Summary
@dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server has a DQL injection via parameters not documented as DQL
A DQL injection vulnerability in several read tools lets a caller bypass the tools' documented field-scope, time-window, and display caps by injecting DQL pipeline stages through parameters typed as identifiers.
Details
Several tools interpolate caller-supplied parameters directly into DQL query strings without quoting or escaping. The affected parameters are documented in their Zod schemas as identifiers or constrained shorthand (such as "24h" timeframe values or Kubernetes UIDs) - not as DQL expressions. The interpolation lets a caller break out of string literals, append arbitrary DQL pipeline stages, and use // line comments (documented in the Dynatrace DQL language reference) to discard the rest of the intended query.
The marginal-privilege ceiling is low because the operator's token also exposes execute_dql with full DQL access. What the injection grants is the ability to bypass the affected tools' contract: the readOnlyHint: true annotation that MCP clients may treat as a signal to auto-approve, the per-tool field selection (e.g., | fields id, name, type), the display caps (maxProblemsToDisplay, maxVulnerabilitiesToDisplay, maxEntitiesToDisplay), and the time-window bounds.
The vulnerable interpolations are:
| File | Line | Parameter | Interpolation |
|---|---|---|---|
src/capabilities/find-monitored-entity-by-name.ts |
23 | entityNames[] |
`fetch ${entityType} | search "*${entityNames.join('*" OR "*')}*" | fieldsAdd entity.type | expand tags` |
src/capabilities/find-monitored-entity-by-name.ts |
41 | entityNames[] |
`smartscapeNodes "*" | search "*${entityNames.join('*" OR "*')}*" | fields id, name, type` |
src/capabilities/list-problems.ts |
27 | timeframe |
`fetch dt.davis.problems, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` |
src/capabilities/list-vulnerabilities.ts |
19 | timeframe |
`fetch security.events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` |
src/capabilities/list-exceptions.ts |
11 | timeframe |
`fetch user.events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` |
src/capabilities/get-events-for-cluster.ts |
20 | timeframe |
`fetch events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` |
src/capabilities/get-events-for-cluster.ts |
27 | clusterId, kubernetesEntityId |
`| filter k8s.cluster.uid == "${clusterId}" or dt.entity.kubernetes_cluster == "${kubernetesEntityId}"` |
All Zod schemas for these parameters use z.string() or z.array(z.string()) with no pattern validation.
PoC
clusterId - quote-and-comment break-out. With clusterId = 'x" or 1==1 //' the constructed query becomes:
| filter k8s.cluster.uid == "x" or 1==1 //" or dt.entity.kubernetes_cluster == ""
The first " closes the string literal, or 1==1 neutralises the filter to match every row, and // discards the rest of the line including the kubernetesEntityId guard.
entityNames - pipeline-stage injection. With entityNames = ['svc" | fields id, name, tags //'] the constructed smartscape query becomes:
smartscapeNodes "*" | search "*svc" | fields id, name, tags //*" | fields id, name, type
After the // line comment, the effective query is smartscapeNodes "*" | search "*svc" | fields id, name, tags. The original | fields id, name, type stage is suppressed and replaced with the attacker's field selection - the tool returns whatever field set the attacker requests (including ones not in the tool's documented output contract).
timeframe - prefix injection. With timeframe = '30d, to: now() | fieldsAdd internal_secret //' the list-problems query becomes:
fetch dt.davis.problems, from: now()-30d, to: now() | fieldsAdd internal_secret //, to: now()
| filter isNull(dt.davis.is_duplicate) OR not(dt.davis.is_duplicate)
...
A new pipeline stage is injected before the tool's intended | filter, and the rest of the query is commented out.
The server's own verify_dql tool can be used to confirm any specific injection payload parses as valid DQL.
Impact
- A caller (typically via prompt injection of an LLM that has access to the affected tools) can bypass the tools' field-scope, time-window, and display caps.
- The affected tools are annotated
readOnlyHint: true, which some MCP clients treat as a signal to auto-approve. The injection turns a "safe" read tool into an arbitrary-DQL surface. - No new data access beyond what
execute_dqlalready provides - the marginal impact is the auto-approval pathway and the broken tool contract, not privilege escalation.
GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7 has a CVSS score of 4.3 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and user interaction required. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (2.1.1); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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Frequently Asked Questions
- What is GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7? GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7 is a medium-severity security vulnerability in @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server (npm), affecting versions < 2.1.1. It is fixed in 2.1.1.
- How severe is GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7? GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7 has a CVSS score of 4.3 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server are affected by GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7? @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server (npm) versions < 2.1.1 is affected.
- Is there a fix for GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7? Yes. GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7 is fixed in 2.1.1. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7? Upgrade
@dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-serverto 2.1.1 or later.