GHSA-Q683-8468-R6H6

WebauthnAuthenticator leaks sensitive HTTP headers through INFO-level logs

Affected versions

Every release prior to 5.3.4 is affected.

Workarounds

Until the upgrade is applied, projects can:

1. Raise the minimum log level for the WebAuthn authenticator above INFO so these two log records are not emitted in production.
2. Configure their Monolog processor/formatter to strip the request key from the context of these records before they are written.

Credit

Reported by Kay Joosten (Dawn Technology), maintainer of Stepup-Webauthn.

Webauthn\Bundle\Security\Http\Authenticator\WebauthnAuthenticator logs the full Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request object inside the log context of both onAuthenticationSuccess() and onAuthenticationFailure() at INFO level:

$this->logger->info('User has been authenticated successfully with Webauthn.', [
    'request' => $request,
    'firewallName' => $firewallName,
    'identifier' => $token->getUserIdentifier(),
]);

$this->logger->info('Webauthn authentication request failed.', [
    'request' => $request,
    'exception' => $exception,
]);

Request::__toString() returns the raw HTTP message, including every request header. As soon as the configured logger normalises or stringifies the context (default behaviour for LineFormatter, JsonFormatter via NormalizerFormatter, etc.), sensitive headers such as Cookie (session identifier), Authorization and any custom auth header are written to the log stream in clear text.

Applications that forward logs to centralised platforms (ELK, Splunk, Datadog and similar) are particularly exposed: log access is typically broader than application access, which can allow log readers to hijack authenticated sessions.

Kodem intelligence

Already deployed Kodem?

The fix removes the full Request object from the log context and keeps only non-sensitive fields (request path, method, firewall name, user identifier). It is shipped in 5.3.4. Older branches will not receive a backport; users on those branches should upgrade to 5.3.4+ or apply one of the workarounds below.

1. What is GHSA-Q683-8468-R6H6? GHSA-Q683-8468-R6H6 is a medium-severity security vulnerability in web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle (composer), affecting versions < 5.3.4. It is fixed in 5.3.4.
2. Which versions of web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle are affected by GHSA-Q683-8468-R6H6? web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle (composer) versions < 5.3.4 is affected.
3. Is there a fix for GHSA-Q683-8468-R6H6? Yes. GHSA-Q683-8468-R6H6 is fixed in 5.3.4. Upgrade to this version or later.
4. Is GHSA-Q683-8468-R6H6 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-Q683-8468-R6H6 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
5. What actually determines whether GHSA-Q683-8468-R6H6 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
6. How do I fix GHSA-Q683-8468-R6H6? Upgrade web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle to 5.3.4 or later.

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