GHSA-PC2W-4MQ8-32QW

GHSA-PC2W-4MQ8-32QW is a low-severity missing authorization vulnerability in @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server (npm), affecting versions < 1.8.7. It is fixed in 1.8.7.

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Runtime intelligence, not another scanner.

Summary

@dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server's createdynatracenotebook missing the human-approval gate

A missing human-approval gate on the create_dynatrace_notebook tool allows a caller to create persistent tenant-visible documents containing arbitrary content (including embedded DQL that other users execute when opening the notebook) without operator consent.

Details

dynatrace-mcp-server registers six write tools: send_slack_message, send_email, send_event, create_workflow_for_notification, make_workflow_public, and create_dynatrace_notebook. Five of these call requestHumanApproval() before executing the side-effect, which elicits the operator's explicit consent through the MCP elicitation protocol. The CHANGELOG explicitly states these approval gates were added "to ensure user consent and prevent unintended actions."

create_dynatrace_notebook does not call requestHumanApproval(). The tool was introduced in a separate release from the approval-gate retrofit and was left ungated. As a result, a caller can create persistent, tenant-visible Dynatrace notebooks containing arbitrary content with no operator confirmation. Notebooks can include embedded DQL queries that later execute under the permissions of any tenant user who opens them.

The vulnerable code is in src/index.ts, lines 1563-1601:

tool(
  'create_dynatrace_notebook',
  'Create Dynatrace Notebook',
  'Create a new notebook in the Dynatrace platform ...',
  {
    name: z.string().describe(/* ... */),
    description: z.string().optional().describe(/* ... */),
    content: z.array(z.object({
      type: z.enum(['dql', 'markdown']),
      text: z.string(),
    })).describe(/* ... */),
  },
  {
    readOnlyHint: false,
  },
  async ({ name, content, description }) => {
    const dtClient = await createAuthenticatedHttpClient(allRequiredScopes);
    const data = await createDynatraceNotebook(dtClient, name, content, description);
    // No requestHumanApproval() call.
    // No destructiveHint annotation.
    // Scopes requested are allRequiredScopes (the broadest possible set)
    // even though only document:documents:write is needed.

    return data
      ? `Document created successfully: ${dtEnvironment}/ui/apps/dynatrace.notebooks/notebook/${data.id}`
      : 'document creation failed';
  },
);

By comparison, every other write tool calls requestHumanApproval() as its first action:

  • send_email (line 1274): const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);
  • send_slack_message (line 652): const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);
  • send_event (line 1367): const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);
  • create_workflow_for_notification (line 1069): const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);
  • make_workflow_public (line 1118): const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);

PoC

Tested end-to-end against a real Dynatrace tenant. The MCP server was started in HTTP mode with the operator's Platform Token:

export DT_ENVIRONMENT=https://<tenant>.apps.dynatrace.com
export DT_PLATFORM_TOKEN=dt0s16....
npx -y @dynatrace-oss/[email protected] --http --port 3000

A single unauthenticated POST from a process with no Dynatrace credentials of its own:

curl -sS http://127.0.0.1:3000/ \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
  -d '{
    "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/call",
    "params": {
      "name": "create_dynatrace_notebook",
      "arguments": {
        "name": "Unapproved notebook",
        "description": "Created without operator approval.",
        "content": [
          {"type": "markdown", "text": "# This notebook was created without approval"},
          {"type": "dql",      "text": "fetch logs | limit 10"}
        ]
      }
    }
  }'

The response:

event: message
data: {"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"Document created successfully:
       https://<tenant>.apps.dynatrace.com/ui/apps/dynatrace.notebooks/notebook/<uuid>"}]},
       "jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1}

The notebook is visible in the operator's Notebooks app within seconds. No elicitation prompt was sent to any operator client.

By contrast, the same harness invoking send_email or send_slack_message returns:

"Operation cancelled: Human approval was not granted for sending this email."

The gate logic exists and is wired up for all other write tools - it is simply missing on create_dynatrace_notebook.

Impact

  • A caller (an unauthenticated network attacker over the HTTP transport when authentication is missing, or a prompt-injected LLM in stdio mode) can silently create persistent tenant-visible documents.
  • The notebook content is attacker-controlled. Embedded DQL queries execute under the permissions of any tenant user who later opens the notebook - a stored-DQL pattern that crosses identity boundaries within the tenant.

The application does not perform an authorization check before performing a sensitive operation. Typical impact: unauthorized access to restricted functionality or data.

GHSA-PC2W-4MQ8-32QW has a CVSS score of 3.7 (Low). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (1.8.7); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.

Affected versions

@dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server (< 1.8.7)

Security releases

@dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server → 1.8.7 (npm)

Kodem intelligence

Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.

Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.

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Remediation advice

Upgrade @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server to 1.8.7 or later to resolve this vulnerability.

Kodem Kai can prioritize this vulnerability in your dependency tree and generate a fix recommendation.

Frequently Asked Questions

  1. What is GHSA-PC2W-4MQ8-32QW? GHSA-PC2W-4MQ8-32QW is a low-severity missing authorization vulnerability in @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server (npm), affecting versions < 1.8.7. It is fixed in 1.8.7. The application does not perform an authorization check before performing a sensitive operation.
  2. How severe is GHSA-PC2W-4MQ8-32QW? GHSA-PC2W-4MQ8-32QW has a CVSS score of 3.7 (Low). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
  3. Which versions of @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server are affected by GHSA-PC2W-4MQ8-32QW? @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server (npm) versions < 1.8.7 is affected.
  4. Is there a fix for GHSA-PC2W-4MQ8-32QW? Yes. GHSA-PC2W-4MQ8-32QW is fixed in 1.8.7. Upgrade to this version or later.
  5. Is GHSA-PC2W-4MQ8-32QW exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-PC2W-4MQ8-32QW is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
  6. What actually determines whether GHSA-PC2W-4MQ8-32QW is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
  7. How do I fix GHSA-PC2W-4MQ8-32QW? Upgrade @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server to 1.8.7 or later.

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