodules path and submodule traversal: no report of this.
Credit
kta1kri.
Appendix, EVIDENCE_gitpython_path_unguarded_20260901.txt (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)
=== EVIDENCE: GitPython, the .gitmodules 'path' field reaches os.makedirs()/clone unguarded ===
Mon Aug 31 18:45:22 UTC 2026
--- artifact: tag 3.1.61 (latest release); git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty ---
--- the containment guard GitPython owns, and its only two call sites ---
33: _to_relative_path,
400: def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo: "Repo", path: PathLike) -> PathLike:
407: path = _to_relative_path(parent_repo.working_tree_dir, path)
542: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)
1041: module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)
--- the parent fix (_validated_name) call sites: it validates the NAME ---
309: def _validated_name(cls, name: str) -> str:
321: name = cls._validated_name(name)
541: cls._validated_name(name)
788: self._validated_name(self.name)
1040: self._validated_name(self.name)
1181: self._validated_name(self.name)
1439: self._validated_name(self.name)
1440: self._validated_name(new_name)
1489: self._validated_name(self.name)
--- update(): name validated, path not; abspath -> os.makedirs ---
try:
self._validated_name(self.name)
# ENSURE REPO IS PRESENT AND UP-TO-DATE
# END early abort if init is not allowed
checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath
module_abspath = self._module_abspath(self.repo, self.path, self.name)
# ``git submodule deinit`` leaves the repository in
# ``.git/modules`` and empties the checkout. Reconnect that retained
# repository instead of trying to clone over it.
if not dry_run and osp.isdir(module_abspath):
try:
git.Repo(module_abspath)
except InvalidGitRepositoryError:
pass
else:
if osp.lexists(checkout_module_abspath) and (
osp.islink(checkout_module_abspath)
or not osp.isdir(checkout_module_abspath)
or os.listdir(checkout_module_abspath)
):
raise OSError(
"Module directory at %r does already exist and is non-empty" % checkout_module_abspath
)
os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)
self._write_git_file_and_module_config(checkout_module_abspath, module_abspath)
mrepo = git.Repo(checkout_module_abspath)
--- where self.path comes from (raw .gitmodules value) ---
def _set_cache_(self, attr: str) -> None:
if attr in ("path", "_url", "_branch_path"):
reader: SectionConstraint = self.config_reader()
# Default submodule values.
try:
self.path = reader.get("path")
except cp.NoSectionError as e:
Impact
Input manipulates file paths to reach files outside the intended directory, such as configuration or credential files. Typical impact: unauthorized file read or write outside the intended directory.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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Apply the guard the project already has, wherever the path is consumed:
# in update(), before deriving abspath (and in any other consumer of self.path):
checkout_rel = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, self.path) # raises if it escapes the working tree
Better still, validate at the boundary: reject a .gitmodules entry whose path is absolute or contains a .. component when the section is first read in _set_cache_()/iter_items(), so no consumer can be added later without the check. A regression test with path = ../escaped alongside the existing name test would pin both fields.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is GHSA-59CR-6R3X-644W? GHSA-59CR-6R3X-644W is a medium-severity path traversal vulnerability in GitPython (pip), affecting versions <= 3.1.61. It is fixed in 3.1.62. Input manipulates file paths to reach files outside the intended directory, such as configuration or credential files.
- Which versions of GitPython are affected by GHSA-59CR-6R3X-644W? GitPython (pip) versions <= 3.1.61 is affected.
- Is there a fix for GHSA-59CR-6R3X-644W? Yes. GHSA-59CR-6R3X-644W is fixed in 3.1.62. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is GHSA-59CR-6R3X-644W exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-59CR-6R3X-644W is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether GHSA-59CR-6R3X-644W is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix GHSA-59CR-6R3X-644W? Upgrade
GitPythonto 3.1.62 or later.